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Although H. P. Blavatsky (1831-1891), co-founder of the Theosophical Society, has featured 
prominently in histories of Western esotericism, her engagement with late nineteenth-century 
comparative religion has not been appreciated. This thesis offers the first sustained analysis 
of H. P. Blavatsky’s theosophical comparative religion. Despite the fact that one of the 
original goals of the Theosophical Society was advancing comparative religion, H. P. 
Blavatsky has been excluded from standard accounts of the field. This thesis draws on a 
range of theoretical resources—Richard Rorty’s pragmatic theory of knowledge, Alun 
Munslow’s analysis of narrative in history, Thomas Gieryn’s critique of boundary-making in 
science, and Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison’s history of objectivity—to argue for the 
inclusion of H. P. Blavatsky in the history of comparative religion. Substantial chapters 
analyse H. P. Blavatsky’s major works, from Isis Unveiled (1877) to The Secret Doctrine 
(1888), to uncover the theoretical template that she developed for analysing religion and 
comparing religions. The thesis highlights H. P. Blavatsky’s interpretative strategies in 
fashioning a theosophical comparative religion. In developing a comparative religion, H. P. 
Blavatsky referred to leading figures in the emerging field of the academic study of religion, 
such as F. Max Müller, E. B. Tylor, and Herbert Spencer, in positioning her theosophical 
comparative religion in the context of late nineteenth-century production of knowledge about 
religion and religions. This thesis demonstrates that H. P. Blavatsky’s comparative religion 
was reasoned, literary, rhetorical, coherent, and strategic. By analysing H. P. Blavatsky’s 
theoretical work on religion and religions in its late nineteenth-century context, this thesis 
contributes to the ongoing project of broadening our understanding of the complex and 
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION      
 
1) PREFACE 
This study examines the writings of Helena Petrovna Blavatsky as an exercise in comparative 
religion in the late nineteenth century. Its primary component will be an exploration of the 
nature and content of her comparative enterprise. This exploration identifies textual links to a 
selection of actors in the broader field of comparative religion and provides insight into the 
nature of the field in the nineteenth century and the boundary-marking mechanisms and 
assumptions which excluded Blavatsky from it. My focus is on the scientific debates of the 
nineteenth century, though other issues are implied, for example, class and gender 
distinctions as they relate to knowledge production and cultural acceptance. Through a 
process of re-description I will remove Blavatsky’s work from the margins of current and 
past research in the field, both of which reflect essentialist assumptions, and situate her as a 
legitimate student of religion having justifiable insights worthy of recognition in mainstream 
thought. In conversation with criticisms aimed at the early founders of the field, her research 
and work in comparative religion will prove to be as insightful as those lauded contributors to 
the field. This journey will include a broad review of the origins of the field of comparative 
religion in the late nineteenth century in the light of recent theories in various academic fields 
which aim to root out essentialist thought patterns inherited from the past. 
Potential entry points are many, but a statement from Blavatsky’s first major work, Isis 
Unveiled (1877), brings to the fore many of the issues examined in this study. She writes, 
“Such are the glimpses which anthropology affords us of men, either arrived at the bottom of 
a cycle or starting in a new one. Let us see how far they are corroborated by clairvoyant 
psychometry” (1988a, vol. I, 295). For the sake of this thesis I collapse into one category 
séance phenomena, spiritualistic phenomena, and the occult sciences. While these do have 
different histories and trajectories, they offered a similar broad challenge to materialistic 
positions of the nineteenth century. In the extract above, Blavatsky addressed the nineteenth 
century, and a number of questions present themselves. What voice is speaking? Who is the 
intended audience? What conditions of knowledge allow for the seamless shift from 
anthropology to psychometry? Is it irrational, ignorant, a stubborn survival, or are other 
factors at play? What are the implied sources of authority (cultural, scientific, political, and 
intellectual)? What power struggles of the past, the results of which underpin our most 
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pervasive and hidden assumptions, are here alluded to? And lastly, what conditions our 
personal response to the statement? The passage hints at the boundary labour of the past and 
present, and evokes any number of binaries which require attention, including: 
science/pseudo-science, scholar/amateur, rational/irrational, science/religion, 
knowledge/faith, and objectivity/subjectivity. The essentialist and dualistic nature of binary 
constructions have been directly challenged since the 1970s, and the complicated 
repercussions of this activity have wide-ranging implications. 
The rationale behind this work is to offer a new perspective on the origins of comparative 
religion emerging in the late nineteenth century. This formative period in the field of 
comparative religion will be reassessed through the work of a forgotten actor, Helena 
Petrovna Blavatsky (1831-1891), co-founder of the Theosophical Society. The historical 
influence of the Theosophical Society in the areas of Western esotericism and the New Age 
has been noted by many scholars (Godwin 1994; Hanegraaff 1998; Hammer 2004; Goodrick-
Clarke 2008). I will, however, argue that Blavatsky participated in the more mainstream 
concerns related to comparative religion in her time and that she should not be excluded from 
the histories of this field.1 Nor should her contribution be confined or solely linked to any 
imagined esoteric current of thought. This re-contextualising of her work will reveal the 
contested nature of various knowledge claims in the nineteenth century. Recent studies in the 
field of comparative religion reflect a qualified acknowledgement of Blavatsky’s interpretive 
enterprise (Chidester 2014, 257-86; Scott 2016, 177-206; Viswanathan 2016, 185-200). 
These studies uncritically presume a mark that Theosophical thought failed to meet. This 
standard, however, reflects a century and a half of decisions, debates, methodological 
assumptions, power struggles, inclusions, and exclusions which, in the light of pragmatic 
trends in contemporary scholarship, are open to reassessment. 
I will argue that Blavatsky’s Theosophical statement is a work of comparative religion 
itself—a statement that is more often read as a body of doctrines or teachings. The aim of this 
study is to recover Blavatsky’s enterprise in comparative religion, a consequence of which 
would be her inclusion in histories of the broader field. Through a re-orientation of 
perspective, a re-description, a new narrative will emerge. My critique is directed not at the 
various historical theories of religion from the nineteenth century; rather, it is directed at the 
                                                          
1 Though not uncontested, the field of comparative religion is often dated to the 1870s with the work of Max 




standard histories of this period and at the boundary work that occurred during that period. A 
new history will not replace existing narratives but will, instead, add a new gaze from which 
the field can be reviewed. A sensitively contextualised reading of Blavatsky’s works and a re-
evaluation of the assumptions inherent in the field of comparative religion are the chief 
methods required to accomplish this task. 
 
2) LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature survey encompasses the scope of this thesis, which is the history of 
comparative religion, the academic field of Western esotericism and its engagement with 
Blavatsky, and the scholarship of the Theosophical Society as they each pertain to 
Blavatsky’s enterprise in comparative religion. A broad mapping of the academic literature 
will show an initial period of boundary-marking in the late nineteenth century, during which 
period Blavatsky’s work was rejected. This was followed by long period of silence, marked 
by the absence of any engagement with Theosophy. In the 1980s and 1990s Theosophy 
becomes a topic of academic study under the emerging field of Western esotericism, with 
primarily peripheral or incidental reference to Blavatsky’s comparative religion. Theosophy 
tentatively re-enters the field of comparative religion in 2014 with Chidester’s Empire of 
Religion, and has subsequently become increasingly recognized. 
 
2.1) History of Comparative Religion 
The history of comparative religion has been outlined in a number of standard works.  These 
include Jan de Vries’s Perspectives in the History of Religions (1977), Eric J. Sharpe’s 
Comparative Religion (1986), J. Samuel Preus’s Explaining Religion (1987), Walter H. 
Capps’s Religious Studies (1995), and Ivan Strenski’s Thinking about Religion (2006). 
Sharpe makes a brief and insubstantial mention of the Theosophical Society and comparative 
religion in his work, but this work is not sufficiently historicist (1986, 256). Some of these 
studies have pragmatic (that is to say anti-essentialist and historicist) intentions, though none 
show any serious intention to re-read the past in the light of these methodological tools and 
insert excluded participants. Strenski, as a notable example, is concerned with the 
justificatory background of early theories and theorists of religion (2006, 3-4). His focus, 
however, on the usual actors, such as F. Max Müller, E. B. Tylor, James G. Frazer, William 
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Robertson Smith, and others, leave the inherited history of the field un-rehabilitated. 
Indicative of the period of absence are Jordan’s early Comparative Religion: Its Genesis and 
Growth (1905) and Carpenter’s Comparative Religion (1913) that make no reference to 
Blavatsky or Theosophy. 
Current theoretical perspectives available to scholars have yet to have their full potential 
realised in terms of undoing the inherited narratives of the past. Tomoko Masuzawa, referring 
to nineteenth-century comparative theology (a precursor to comparative religion) and the 
paucity of women writers in the field, manages to refer to the Theosophist Annie Besant in a 
footnote and notes, “Her [Besant’s] treatises, however, are written from an expressly 
Theosophical point of view, which make them rather atypical” (2005, 75). That she is unable, 
or unwilling, to mention Blavatsky, a woman and surely Besant’s equal, suggests an 
uncritical acceptance of past discourses of the field. The description as “atypical” simply 
preserves and perpetuates the inherited prejudices of the past. David Chidester in his Empire 
of Religion (2014) has written Theosophy back into the field of nineteenth-century 
comparative religion. For Chidester, Theosophical comparative religion is anti-Christian, 
based on secretism, resembles/mimics/shadows critical scholarship, and is based on occultist 
premises. Its authenticity is based on an esoteric wisdom tradition and secret teachings of the 
East. This reading, however, retains a residual hierarchical structuring which privileges 
existing mainstream comparative religion narratives. I argue that a more charitable historical 
contextualising of Blavatsky’s efforts will render untenable such privileging. More recently, 
J. Barton Scott’s Spiritual Despots: Modern Hinduism and the Genealogies of Self-Rule 
(2016) and Gauri Viswanathan’s chapter on Blavatsky in Religious Dynamics under the 
Impact of Imperialism and Colonialism: A Sourcebook (2016) show increasing awareness of 
the Theosophical interpretive endeavour. This unfolding trajectory calls for a review of the 
initial period of boundary work. 
The above studies refer primarily to histories of comparative religion. I adopt a pragmatic and 
narrative theoretical base, and in terms of methodological perspectives in the field I locate 
myself within existing movements. An example of a narrative reflection on religion is Gavin 
Flood’s Beyond Phenomenology: Rethinking the Study of Religion (1999), where he discusses 
the value of contextual readings of the past and of religion as narrative. I will discuss my own 
theoretical grounding in Richard Rorty’s pragmatism, with its narrative implications, later in 
this chapter. In some ways my work will rest uneasily within Flood’s thesis. He has oriented 
himself within the results of the boundary disputes of the nineteenth century. For example, his 
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use of terms such as “science,”“theology,” and “metaphysical” is problematic. One can 
witness his position when referring to the truth claims of traditions or religions where he can 
note that his internal coherence theory is premised on “the contention that the central 
doctrinal claims of religions are not empirical claims, at least in the late twentieth century” 
(Flood 1999, 171). I am working within a period, the late nineteenth century, in which the 
provinces of these terms are up for negotiation, and wherein Theosophy certainly made 
empirical claims. My own contribution is not a methodological overhaul of theories of 
religion. These theories, like my own work, are historically situated. My contribution is the 
application of Rortyan pragmatic insights to a particular historical period, the late nineteenth 
century, and to a specific marginalised actor, H. P. Blavatsky. My work, then, is part of the 
undoing of the past as currently premised in the present state of the field. 
To level the field I could move in two potential directions. I could read all enterprises in 
comparative religion in the late nineteenth century ironically, or, I could read them all as 
serious attempts to produce knowledge. Practically, that means I could either critique (or 
reflect critiques of) existing nineteenth-century scholars and read Blavatsky’s work in a 
similar judgmental light, or, I could “elevate” the writings of Blavatsky to the status of 
justifiable. As an example of what I mean, the following is a recent assessment of Max 
Müller’s mythological comparisons, 
This was Müller’s lack of a stringent method, for despite his recurrent appeals to the 
force of irrefutable etymological correspondences, the reconstructions which he 
proposed more often than not had a shaky linguistic basis, consisting to a large extent 
of associative flights of fancy based on a highly eclectic use of the evidence and a 
specifically romantic view of religion. (Maier 2012, 503) 
Not a ringing endorsement of the founder of a field. The question is: Must H. P. Blavatsky 
“raise her game” to meet this nineteenth-century standard, or, are the familiar actors to be 
“reduced” to her level? Or, perhaps, certain types of valuing are best forgotten. The broad 
point I make here is that with the re-evaluation of early theorists in the light of contemporary 
perspectives one would anticipate a corresponding review of forgotten and marginalised 





2.2) Academic Studies of Theosophy 
Studies of Theosophy and the Theosophical Society are broadly located in the academic field 
of Western esotericism. The studies of Bruce Campbell, Joscelyn Godwin, Wouter J. 
Hanegraaff, Olav Hammer, Antoine Faivre, Kocku von Stuckrad, Garry. W. Trompf, Egil 
Asprem, James A. Santucci, Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, Robert Ellwood, and others are well-
known. Primarily, incidental mention of Blavatsky’s comparative religion is evident, though, 
some studies, such as Hammer’s Claiming Knowledge, present a deeper engagement with her 
interpretive methods. Existing scholarship, however, reflects a number of general points 
which require to be engaged. 
In this study I assess the work of Blavatsky alone. I am not examining her contemporary or 
later Theosophists, nor am I reviewing movements often associated with the Theosophical 
Society, such as the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn or the Hermetic Brotherhood of 
Luxor. I do not seek an overarching definition of “esotericism,” Western or otherwise. 
Blavatsky did adopt the designation of “esotericist” and “occultist,” however, the use of these 
terms does not necessarily mean that she slotted herself into larger narratives hatched in the 
academic environment of the 1990s to the present. Bergunder illustrates this issue in what is 
one of the most useful studies on the definition of “esotericism” available. Discussing 
esotericism as an empty signifier and an identity marker he states that, “Esotericism as an 
identity positioning has its place in a religious discourse field” [my italics] (2010, 25).  In the 
period I am discussing the bounds between religion and science, as well as other discourses, 
is under negotiation, not given.2 
We might ask ourselves: If Theosophy is positioned as an esoteric discourse, and is involved 
in comparative religion, is there an esoteric comparative religion? Does it have any 
hermeneutic power to generate such a category? Two problems arise. The first is to define 
what “esoteric” means in this context. Given the ongoing definitional debates, and the notion 
that definitions are purpose specific, it is not clear how this definitional problem will be 
overcome, or, if overcome, will not be self-fulfilling.3 Secondly, it appears that much of this 
defining may be running afoul of Davidson’s third dogma of empiricism – the scheme-
content binary. There is only one world, and we are all living in it and responding to it 
(Davidson 1973-1974; Davidson 1989; Ramberg 1989, 38-48; Rorty 1999, 33). Davidson 
                                                          
2 The “conflict thesis” between religion and science in the nineteenth century has been under revision for 
some time. 
3 See Bergunder (2010) for an outline of problems surrounding attempts to define esotericism. 
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shows that there is no scheme which cannot be made sense of, that is, there are no 
incommensurable schemes. There is, in fact, no scheme-content division at all. The debates, 
therefore, inevitably move toward justificatory assessments which require broad historical 
contextualising. Put slightly differently, could H. P. Blavatsky be existing in a different 
linguistic community from, for example, Tylor, Max Müller, or Tyndall? Is she using an 
incommensurable vocabulary which reflects some alternate rationality? Or, was she very 
much speaking the language and reflecting the underlying rationality of the larger society? I 
suggest that there is no edifying methodological reason to read Theosophical comparative 
religion out of the history of comparative religion. As such, the space in which Theosophy is 
contextualised becomes important. This is not an idle question if we compare Godwin’s The 
Theosophical Enlightenment with Chidester’s Empire of Religion. Chidester can locate 
Theosophical efforts within the field of comparative religion, while Godwin has 
contextualised Theosophy in the esoteric and occult currents from the eighteenth century 
onwards. I will cut across previous readings of Theosophy by centring my study on the works 
of H. P. Blavatsky and by focusing on her enterprise in comparative religion. 
If we regard Blavatsky’s Theosophy as a unit, a sentence, we can ask: in what “language” is 
it to be located? What is the larger contextualising whole which will give meaning to the 
Theosophical statement? I move here to invoke a semantic or meaning holism in the study of 
religion. The answer to the question, of course, is the late nineteenth century in its entirety, 
not just peripheral movements, trends, and fields within it. Typological and historically based 
theories are typically proposed in the academic field of Western esotericism, and 
Theosophical thought is usually subsumed into one of these approaches (Hanegraaff 2006, 
337-8). One concern with current, broader narratives is that they relegate specific 
movements, in this case Theosophy, to a unit place in a larger diachronic discourse. This 
“colours” the unit, which becomes problematic when the narratives are not sufficiently 
synchronically informed and situated. Naturally, I am arguing that existing narrative 
placements have inadequately contextualised the writings of Blavatsky in their synchronic 
environment. 
It is my position that a careful synchronic assessment of her work in the light of current 
research and methodologies should be the starting point. A synchronic stance emphasises the 
explanatory value of a holistic perspective, which I will stress throughout this study. The 
narrative in this instance is the synchronic field of actors and events. This still leaves the 
question of which synchronic fields she should be located in and against. There is also the 
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question as to when a synchronic period begins and ends. These are issues to be worked out 
through processes of negotiation and experiment. From my perspective this is best 
approached through her works and the fields therein referenced, including the various 
contemporary sciences, spiritualism, history, philosophy, religion, and the “occult sciences”.4 
These references reveal the issues which concerned her and with which she, along with many 
late nineteenth-century actors, engaged. I will examine her works as honest, literary, 
rhetorical, argumentative, rational, and reasoned responses to the issues of the day. The issues 
themselves will be drawn from her works. Foucault refers to a “useless erudition” which he 
restates as “subjugated knowledges” (1980, 79, 81). I want to emphasise the “knowledge” 
half of this term. My larger aim is to read H. P. Blavatsky’s perspectives as equal to “non-
subjugated” knowledge. I suspect that the continuing attempts to define “esotericism” 
functions, in part, to keep separate certain chosen discourses.5 I am, however, deliberately 
making no grand claims as to where all “esoteric” movements should be placed. I am dealing, 
instead, specifically with the Theosophy of H. P. Blavatsky as it relates to comparative 
religion. It is my argument that the Theosophical work of Blavatsky is not to be solely 
located in esoteric streams, but rather she is to be read as a participant in the mainstream 
debates of the day, drawing justifiable conclusions from the information available. Her 
intellectual links to more mainstream positions have been undervalued and under-researched 
thus far. 
A further concern is that current perspectives on Theosophy perpetuate inherited opinions of 
the past. An example of this can be found in Olav Hammer’s Claiming Knowledge (2004). 
The shortcomings of a work like this are outlined in Massimo Introvigne’s review of 
Hammer’s text (2014).6 Hammer’s normative work combines in one theoretical frame 
participants as diverse as H. P. Blavatsky, Rupert Sheldrake, and Shirley MacLaine. For him, 
they share one important characteristic: they are “claiming knowledge” to which they have no 
entitlement. Hammer, of course, seems to feel that he has made no such error. His critical 
skills have insulated him from the lesser minds which he studies. His master narrative, 
                                                          
4 One need only review the bibliographies of Isis Unveiled and The Secret Doctrine to note that her interests 
were not confined to occult or esoteric sources. 
5 See Asprem (2014, 7-11), where he makes this very point in relation to academic boundary work and 
Western esotericism as it struggles to become an acceptable subject. Ironically this is virtually the opposite 
movement from that in late nineteenth century when mainstream sciences were conducting the boundary 
work. 
6 This is not to say the work has no value, and it has made many interesting observations on specific traditions 
and practices. It is the universalising scope and the assumption that “esotericists” are over “there” doing 
something us “scholars” over here would never do that I find problematic. 
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however, collapses under the weight of its own details. It is simply not convincing for every 
person he mentions, historically spanning at least 150 years, to be subsumed into one 
overarching theory or trajectory. As scholars unpack the specific details of individual actors 
his smoothing assumptions will be revealed. As an example of this I have extracted his 
statements on the lost continent of Lemuria, which became an important part of Blavatsky’s 
speculation in the Secret Doctrine. Referencing “esoteric” uses, he mentions Lemuria in 
relation to Reiki, Rudolf Steiner, Edgar Cayce, and Theosophy. I review here only his 
statements as they pertain to Theosophy. For Hammer, Theosophy is “constructing” an 
historical tradition which elements are loosely, Lemuria, Atlantis, Egypt and India (2004, 54). 
Lemuria and Atlantis are “imaginary utopias” with imaginary civilizations (2004, 99). Then, 
on pages 100-101, he discusses the origin of the idea of Lemuria, which is to be found in the 
mainstream sciences with Ernst Haeckel and Philip L. Sclater. Here is the important 
sentiment, Hammer continues, “Every position within the Esoteric Tradition has had its own 
idea of what aspects of science were interesting. Each position has also had its own cultural 
context from which to draw ideas and inspiration. Lemuria was a legitimate and interesting 
biological theory during the 1880s, when Blavatsky appropriated the idea for her own 
purposes” (2004, 260). A “legitimate and interesting biological theory during the 1880s”—
could this phrase hint at a new context for Blavatsky’s works? What were the legitimate 
speculations of science around lost continents in the late nineteenth century? What logical 
inferences could be made from various scientific positions? And, which coherent conclusions 
could be drawn from the scientific speculations of the day? Is it possible that she fell within 
the limits of such speculation? I would argue that, in the light of Ramaswamy’s The Lost 
Land of Lemuria (2004, 53-96), it is possible to read Blavatsky on Lemuria in just this 
manner. A proper assessment of Blavatsky would require a more detailed synchronic study 
and a separation of her work from the diachronic development of the Theosophical tradition 
after her. This is not to argue that everything she proposed would have already been said by 
any particular scientist, and she certainly inhabits the “vanishing points” of science. I will 
argue that the sciences of the late nineteenth century were considerably more internally 
diverse than often presented, and still in the process of being negotiated into what we now 
accept as their current normative forms. Blavatsky’s works represent one woven narrative of 
the ideas and resources available in the late nineteenth century. 
In his recent work, Esotericism and the Academy (2013), Wouter Hanegraaff tracks the 
elements of Western esotericism from late antiquity to the present. He works to identify the 
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various currents and positionings which form the foundation of contemporary esotericism 
stances. In this work he has little specific to say about H. P. Blavatsky and Theosophy. He 
makes reference to the accusations of plagiarism against her, and evaluates her enterprise in 
comparative religion as “idiosyncratic” (2013, 243, 273).7 It is unclear what he means by 
idiosyncratic, which has two senses – “peculiar” or “individual”. It seems unlikely he means 
“individual,” as he links her work to that of Emma Hardinge Britten, and if he actually meant 
“individual” it would be superfluous as surely every person’s work is their own. The general 
sense of Hanegraaff’s work suggests he has “peculiar” in mind. What, however, does he 
mean by this? The range of potential meanings in English is wide – from pejorative 
associations to laudatory ones. I suspect he has pejorative associations in mind. For an 
entirely different view on the virtues of idiosyncrasy, and one which I endorse, one could 
review Richard Rorty’s Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1993, 24, 33, 197). Here the 
idiosyncratic individual is the strong poet, the self-creator, living life in the best way possible. 
Idiosyncratic ideas in turn can become domesticated if accepted by society, or ridiculed if 
rejected by later reviewers. This reveals a weakness of Hanegraaff’s historiography. His 
attempt to accurately “mirror” debates of the past is, firstly, impossible, and, secondly, 
functions to reify, reproduce, and perpetuate categories read into and from the past. Mirroring 
without interpreting is, in practical and theoretical terms, not possible as all history telling has 
a narrative quality involving selection and rejection. I will pursue this theme later in this 
chapter with a discussion of Richard Rorty and Alun Munslow. 
Hanegraaff’s reliance on a methodological agnosticism was signalled in his well-known 
article, “Empirical Method in the Study of Esotericism” (1995). Reading his section on the 
“reductionism” versus the “empirical option,” a few challenges are revealed. Firstly, he 
projects current divisions of physical versus metaphysical into the past. The late nineteenth 
century was a period of negotiation of these categories. Secondly, it does not allow him to 
distinguish between what a person is saying as opposed to what they are doing by making a 
particular claim. For example, if an “esotericist” were to make a claim to knowledge through 
mystical gnosis, Hanegraaff neither contextualises the claim in terms of justifiability, nor can 
he assess what it means to make such a claim in a particular place at a particular time. It is 
true that H. P. Blavatsky’s thoughts were peripheral in the late nineteenth century, but on 
what basis is that valuing to be continued into the present? The work of most late nineteenth-
                                                          
7 More recently Gauri Viswanathan can refer to H. P. Blavatsky as “first and foremost a theorist of religion,” 
though still making use of “idiosyncratic” methods (2016, 173). Jason Ā. Josephson-Storm similarly refers to 
the Theosophical Society’s “idiosyncratic concepts in a range of domains” (2017, 120). 
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century theorists of comparative religion have been decentred in the field. If her work is 
idiosyncratic, we ask, in relation to what norm? No nineteenth-century scholar of religion has 
had their work uncritically accepted in the current field. Criticisms of, for example, Max 
Müller, are well-known, but others too have not escaped critique. Chidester, for example, can 
argue that Tylor’s animism is not a reliable entry point into the study of religion. It is too 
enmeshed in the political and colonial activities of the time (Chidester 2005, 81). Hanegraaff, 
I suggest, has accepted the categorisations of the past, a natural function of his methodology 
perhaps, but one which is insufficiently revisionist and can say little about the subject at 
hand.  
Hanegraaff’s work is also insufficiently synchronic in terms of the span of positions available 
in the sciences in the late nineteenth century. It essentialises various late nineteenth-century 
fields of knowledge, which inevitably reinforces his argument for exclusion and rejection. 
His work, in short, is as theory laden as any other approach and subject to the same criticisms 
(Otto 2013, 234, 236). In the case of Blavatsky, Hanegraaff is insufficiently revisionist and 
this leaves him unable to challenge the assumptions of the past (Pasi 2013, 204, 209-10). To 
reverse my point, if Western esotericism is simply a “waste basket” of rejected knowledge, 
which is potentially filled with a wide variety of unconnected positions united only by the 
fact of their rejection (i.e. no substance uniting them), then we must revisit the nature of the 
“monolithic rejector” (Hammer 2013, 245). What entity, identity, cultural standpoint, is in a 
position to reject a wide variety of discourses and remain unitary itself? This thesis 
challenges value positions of the past so that a more representative picture can emerge. 
This type of academic activity is related to another—the selective application of theoretical 
tools. By accepting categorisations of the past, current scholars see historical material in 
different ways. For example, H. P. Blavatsky’s comparative religion is somehow wanting, 
while Tylor’s or Max Müller’s were noble efforts of the field. This negative valuing and 
separating out of categories is reinforced by the selective use of contemporary theory. An 
article which illustrates this is Andrew Dawson’s “East is East, Except when it’s West” 
(2006). Dawson is critiquing the “Easternization thesis” where it had been argued that the 
West had begun appropriating Eastern concepts, teachings, philosophies, and practices, to the 
excising of Western habits. Drawing on Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, Dawson suggests that 
the “western gaze” essentially seeks itself. He notes, “I conclude that irrespective of their 
exotic appearance and despite the subjective intentions of adherents and practitioners, the 
Eastern concepts and practices that are increasingly common in the West actually do little 
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more than refract the modern Western habitus back on to itself” (2006, 10). Examples of 
Western endeavours (and individuals) guilty of this include, 
“Blavatsky,”“Steiner,”“Gurdjieff,” and late nineteenth- and twentieth-century esoteric and 
new age movements (2006, 2). This gaze, we must assume, is deeply rooted in the orientation 
of individuals, below the level of conscious action, despite what Dawson notes in the quote 
below. These characteristics guide the individuals to seek what they recognize and can 
therefore more easily appropriate. He writes,  
Such appropriation, however, was neither wholesale nor uncritical, but comprised a 
self-conscious and selective remodelling of Eastern themes along lines determined by 
existing esoteric/theosophical preoccupations (Hanegraaff: 471-72). Referring to late-
twentieth century appropriations as part of his own critique of the “Easternization 
thesis,” Hamilton notes that in “many instances the form in which Eastern religions 
have influenced the West is...significantly modified to suit Western circumstances or 
in accordance with the specific interests or prejudices of Western scholars (247).” [3] 
Although Hanegraaff, Hammer, and Hamilton do well to note the qualified 
appropriation of eastern themes by late-nineteenth and twentieth century esoteric and 
new age movements respectively, they do not identify the hermeneutical dynamics 
that have informed this process of selective appropriation. (2006, 2) 
Every insight and shortcoming listed above could surely be applied to E. B. Tylor, Max 
Müller, Andrew Lang, and any number of scholars of religion. Is it possible that these 
quintessential Europeans were immune to the Western habitus which infected Blavatsky and 
others? Are scholarly methodologies such that they allow for objective realising of the 
subject? H. P. Blavatsky, I suggest, was engaged in comparative religion in the same manner 
as any other actor in the field, regardless of whether we see that as useful scholarship or 
constructivist fantasies.  
Kocku von Stuckrad has applied a theoretical perspective to Blavatsky in his The 
Scientification of Religion with which I share much in common, though I wish to distinguish 
my work from his (2014, 94-110). As he did not present a detailed study of any specific 
Theosophical theme in his study, I cannot properly assess the potential fruit of his work. 
Stuckrad proposes a discursive analysis in which Blavatsky is conceptualised as a “discursive 
hub” wherein various discourse strands are drawn together. Certainly, I share Stuckrad’s 
interest in the application of a “sociology of knowledge” perspective and a dense historicism. 
His call for a relativistic perspective over a realist reading of science is also one I endorse 
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(2014, 2, 9). Adopting a relativistic or constructivist position is not an indication of an 
ontological commitment or lack thereof. Rather, a relativistic position should be seen as an 
antidote to the “poison” of inherited normative readings of the past. Relativism is an opening 
gambit which enables an uncritical and open stance towards all positions taken by 
participants in past debates. As a technique, it must be followed by an attempt to justify the 
various positions proposed. I have adopted three insights which I find missing in Stuckrad. 
The first is an appreciation of Daston and Galison’s epistemic codes. As I will illustrate later 
in this chapter, the interpretive and justifying power of their “truth-to-nature” code is too 
explanatory to be ignored. Secondly, Stuckrad has not emphasised the process of narrative 
selection that is undertaken by both the researcher and subject. Choices are made by the 
academic (the author-historian) and their subject as stories are woven from the material at 
hand. Finally, the entry point selected by the researcher/academic is both idiosyncratic and 
arbitrary. The choices made will affect the nature of the narrative which is finally presented. I 
am unable to pursue this in detail, but part of my concern with Stuckrad is not only over 
aspects of his methodological orientation. In addition, I take issue with some of his 
explanatory choices. One example is that he has endorsed inherited narratives which 
determinately link Theosophy and esotericism, which is not especially interesting or 
explanatory. 
Examples of the perspective I intend to follow can be seen in the following three references. 
The first is by Christopher M. Hutton and John E. Joseph, who discuss Theosophy and 
modern linguistics in “Back to Blavatsky: The Impact of Theosophy on Modern Linguistics” 
(1998). They reread the history of linguistics “without the prior imposition of a sense of 
progress,” which allows for excluded actors to be assessed. After quoting Blavatsky they 
note, “The summa of Blavatsky’s theosophy, The Secret Doctrine (1888), includes a theory of 
language development which in some respects is eerily similar to much academic theorising 
of the time” (Hutton and Joseph 1998, 184). This is not to argue that H. P. Blavatsky was a 
linguist, but rather that she drew on, and used, recognizable contemporary positions in her 
works. Her speculations fell within the bounds of the field, which was itself in the process of 
formation. 
The second is found in Egil Asprem’s “Pondering Imponderables: Occultism in the Mirror of 
Late Classical Physics” (2011). Engaging, in particular, the neo-Theosophy of Charles 
Webster Leadbeater and Annie Besant, he notes, “I do suggest that a more thorough 
understanding of the sciences of the day leads to a reconsideration of the degree to which 
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various occult systems were scientifically marginal” (2011, 133). Any particular science was 
characterised by a range of positions, not by one single strand of “true” and “rational” 
thought. 
The third example is drawn from Peter J. Bowler’s Theories of Human Evolution: A Century 
of Debate 1844-1944. Discussing non-Darwinian speculations that are now rejected, he 
writes,  
To back up the claim that we should not dismiss the earlier theories as totally 
unscientific, I compared them with what most of us would regard as a thoroughly 
“mythical” account of human origins, the theosophist interpretation of Madame 
Blavatsky’s The Secret Doctrine of 1885 [1888?]. Blavatsky was well read in the 
scientific literature of her time and makes a surprisingly good effort to show that her 
theory of monsters, giants, and ancient civilizations is compatible with the evidence. 
Yet the theosophist movement was still printing exactly the same text half a century 
later (the edition I consulted was published in 1925), by which time a considerable 
amount of additional evidence had been unearthed. It is this refusal to change the 
theory, or even to update the ‘sacred text’ that marks the unscientific character of the 
movement, not the structure of the theory offered. (1986, 9) 
This extract adds support to my argument that H. P. Blavatsky’s writings should be separated 
from later generations of Theosophical thought. 
These references point to a specific period in the history of the sciences, a time before the 
total dominance of the modern scientific paradigm, in which various conceptualizations of 
science, nature, humanity, and truth were possible. The Theosophical work of H. P. 
Blavatsky is one such nexus of conceptualization which needs to be carefully assessed in its 
historical context. 
 
2.3) Theosophical Scholarship 
Theosophical scholarship engaging in an interpretation of religion has been ongoing since the 
inception of the society and is too vast to survey in detail here. There is a century and a half 
of Theosophical journals, books, translations of texts, and lectures dedicated to explaining the 
category of religion and interpreting individual religions in the light of Theosophical 
perspectives. This global enterprise, rooted originally in the works of H. P. Blavatsky, can be 
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regarded broadly as the Theosophical engagement in comparative religion. For brevity’s sake 
I will mention two examples of Theosophical scholarship. An important early Theosophical 
scholar and confidant of H. P. Blavatsky was G. R. S. Mead. Mead was a university trained 
scholar, and recognized expert in Gnosticism. We might note that Max Müller himself 
recognised Mead’s scholarly competency, lamenting only that he wasted it on Theosophy 
(Mead 1904). For our purposes, an example of his scholarship can be seen in his work, Did 
Jesus Live 100 B.C.?, originally published in 1903. In this book Mead argued that a “Jesus 
figure,” upon whom the New Testament Jesus of Nazareth was based, lived approximately 
100BCE. This is a standard Theosophical position, confirmed by Blavatsky and The 
Mahatma Letters. This raises issues of authority and revelation in the Theosophical Society. 
If Blavatsky and the mahatmas affirm a position, what stance can an ordinary member of the 
Theosophical Society take? Mead’s work presents one solution. He affirms the psychic 
validity of certain “associates” of his, but goes on to produce a work of historical 
investigation which surveys the proof for the existence of Jesus (Mead 1992, 18-9). The 
question we ask ourselves is not whether his work is “true,” but whether it is justifiable based 
on the historical evidence and in the context in which Mead was writing. It is relevant to note 
that it is quite possible to find academic positions which reflect certain Theosophical 
opinions, for example, that the New Testament Jesus figure did not exist, or that the New 
Testament was influenced by Buddhist sources.8 
More recently, Theosophically sympathetic and scholarly work can be seen in David Reigle’s 
research into Tibetan Buddhism and Theosophy.9 Educated in both Sanskrit and Tibetan, 
Reigle has been carrying out research aimed at locating the Theosophical Stanzas of Dzyan. 
His studies into the Jonang sect of Dolpopa have given Theosophical claims of Tibetan 
influence a small impetus (Reigle 1999, 83-95). His original language skills remove his work 
from much other Theosophical scholarship, though many theosophical scholars have been 
proficient in relevant subject languages. Reigle’s work poses many questions. For example, 
while he diligently searches in a critical manner for an Asian language version of the Stanzas, 
Isaac Lubelsky can refer to the Stanzas as “forgeries” (Lubelsky 2012, 119). Original and 
forgery are not unproblematic distinctions in the study of religion. Reigle and Lubelsky are 
both academically trained; however, they are at opposite ends of the spectrum regarding the 
                                                          
8 As an example, see Zacharias P. Thundy, Buddha & Christ (1993). 
9 David Reigle’s work can be found in his book, Blavatsky’s Secret Books (1999), and on his two websites, 
easterntradition.org and prajnaquest.fr. Reigle is not a member of any Theosophical Society to my knowledge, 
though he is clearly sympathetic to it. 
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Stanzas of Dzyan. Is Reigle, for all his academic achievements, simply a “religionist”? Does 
Lubelsky have the academic credentials to assess Reigle’s original language research? These 
are not simple questions to answer. We might, in addition, show caution in looking for the 
perspective on the past and present. Various positions can be justifiable and subject to review. 
It is not simply that different communities will produce different works. David Reigle 
challenges the division between insider and outsider by producing legitimate scholarly works. 
 Theosophically oriented research is diverse and is not automatically adopted or accepted 
within the Theosophical Society.10 There is no one who speaks on behalf of all members, or 
for the tradition itself. This is a partial response to Chidester’s use of Patrick Bowen’s 
writings on a secret African Brotherhood to exemplify Theosophical scholarship (2014, 269-
76). It might be more cautious to see Bowen’s work, and any work, as the product of the 
author, their assumptions, and their context. Conflating it to represent a whole tradition is 
limiting. Bowen’s basic idea of a diffusionistic wisdom tradition spreading to Southern 
Africa is not irrational or lacking in coherence. Rather, it belongs to a different mode of 
interpretation, rooted in the assumptions of early Theosophical work. 
 
3) RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Theosophy and the Theosophical Society are often incidentally associated with the field of 
comparative religion (Hanegraaff 1998, 449; Goodrick-Clarke 2008, 200, 225; Trompf 2011, 
57; Lubelsky 2012, 84; Josephson 2013, 320; Chidester 2014, 269-76; Stuckrad 2014, 98). 
Many, though not all, of these scholars work within the academic field of Western 
esotericism, and this is part of the problem. As I will argue, an appeal to Rorty’s distinction 
between normal and revolutionary science, an appreciation of séance phenomena as emergent 
sciences, and a less normative reading of the history of the late nineteenth century will result 
in a recasting of our understanding of the works of H. P. Blavatsky. With the primary 
exception of Chidester in his recent book, Empire of Religion, Theosophy has not featured in 
any detail in mainstream histories of the field of comparative religion. That is to say, it has 
not been placed within the historical development of the field of comparative religion. This 
omission is noticeable because the Theosophical Society has, since its inception, openly 
                                                          
10 There is, however, a distinct tension within the Theosophical Society between authoritarian and democratic 
principles, between revelation and freedom of thought, which is a manifestation of the characters of the two 
main founders, H. P. Blavatsky and H. S. Olcott. See Stephen Prothero “From Spiritualism to Theosophy: 
‘Uplifting’ a Democratic Tradition” (1993) for a discussion on this theme. 
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displayed an interest in interpreting religion. An early revision of the second of the main 
objectives of the society was “To study Âryan literature, religion and science” (Ranson 1938, 
548). This was consolidated into a more familiar form, “To promote the study of Aryan and 
other Eastern literatures, religions and sciences” (Blavatsky 1987, 306). In 1896 the revised 
second objective of the Theosophical Society was amended to read, “To encourage the study 
of comparative religion, philosophy and science” (Ransom 1938, 552). A survey of 
Theosophical literature to the present reveals a concern with the interpretation of religious 
traditions, with comparative religion being a central element of the program of the 
Theosophical Society.  
This exclusion is not sustainable and I will confront the forces of exclusion that came into 
play. No theory of nineteenth-century comparative religion has withstood a century and a half 
of criticism. In fact, even during the late nineteenth century, individual theories and theorists 
of comparative religion came under criticism from competing voices within the field. In light 
of these historical and contemporary assessments I will reread H. P. Blavatsky’s 
Theosophical endeavour in its historical context. 
 
4) UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
This study encompasses two fields, the emergence of the academic field of comparative 
religion in the late nineteenth century, and the Theosophical works of H. P. Blavatsky. 
Primarily this thesis will involve a textual analysis of the two main works of Blavatsky, Isis 
Unveiled (1877) and The Secret Doctrine (1888), as exercises in comparative religion. These 
works, and the balance of her writings where relevant, will be read in the context of various 
historical developments in the late nineteenth century from which they emerged.11 An 
intermediary section, covering the years between the publishing of Isis Unveiled and The 
Secret Doctrine, will review some important works in the development of Theosophy, 
namely, A. O. Hume’s “Fragments of Occult Truth” (1881), A. P. Sinnett’s Esoteric 
Buddhism (1883), and The Mahatma Letters to A. P. Sinnett (1880-1886). While not directly 
penned by Blavatsky these texts are intimately linked to her enterprise. The overarching 
disciplinary field is that of comparative religion in the nineteenth century, and I will maintain 
focus on H. P. Blavatsky’s enterprise in comparative religion. 
                                                          
11Blavatsky’s works include 15 volumes of Collected Writings, sundry volumes of letters, stories, and additional 
published works such as The Key to Theosophy and The Voice of the Silence. 
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5) RESEARCH QUESTION 
I have crystallized my interest into the following research question:  
What is the nature and character of H. P. Blavatsky’s enterprise in comparative religion? 
From this root question flow various related concerns, including: 
What methodologies and assumptions underlie the work of H. P. Blavatsky, particularly in 
her main works, Isis Unveiled and The Secret Doctrine?  
What social and intellectual forces and assumptions underpinned the development of the field 
of comparative religion in the late nineteenth century? 
What forces of exclusion consigned the Theosophical hermeneutic to the fringe, or beyond, 
of mainstream studies of religion? This boundary work is evident at the foundation of the 
field of comparative religion and exists to this day. 
Identifying the interpretive methods of H. P. Blavatsky will form the central and foundational 
part of this study. 
 
6) RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Parameters were drawn around the field of comparative religion as it developed and unfolded 
in the late nineteenth century. The disciplining of the field required that boundaries were 
erected which marked criteria for exclusion/inclusion. The current field of comparative 
religion has inherited these initial acts of boundary work. It is my intention to review some of 
these initial boundaries and question their validity. Fresh perspectives and readings will tell 
different stories which cast new light on these formative issues. 
My objective is to open the field of comparative religion in the late nineteenth century in 
order to insert a new actor, H. P. Blavatsky. To enable this I will question the standard 
histories of comparative religion and seek the conditions of inclusion and exclusion. A 
recovery of Blavatsky comparative enterprise and a contextualized rereading of her works 
will throw light on how theory is produced in given situations in response to a variety of 




7) RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
7.1) Delimiting the Field 
To facilitate an assessment of H. P. Blavatsky’s Theosophy in the field of comparative 
religion it is necessary to delimit the field. In relation to the history of the Theosophical 
Society this is usually approached through distinguishing between first, second, and third 
generation Theosophy, or, between original and neo-Theosophy/Pseudo-Theosophy. 
Conventionally, H. P. Blavatsky, W. Quan Judge, and H. S. Olcott (among others) are 
regarded as first generation Theosophists. Second generation Theosophists would include, 
among others, Annie Besant and Charles Webster Leadbeater (Godwin 2013, 15-32; 
Wessinger 2013, 33-50). This distinction is both warranted and desirable. Besant, and in 
particular Leadbeater, introduced new ideas into the Theosophical Society which bore less 
and less resemblance to those of Blavatsky (Santucci 1989, 43-4). In addition to this, the 
cultural and scientific context had changed in the mid 1890s and the early twentieth century. 
It is my view that the close link Theosophy had with science would have precipitated a re-
orientation of expression. As the scientific paradigm changed, the Theosophical presentation 
would have attempted to adapt in response. 
Limiting my study to the works of H. P. Blavatsky is an instance of internal boundary work. 
As Foucault alerts us, appeals to “tradition” on which to base continuity are open to suspicion 
(Foucault 2002, 23). There can be no simple detailing of a uniform presentation of 
Theosophy over time. The Theosophical Society has existed over nearly a century and a half 
of social, scientific, and cultural change; it is spread out over many continents and countries 
and has had any number of individual actors take charge and shape it. A synchronic 
perspective, therefore, is well suited to reveal the place of Blavatsky’s Theosophy in its 
holistic intellectual and cultural settings. Foucault also notes that appeals to the oeuvre of an 
author as a basis of continuity will also not withstand scrutiny. As such, we might expect an 
unfolding and development of ideas within the work of H. P. Blavatsky over the course of her 
writings. I will engage in a careful reading of her works, envisaged as a comparative 
enterprise, looking to identify underlying organising principles and vocabulary development. 
A second delimiting move that I propose is to separate the Theosophical Society from some 
of the esoteric societies with which it is often linked. In particular, I have in mind the 
26 
 
Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, and the Hermetic Brotherhood of Luxor.12 The Golden 
Dawn’s primary concern with ritual magic has no parallel with primary Theosophical 
concerns. The Hermetic Brotherhood of Luxor’s emphasis on “practical” occultism, while 
likely an early concern of the Theosophical Society, was quickly overtaken by its more 
recognized aims (Deveney 1997, 80-4). It is in the Inner Group Teachings and the Esoteric 
Instructions, rather than Blavatsky’s public works, that the closest parallels may be seen. 
There was, no doubt, a certain cross-fertilisation of ideas, and there was definitely a cross-
membership. However, these two societies had different characters and aims. The placing of 
the Theosophical Society in the field of Western esotericism has obscured an important 
aspect of the nature of the Society which is its links to mainstream thought and trends. This is 
particularly true if one reads the Society’s work from the perspective of the field of 
comparative religion. I will work, then, to reread H. P. Blavatsky’s Theosophy back into the 
central debates of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 
 
7.2) Opening the Field 
I begin with the current state of things. Theosophical knowledge, Theosophical epistemology, 
Theosophical hermeneutics, Theosophical opinion, in fact, the entire body of Theosophical 
thought is marginal to mainstream endeavours in any field of knowledge. At best it is a 
relatively popular subject of study in the field of Western esotericism. My focus is on the 
field of comparative religion. Despite being a foundational aim of the early Theosophical 
Society, and despite the fact that the Theosophical Society is still actively engaged in a 
comparative/interpretive study of religion, it is included in no substantial manner in 
mainstream histories of the field. The current most important exception is David Chidester’s 
Empire of Religion: Imperialism & Comparative Religion (2014, 269-76) where 
“Theosophical Comparative Religion” is discussed. I suggest, therefore, that Theosophy can 
qualify as a “subjugated knowledge” as detailed by Foucault in his Power/Knowledge 
lectures. For Foucault, subjugated knowledge can be characterised as being 
“buried,”“disguised,”“inadequate,”“disqualified,”“insufficiently elaborated,”“naïve,” and 
                                                          
12 For the Golden Dawn see Howe, Ellic, The Magicians of the Golden Dawn: A Documentary History of a 
Magical Order 1887-1923 (1985) and Gilbert, R. A. The Golden Dawn and the Esoteric Section (1987).  On the 
Hermetic Brotherhood of Luxor see Godwin, J., Chanel, C., and Deveney, J. P. The Hermetic Brotherhood of 
Luxor: Initiatic and Historical documents of an order of practical occultism (1995). See Owen, Alex, The Place of 
Enchantment: British Occultism and the Culture of the Modern (2007) for a work which discusses all Theosophy 
and the Golden Dawn, amongst other occult groups. 
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“beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity” (1980, 81-2). Foucault refers to a 
“Freemasonry of useless erudition,” and we might adapt this as a “Theosophy of useless 
erudition” (1980, 79). While Theosophical oriented scholars are currently engaged in 
interpretive endeavours using Theosophical tools, mainstream comparative religion is  
referring to Theosophy as an inadequate, or “idiosyncratic,” relic of the past (Hanegraaff 
2013, 243). 
To account for this exclusion—this split or demarcation—we need to direct our attention to 
the founding of the Theosophical Society (1875), which, intriguingly, is near 
contemporaneous with the founding of the field of comparative religion, often dated to 1870 
with Max Müller (Sharpe 1986, 35). Something more interesting is occurring here than mere 
coincidence. My argument will be that Theosophical knowledge, within the parameters of its 
comparative religion enterprise, is currently a marginal, subjugated, and peripheral body of 
work. I will argue that this process of marginalising began in the 1870s. The results of this 
process of rationalization in a wide variety of fields, and reflected in that of comparative 
religion, have become entrenched. It was in the late nineteenth century that the debates 
surrounding inclusion and exclusion, were played out, the results of which were solidified. It 
is since the 1960s and 1970s that these boundaries have been seriously questioned in a variety 
of sciences. The boundaries in the field of comparative religion have yet to be seriously 
challenged. It is this initial period of boundary marking that I challenge, with the goal of 
reassessing H. P. Blavatsky’s Theosophical enterprise in comparative religion. Before 
moving to this pivotal period, we might reflect one more warning from Foucault, who wrote,  
What types of knowledge do you want to disqualify in the very instance of your 
demand: ‘Is it a science’? Which speaking, discoursing subjects – which subjects of 
experience and knowledge – do you want to ‘diminish’ when you say: ‘I who 
conduct this discourse am conducting a scientific discourse, and I am a scientist’? 
(1980, 85) 
Yes, precisely, we shall see that almost no-one is innocent, and many claimed the authority of 
“Science.” I have earlier referred to three examples presented by Christopher M. Hutton and 
John E. Joseph, Egil Asprem, and Peter J. Bowler which hint at a possible reassessment of 
Theosophy. This type of re-evaluative process is already underway in the related fields of 
spiritualism and the occult sciences which have attracted more scholarly attention thus far. 
Roger Luckhurst makes the point eloquently in relation to telepathy when he writes,  
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One of the appeals of analysing ‘marginal sciences’ like Mesmerism and Spiritualism 
in the nineteenth century has been to question the assumptions behind demarcations 
of science and non-science, proper and improper knowledge. Part of the fascination 
of psychical research has been in coming to understand how it capitalized on the 
fissures of scientific naturalism, exploiting uncertainty and transition in knowledges 
and institutions of cultural authority. Telepathy was theorized at vanishing points – 
just where confident demarcations between truth and error, science and pseudo-
science, could not at the time be determined. It seemed more promising to approach 
telepathy as if it were a possible formulation, at least for a certain time in the late 
Victorian period, and to treat the central figures in its emergence as if, as Steven 
Shapin puts it, ‘their “cognitive wiring” was in proper working order: that is to say, 
they are all possessed of “natural rationality.”’ (2002, 2) 
Richard Noakes has made similar points in a number of his studies on spiritualism, as has 
Andreas Sommers. The range of responses to spiritualistic phenomena in the late nineteenth 
century reveals disputes over what were the correct scientific approaches to a subject, the 
place of authority in the sciences, and highlight the negotiation over the meaning of the 
categories invoked, for example, what were the legitimate boundaries of the “natural” or 
“supernatural” in relation to “science” (Noakes 2004; 2008; Sommers 2014). The received 
normative responses to these nineteenth-century debates have been challenged in the social 
sciences in the last three decades or so. I will locate my work within this stream of thinking 
through, in part, the work of Richard Rorty, whose pragmatic anti-essentialism allows for a 
rereading of past conflicts in theoretical ways other than that of a long march towards 
increasing truth and rationality. 
My review of the boundary work of the late nineteenth century is in reference to two areas. 
The first, and primary boundary work, was that of the mainstream sciences as they began to 
define themselves. The second, relevant to my work, is that of the field of comparative 
religion. The Theosophical knowledge and perspective was found wanting on both fronts. 
Science, undoubtedly, was the elephant in the room and it certainly permeated H. P. 
Blavatsky’s works. For the purposes of my argument, Thomas F. Gieryn has done interesting 
work on science as a cultural space and the processes of definition that establishing an 
institution in any period entails. Gieryn’s work forms a link between Foucault and Rorty, 
between power and pragmatism. In his Cultural Boundaries of Science, Gieryn adopts the 
cartographic metaphor of “maps,” with a map for him being a “form of representation” (1999, 
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7).13 For him, as for Rorty as we will see below, there can be no representation which is 
“true” to reality. Arguing for a pragmatic evaluation of science, he sees no point in evaluating 
the accuracy of its representations. Maps are contingent, limited, constructed, and mediating. 
Science is a “cultural space” with no ontological foundation. Gieryn argues that one needs to 
look for the success of science as discourse “downstream,” i.e. where it consumed in society. 
This links to Rorty’s social or communal justification and endorsement of specific claims. 
Gieryn offers a definition of boundary work, “the discursive attribution of selected qualities 
to scientists, scientific methods, and science claims for the purpose of drawing a rhetorical 
boundary between science and some less authoritative residual non-science (Gieryn 1999, 4). 
There are always contests and no single map is secure. Various participants will either claim 
or undermine, depending on the strategy, the assumed qualities of science which include, 
according to Gieryn, the following: objectivity, efficacy, precision, reliability, authenticity, 
predictability, sincerity, desirability, and tradition. Science as a category and enterprise is 
negotiated, and this negotiation is either more or less visible in any particular moment in 
history. Representations of science are mobilised in certain contexts for certain goals. There 
is no essential science or set of qualities one may call “scientific” which are trans-historical. 
There is also no convergence in science over time, no objective referent. Those who lose out 
in the struggle are marginalised with the title “science” being conferred on the winners. 
Gieryn summarises his own perspective on science by describing it as local, episodic, 
pragmatic, strategic, contingent, and constructed. His notion of science as cultural space and 
as the product of contingency, strategy, and negotiation removes the debate from what is true 
and what is false. The late nineteenth century was one such period of dramatic boundary 
work, not simply between true and false, good science and bad science, but between 
competing rational discourses whose places were in the process of being negotiated. Viewing 
science and science-making in this pragmatic perspective opens the field and allows for a re-
description in the sense that marginalised voices can now be heard. This is part of my 
opening gambit, a challenge to existing narratives. 
What am I aiming to accomplish? I am looking for a method of reviewing past debates, 
theories, and events without accepting any inherited hierarchical evaluative status imposed on 
them. I elaborate on my earlier endorsement of a theoretical relativism by highlighting the 
boundary work involved in the establishment of any “science.” Referencing comparative 
                                                          
13 An early article by Gieryn also highlights the pragmatic stances adopted by scientific naturalists to establish 
the centrality of their disciplinary perspective (1983, 781-95). 
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religion, one reason this is plausible is that no theory of the late nineteenth century has 
withstood the test of time. We must shed past valuations and begin a process of reassessment. 
We are, however, inheritors of past evaluative decisions; they form and define in many ways 
the field in which we work. They certainly define its standard histories. It would seem that 
these inherited characteristics, which may or may not be readily apparent in the field as it 
now stands, do still have a guiding momentum. I believe we need a way to break from this 
directing pulse, and Richard Rorty’s pragmatic stance to knowledge and history does 
precisely this.14 My interest in Rorty is not premised on his statements about religion. It is 
clear he had little sympathy for the topic. The use I have for his work is based on his assault 
on epistemology, his call to historicism, and the resulting holism.15 While Rorty’s positioning 
could, in my view, open almost any period in history, it has particular force in periods of 
conflict and conscious self-definition. Historical periods in which “knowledge” is being 
transformed, negotiated, valued, defined, or produced, and periods where a misplaced 
“certainty” is that which the present has cast back into the past, these periods are interrogated 
through his pragmatic perspective. The late nineteenth century, when comparative religion as 
a science was being born, is just such a period. 
In his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1980), Richard Rorty begins to open space for 
the “conversational” approach he anticipates by breaking with contemporary epistemology. 
Specifically, he is engaged in an attempt to break with any theory of knowledge based on 
accurate representations. The process of representation is initiated by an encounter with an 
object which determines a belief. Knowledge is envisioned as the collection of accurate 
representations and the mirroring quality of the mind is such that under certain conditions a 
privileged collection of representations can be isolated. These privileged representations, 
which are self-evidently true, are the basis of the various theories (Rorty 1980, 163). This 
representational foundationalism, described by Rorty as the attempt to “mirror” nature, is 
indefensible. Whatever the mind may be, and whatever its powers may be, it does not have 
the ability to accurately represent the “world as it really is.” Adopting an evolutionary 
                                                          
14 A pragmatic engagement with the study of religion has a lengthy history, from early expounders such as 
William James, John Dewey, and Charles Sanders Peirce through to Richard Rorty. Two notable recent 
contributions to the field are, Slater, Michael R. 2016. Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, and Davis, G. Scott. 2012. Believing and Acting: The Pragmatic Turn in 
Comparative Religion and Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. An article which specifically drew my 
attention to Rorty and Pragmatism was, Davis, G. Scott. 2009. “Richard Rorty and the Pragmatic turn in the 
study of religion.”Religion 39: 69-82. 
15For concise assessments of Richard Rorty and history see, Ankersmit, Frank. 2008. “Rorty and History.” New 
Literary History 39:79-100, and Jenkins, Keith. 1995. On ‘What is History?’: From Carr and Elton to Rorty and 
White. London: Routledge. 
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vocabulary, Rorty wonders when the mind stopped coping with the world and started 
reflecting it. He strives to undermine what he sees as the founding ocular metaphor, and 
philosophical error, that the mind is a “mirror of nature,” and that the task of philosophy it to 
sift through the various representations and identify those which are true to the object. There 
are no privileged representations, and no amount of “cleansing the mirror of the mind” can 
uncover the real nature of the world. With this the “correspondence theory of truth” is 
revealed as being founded on metaphysical dualisms which cannot be sustained. 
This stance invokes an anti-essentialism of universal character. There is nothing which is not 
contingent—not language, self, or community—and there is no stable centre on which to 
ground a theory of true knowledge (Rorty 1993, 3-69). Philosophy, experience, religious 
statements, and the natural sciences cannot offer a firm foundation on which to build a body 
of truths that are immune to revision. He rejects all ontological groundings, including notions 
of “God,”“Truth,”“Knowledge,”“History,”“Science,”“rationality,”“morality,”“method,” and 
so on. There is no “bird’s eye view” outside of the system from which statements can be 
judged. We cannot step outside of our vocabularies to assess propositions for their 
truthfulness to the world as it is. 
From this anti-essentialist premise Rorty proposes a distinction between truth and 
justification. He wants to drop any talk of the “truth” as some achievable, self-evident goal, 
one which all humanity agrees to due to a compulsion from outside of the person. He makes a 
distinction between the “world being out there” and the “truth being out there” (Rorty 1993, 
4-5). Truth, he argues, is a property of linguistic entities, or sentences, and without sentences 
there are no truths. Language itself is a human creation, subject to change and amendment, 
and truth cannot be located there. He writes,  
We can think of knowledge as a relation to propositions, and thus of justification as a 
relation between the propositions in question and other propositions from which the 
former may be informed. Or we may think of both knowledge and justification as 
privileged relations to the objects those propositions are about. (1980, 159) 
Rorty argues for the former position. In the place of accurate representations of the “nature of 
things” in the mind, he proposes the notion of “justification.” “Justification” he notes is “not 
a matter of a special relation between ideas (or words) and objects, but of conversation, of 
social practice” (Rorty 1980, 170). Jeffrey Stout elaborates on the distinction between truth 
and justification, noting how they “swing free” of each other. One may have epistemic 
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justification for one’s beliefs even though they may not turn out to be true. Justification is a 
historically and culturally contextualised process. Alternately, one may hold a belief which 
turns out to be true even though we have no supporting reasons to hold that belief (Stout 
2002, 27-31). We enter a linguistic community and learn a particular vocabulary, and it is in 
consequence of these events that flow our knowledge, awareness, concepts, language, 
inference, and justification (Rorty 1980, 187). Justification is, therefore, contextual and 
historical, rooted in the society in which one lives. There is no need, or possibility, to ground 
knowledge in empirical or ontological foundations. Knowledge is what a community allows 
one to say, and is a matter of social practice. In short, Rorty argues that “truth” (knowledge) 
is made rather than found. This is the destructive aspect of Rorty’s pragmatism, his critique 
of accepted positions, and this is the part most relevant to the current study. In Philosophy 
and Social Hope, and throughout his writings, he works to move away from distinctions such 
as found/made, discovery/invention, and objective/subjective (1999, xvii-xviii). His real aim 
is to shift the conversation to notions of “use,” as it relates to various ends by different 
communities. I will at the end engage with this aspect of pragmatism by presenting a short 
argument for the purpose and use of theories of religion. 
This constructivist position is a powerful antidote to a wide variety of foundational positions 
in the late nineteenth century, in particular those of the sciences, but including those of the 
Theosophical Society. A consequence of this is that knowledge is holistic, coherent, and 
narrative in nature. For Rorty,  
A thoroughgoing holism has no place for the notion of philosophy as “conceptual,” 
as “apodictic,” as picking out the “foundations” of the rest of knowledge, as 
explaining which representations are “purely given” or “purely conceptual,” as 
presenting a “canonical notation” rather than an empirical discovery, or as isolating 
“trans-framework heuristic categories.” If we see knowledge as a matter of 
conversation and of social practice, rather than as an attempt to mirror nature, we will 
not be likely to envisage a metapractice which will be the critique of all possible 
forms of social practice. (1980, 170-71) 
The consequences of Rorty’s pragmatism are many. The desired actor in society is the liberal 
ironist, liberal in that cruelty is to be avoided, and ironist in the sense that the agent accepts 
the contingency of everything (1993, xv). While pragmatism implies a rejection of both 
religious faith and Enlightenment rationalism, it does not theoretically privilege naturalistic 
methodologies and explanations (Blum 2011, 83). Pragmatism allows for a methodological 
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pluralism, with a strong historicist and nominalistic perspective. For example, a society in 
which there were no naturalistic explanations of the world, invoking instead metaphysical 
explanations, cannot be said to be less in touch with the world than later societies in which 
naturalistic theories dominate. The historical contextualising of knowledge, and the notion of 
knowledge as justified true belief, in which the community is the only possible deciding 
authority, does not allow for judgements based on ontological foundations. It also will not 
allow for deep comparisons of the present with the past and misguided conceptions of 
increasing rationality, progress, or advance in knowledge.  
We are born into a linguistic community, with a vocabulary to be learnt, which in turn 
informs the debates and questions possible. We are also trained into various communities 
with their specific vocabularies, for example, the natural sciences, religious groupings, 
philosophical clubs, and so on. These vocabularies are, for Rorty, attempts put forward by 
human beings to cope with the world, they are therapeutic and edifying. There is a “potential 
infinity of vocabularies in which the world can be described,” and this pluralism allows for 
the “conversation” to continue (1980, 367). Instead of assuming we have hit the solid ground 
of reality, pragmatism allows the past and the periphery to speak and be heard—if we only 
allow them. A controversial implication of this is that the Western scientific enterprise is 
simply another vocabulary, and should not be viewed as the foundation of all other 
knowledge or as representing reality as it is. Science is a value based enterprise and its value 
lies in the communal agreement that predicting and controlling nature in order to reduce 
suffering is the goal worthy of aiming for. Science is not the paradigm of objectivity, 
commonsense, rationality, or of methodologically neutral investigation. Science is simply the 
best means humanity has evolved for controlling and coping with the world. Alexander 
Kremer, quoting Rorty in Philosophy and Social Hope, makes this clear, 
On this view, to say that a belief is, as far as we know, true, is to say that no 
alternative belief is, as far as we know, a better habit of acting. When we say that our 
ancestors believed, falsely, that the sun went around the earth, and that we believe, 
truly, that the earth goes around the sun, we are saying that we have a better tool than 
our ancestors did. Our ancestors might rejoin that their tool enabled them to believe 
in the literal truth of the Christian Scriptures, whereas ours does not. Our reply has to 
be, I think, that the benefits of modern astronomy and space travel outweigh the 
advantages of Christian fundamentalism. The argument between us and our medieval 
ancestors should not be about which of us has got the universe right. It should be 
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about the point of holding views about the motion of heavenly bodies, the ends to be 
achieved by use of certain tools. Confirming the truth of Scripture is one such aim, 
space travel is another. (Kremer 2010, 328; Rorty 1999, xxv) 
Rorty rejects religious doctrines and teachings, not on any point of truth to reality or 
ontological foundations, which for him are not assessable by their own commitments. He 
acknowledges that his endorsement of liberal democracy and the scientific endeavour are not 
based on a-historical factors, but on contingent pressures which can change as society 
changes. He is simply thankful that humanity has decided one way instead of another (1980, 
330-1).  
This stance has led to charges of relativism against him, though he has sufficiently defended 
himself against the most telling consequences of the claims (Rorty 1991, 23; Rorty 1999, xvi-
xxxii; Tartaglia 2007, 210-6; Tartaglia 2012, 284-301). Rorty notes that charges of relativism 
trade on ontological dualisms, vocabulary he wants to drop in favour of a vocabulary of use 
or purpose. His endorsement of Donald Davidson’s criticism of the scheme-content 
distinction ensures that human beings are always in contact with the world and always 
speaking about the world (Davidson 1973-74, 8, 20). Linked to Davidson’s principle of 
charity, which argues that we are mostly correct in our views, this ensures that an empty 
relativism is refuted. Relativism, when actually presented, is to be rejected as unsustainable, 
but only once it has done its work as a part of a broader strategy. We need to reread the past 
without adherence to the normative narratives we have inherited. This is not so we can find 
“the truth,” but rather to present more useful norms. Useful for what purpose? For whom? I 
propose norms useful for explaining our own human behaviour to ourselves. 
Of direct importance to my argument is the distinction Rorty draws between normal and 
abnormal discourse and between normal and revolutionary science, resulting in a “re-
contextualising,” and how this relates to “facts” and “objects.” Normal science and normal 
discourse are those sciences and discourses about which everyone in a given society knows 
the rules. They are the accepted norms of a given society. Abnormal science and discourse 
are those novel presentations that challenge the normal and accepted way of doing and seeing 
things. These new irruptions can go two ways: they can be viewed either as “odd” and be 
rejected, or they can be viewed as “odd” but eventually become the new standard of a society. 
The latter process involves a re-description and re-contextualising of “facts” and “objects.” A 
new description can involve a new vocabulary and language, entailing the dropping of old 
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vocabularies (and metaphors) and the issues inherent in them. (For example, Rorty’s 
dropping of the “mirror of nature” metaphor releases one from questions of representation). 
Rorty sees contexts divided into two: firstly, as “a new set of attitudes toward some of the 
sentences previously in one’s repertoire” and secondly, as “the acquisition of attitudes toward 
new truth-value candidates, sentences towards which one had previously had no attitudes” 
(Rorty 1991, 94). Rorty is keen to the error of separating fact or object from description or 
theory. There is no fact or object independent of context. There can only be a re-
contextualising of something already contextualised, something already described. There are 
no self-consisting facts or objects which impose themselves on the mind. Furthermore, there 
is no privileged context in Rorty’s pragmatism, there is only what society has accepted and 
will accept, which he hopes will be an ongoing conversation between all possible 
participants. If there is no privileged context, is there a limit to legitimate or justifiable 
contextual readings? I see a link here with Derrida’s free “play” in his “Structure, Sign and 
Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” (2005). What can arrest the play of 
signification once we swing free of the stabilising and balancing centre, be it, “essence, 
existence, substance, subject, alētheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so 
forth” (Derrida 2005, 353)? Can one position be more highly valued than another? If it can, 
what criteria could be used? Rorty’s criticism of epistemology, Derrida’s criticism of 
presence/transcendental signified, and Foucault’s suspicion of claims to being “scientific” 
reveal something else at work, for example, power or desire. Derrida writes, “The absence of 
the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely” 
(2005, 354). For Rorty there is no final vocabulary, no limit to the possibilities for re-
description and re-contextualising.16 
When something new appears in a society (Rorty’s example is the debate between Cardinal 
Bellarmine and Galileo) there is no way to appeal to the “facts,” to “rationality,” to “objective 
reality,” or any other metaphysical presence to decide which is correct.17 The “world” does 
not impose itself unambiguously on the human mind. Theories and descriptions can only be 
judged for the purposes they serve, and the community decides what purposes it values. 
Periods of revolutionary science, and the processes of rejection and transformation, happen 
                                                          
16 Rorty himself has announced his preference for liberal democracy, naturalistic explanations, and increasing 
societal happiness, though he concedes there is no way of grounding these preferences in any theory of truth. 
17 For an interesting example of this style of historiography see Hasok Chang on the reception and rejection of 
Phlogiston. Chang, Hasok. 2010. “The Hidden History of Phlogiston: How Philosophical Failure can generate 
Historiographical Refinement.” Hyle – International Journal for Philosophy of Chemistry 16: 47-79.  
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continuously. Of relevance to my argument is the place of spiritualism and the “occult 
sciences” (telepathy, mesmerism, psychometry, etc.) in the late nineteenth century. While 
these, like Theosophy, have been either rejected or transformed into some new form, during 
the initial period of negotiation and disciplining there is no possible appeal which can a priori 
reject these new descriptions and events. The general stance towards these “fringe” positions 
can be described as evaluating them as pseudo-scientific, amateurish and irrational. This has, 
however, been under revision, as I have briefly discussed above. Emergent positions are not 
intrinsically “irrational” or examples of Tylorian “survivals,” they are so designated by the 
participants and the community. There is, however, a period of assessment, of evaluation, and 
of counter-disciplining during which time positions are being negotiated and created. 
Theosophy, with its comparative religion, emerged during one such period – the late 
nineteenth century. I argue that spiritualism and its related material phenomena, for example, 
the séance phenomena and other “occult sciences,” were sufficiently challenging to the 
dominant naturalistic discourse of science that the scientific engagement with them can be 
regarded as instances of Rortyan revolutionary sciences or discourses. That society eventually 
rejected or transformed these forms of knowledge and scientific engagement is an historical 
fact, one which was under debate in the nineteenth century. While these debates raged, and 
various fields were being rationalized, the emergent knowledge became the foundation for a 
Theosophical comparative religion. This historical placing of Theosophy and its linking to 
science, emergent (potential) science, and what are now subjugated forms of knowledge 
rejected by mainstream cultural engines of knowledge, forces a re-evaluation of the enterprise 
of Theosophical comparative religion. 
In his Philosophy as Cultural Practice, Richard Rorty brings into relief many of the issues 
involved. Discussing the distinction between private and public religion, he writes,  
As I see it, the question of whether to keep on talking about God, whether to keep 
that logical space open, needs to be divided into two sub-questions. The first is a 
question about an individual’s right to be religious, even though unable to justify her 
religious beliefs to others. It might be formulated in the first person as “have I the 
right to my religious devotions even though there is no social practice that legitimizes 
inferences from or to sentences that I employ in this devotional practice – a lack 
which makes it impossible for many, and perhaps all, of my fellow-humans to make 
sense of this practice?” (2007, 25) 
37 
 
There is something at stake here. Nicholas Wolterstorff’s critique of Rorty’s public/private 
binary highlights the concern (Wolterstorff 2003, 131-33).18 He thinks Rorty contradicts 
himself when he suggests that religion must earn its way into public debates. Rorty’s 
philosophy may not privilege naturalism and evolution ontologically, but he has rooted his 
position in these perspectives. Wolterstorff is wrong on this point. Knowledge must show 
itself as useful and justified, otherwise we will end up with the following type of 
unsatisfactory statement. Discussing H. P. Blavatsky, Kocku von Stuckrad writes, “On the 
one hand, we have no reason to doubt that Blavatsky possessed mediumistic powers, which 
could have played a certain role in the creation of her major works” (Stuckrad 2014, 98). "On 
the other hand,” Stuckrad notes that “there is almost nothing in Isis Unveiled that could not 
have been gathered from contemporary literature” (2014, 98). “We,” read here academic 
scholars of the twenty-first century, have every reason to doubt H. P. Blavatsky’s 
supernatural powers, and almost no reason to affirm them. What current field of knowledge 
endorses anything like H. P. Blavatsky’s occult claims? I will argue that H. P. Blavatsky and 
her contemporaries had every reason to believe in certain powers of the mind, but we must 
offer naturalistic explanations of what she was doing and claiming. 
It is the community, the social body, which decides what is religious, what is scientific, what 
is legitimate, and what qualifies as “making sense.” For “God” replace spiritualism and the 
various occult sciences. Once these are contextualised in the late nineteenth century, and read 
through a pragmatic anti-essentialism, I argue that many of the received assumptions of the 
present are sufficiently challenged to demand a re-reading of comparative religion during that 
period. It is not that any effort of the past is to be removed from history, rather, it is a call for 
a re-description of the field to include forgotten endeavours.  
The anti-representational trend I have outlined with Rorty, and more briefly in respect to 
science with Gieryn, has developed in the field of history. Which is not to say there are no 
competing trends—there are—and this is, in a sense, the point. We should not essentialise 
any field of academic study to the point that it cannot be challenged. Instead, a multiplicity of 
voices is to be encouraged. Alun Munslow has consolidated the ideas of theorists such as 
Hayden White, F. R. Ankersmit, Gérard Genette, and many others into what he calls a 
                                                          
18 See also Slater, Michael R. 2014. Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge 




narrative-linguistic theory of history, or a “deconstructive history” (2003, 1-23).19 Munslow 
is at pains to show that history is not about finding the “real” or “objective” past. He 
emphasises the role of the situated author-historian as the producer of narratives and 
meanings, who plays as much a role in history generation as any particular activity, for 
example, consulting source documents or using theoretical methodologies to unlock the past. 
Once the break is made with epistemological foundationalism and accurate representation, 
once we accept that history is not underpinned by a correspondence theory of truth, we enter 
the realm of narrative and storytelling. With the rejection of foundational epistemology go 
associated normative ideals, such as universal rationality, decontextualised objectivity, the 
distinction between subject and object, and between historian and object of study. The 
situated historian now assumes a central place in the imposition of meaning on the past 
through processes of selection, voice, focalisation, and story space negotiation (Munslow 
2007, 44-63; Munslow 2010, 153-60). My own selection of H. P. Blavatsky as the subject of 
focalisation has clearly affected the story I am weaving, as I view the debates through my 
reading of her writings. Embracing a semantic holism Munslow continues that while 
individual sentences may have propositional value, there are no “brute facts” or “raw 
materials” which determine their own meaning. Individual facts or statements are always 
already part of a larger discourse and never stand free from contextualising conditions. In 
addition, the binding of individual sentences about the past into a meaningful narrative is a 
complex process undertaken by the historian, and is not something imposed by the past on the 
historian. In a powerful passage Munslow writes, 
Many historians still find it difficult to accept three particular corollaries of the 
narrative-linguistic position of the new history. First, the emplotment does not pre-
exist in the evidence. Second, the logic of inference (explanation via induction and 
deduction and the assigning of knowable intentionality) is secondary to the figurative 
capture and representation of the content of the past. And finally that a moral 
judgement is crucial to how we provide a meaning for it. In other words, that the 
metaphoric form which results from the exercise of the historian’s imagination in 
which they first secure the past by choosing a period, a theme, a problem, an event, 
an intention, the wish to ‘know things about’ and their ‘meaning’, has a powerful pre-
shaping authority over our historical knowledge, its interpretation and, therefore, the 
final meaning we ‘find’. (2003, 152) 
                                                          
19 Representative works by Alun Munslow include; 2007. Narrative and History. Hampshire: Palgrave 




The importance of, for example, a story space can be illustrated by reference to Alex Owen’s 
The Place of Enchantment (2007). Owen is working with the period between 1880 and 1914 
(2007, 7). Among the many movements discussed, the Theosophical Society is an important 
participant in her narrative. The years 1880 to 1914, however, do not conform to any internal 
developments in the Society. The first/second generation split, well accepted in Theosophical 
studies, does not map onto her dates. H. P. Blavatsky passed away in 1891, and any 
discussion of her historical contextualising cannot exceed that limit. That the Society existed 
beyond her death is obvious; however, it did not exist in the same way, or in the same larger 
cultural and intellectual environment. Munslow further notes,  
What this means is that the historian has to create a narrative in which he or she 
composes their preferred list of propositional factual statements (from the millions 
available to them) in a particular way. 
The issue is how such descriptive statements (the facts) or others that are constituted 
by one historian’s ‘reading’ of the archive, are ordered and ‘put together’ through the 
mechanisms of emplotment, argument, use of concepts and ethical judgements to 
form a coherent and plausible structure of historical interpretation of the events to 
which they refer. (2003, 162) 
These passages reinforce the notion that history telling is not a closed enterprise, but one 
open to new readings, new descriptions, and new meaning. We see this on a practical level in 
many instances of contemporary history work, for example, spiritualism and the “occult 
sciences” have been presented in continuum from being “irrational” to being seen as 
“emergent sciences.” This is not a license for irresponsible free reign as narratives must be 
defended and presented to society at large. Munslow too acknowledges the need for a 
“responsible relativism,” rooted in epistemological scepticism and under-determinism, which 
enables creative histories to be written (2007, 121-2; 2010, 4, 64-5). The capacity, however, 
for re-description and for historians to recontextualise the past is both broad and inspiring. 
 
7.3) Challenging Binaries 
Rooted in the above-detailed theoretical positions my reading of H. P. Blavatsky’s work as an 
enterprise in comparative religion will question certain inherited binaries. These include 
professional/amateur scholarship, mainstream/periphery, science of religion/theology, 
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religious studies/religion, exoteric/esoteric, outsider/insider, and rational/irrational.20 
Nineteenth-century spiritualism challenges many of these binaries, as does, I propose, 
Theosophy (Stolow 2008, 673). The hierarchical valorising of one half of a binary can 
function on a political level to dominate the other. Binaries can reflect the process of self-
definition, of rationalisation, and a separating of something valued from another. Binaries, 
therefore, are invoked and are not found, and can reflect problematic teleological impulses.  
Any privileging of ideas, theories, and methodologies is open to suspicion. We must, 
however, remain alert to the fact that power is not exercised in a unidirectional manner. All 
sides in a struggle adopt positions and assert themselves from the options available within the 
entire field. The politics of power involved in the drawing of boundaries says less about the 
objective value of any position than it does about the unfolding of a discourse field. 
Pragmatism has freed us from accepting any particular perspective as “true” in the sense of 
corresponding to “reality as it is.” The replacing of this with the notion of narrative 
construction and use reconceptualises the debate away from hard and fast distinctions to a 
more perspectival position. Once the implication of this freedom is grasped, new readings of 
the past become possible. The late nineteenth century is a period of determined boundary 
marking in a wide variety of fields, and is open to rereading for this very reason. 
Three illustrations might be cited. Firstly, Jonathan Z. Smith reminds us of the politics at play 
in the distinction between the “academic” study of religion and “being religious” (Smith 
2014, 462). By “being religious” I include a number of things, including comparative 
theology, theology itself, and being an active member of a particular tradition – activities 
based on the foundation of a particular religious tradition. We cannot simply erase the 
distinction because while both sides are doing the same thing, studying religion, they do so 
from different founding assumptions (Flood 1999, 226; MacKendrick 1999, 77-83). 
Pragmatism frees one from any “essentialist” or “foundational” rejection of a particular 
perspective. In terms of content, or propositional statement, there can be no simple rejection 
of “religious” positions, there are only justifiable choices. We are no longer looking for the 
“truth” of a situation in relation to reality, but, rather, what is justifiable in an historical 
period (Kremer 2010, 328-9). This is where my work is situated. I am looking to re-examine 
these dichotomies in a particular period.  
                                                          
20On the latter, referring to Blavatsky’s works, Lubelsky cautions of the “irrational character of these writings, 
as well as their credibility” (2012, 118). Many of these distinctions are already challenged in the field, if not 
specifically in relation to Theosophy. For example, on challenging the notion of an insider/outsider “problem” 
see Gardiner and Engler (2012) and Jeppe Sinding Jensen (2011). 
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We might expand this by investigating the nature of scholarship within the Theosophical 
stream as opposed to that in the academic community. Is serious research into religions being 
carried out within the Theosophical tradition? I have suggested that earlier Theosophical 
oriented scholars such as G. R. S. Mead and a contemporary scholar such as David Reigle do 
meet the requisite standards. I also have here in mind a specific accusation levelled at H. P. 
Blavatsky by Max Müller in his journal discussion with the influential early Theosophist, A. 
P. Sinnett. Max Müller notes in reference to Blavatsky’s “esoteric Buddhism” that, “No one 
can study Buddhism unless he learns Sanskrit and Pâli, so as to be able to read the canonical 
books, and at all events spell the names correctly” (1901, 107). This position can be 
problematical in a number of ways. Max Müller, in his comparative works at the very least, 
cannot surely have claimed familiarity with the language of every sacred scriptural reference 
he discussed. Chidester has, for example, revealed his reliance on compromised and 
problematic works on Southern African religion (2014, 59-89). Perhaps most tellingly, Max 
Müller used this same defence against Andrew Lang in their disputes. Lang was also no 
Sanskritist, but quite clearly was an important figure in the history of comparative religion 
(Dorson 1955, 399). Another example is that of Sir John Lubbock who is included in studies 
of comparative religion (Chidester 2014, 96; Sharpe 1986, 51-53). Lubbock, however, had no 
university qualifications behind him. What is the rationale for including Lubbock, but 
excluding G. R. S. Mead or H. P. Blavatsky? It could be that Lubbock endorsed the 
fashionable, dominant line and Mead did not. 
Secondly, in his important study, The Theosophical Enlightenment, Joscelyn Godwin 
remarks, “The time of the gentleman amateur was passing” (Godwin 1994, 311). He suggests 
that as the fields of Asian studies and comparative mythology became increasingly 
specialised it became difficult for a single person to encompass the entire range of data into a 
single theory. It was left to occultists or esotericists, who could claim special knowledge, to 
speculate in this manner. I am not certain one could entirely agree with Godwin on this issue. 
As exemplified by Herbert Spencer’s A System of Synthetic Philosophy, totalizing theories 
were the hallmark of the field of comparative religion. In a sense, any explanatory theory is 
comprehensive in scope. The beginning of a separation between specialist and amateur 
should be questioned in the light of the history of comparative religious theories, and of the 
methodological pluralism that pragmatism allows. It is not, obviously, my intent to say 
illogical or unreflective opinions are equal to well-thought-out and thoroughly researched 
perspectives. I am suggesting that the latter are not confined to an academic environment, 
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though they may well predominate there. Terms such as “irrational,”“illogical,” and 
“amateur,” in many instances reflect boundary work which demands critical scrutiny. 
A third, pertinent instance of the effects of boundary marking is highlighted by Jeremy 
Naydler in his Shamanic Wisdom in the Pyramid Texts (2005), a book based on his PhD. His 
outlining of the formation of the academic discipline of Egyptology highlights the deliberate 
exclusion of “esoteric” perspectives and content, for example, mysteries or shamanistic 
practices, from the academic field.21 Though not entirely undisputed, these exclusions exist to 
this day in the field. A specific example of exclusion is whether the Egyptian books of the 
afterlife were used by living individuals, or, were intended solely for the use of the deceased.   
We realise that both sides of a binary may be mobilized by the participants as part of their 
manoeuvres to appropriate authority and establish their perspectives. Participants are not 
simply consigned to an “esoteric” category; they may actively locate themselves as 
esotericists for polemical reasons of their own. It is my intent to question this distinction 
through the examination of an esoteric position: that of H. P. Blavatsky. Bergunder argues 
that “esotericism” can profitably be seen as an empty signifier, and as such there is no set 
content which differentiates an exoteric from an esoteric statement (Bergunder 2010, 20-4). 
There is no essential, a-historic esoteric position, and the content of a particular statement 
cannot, therefore, place a person in any conclusive way. I will argue that there is little in the 
Theosophical position, in relation to comparative religion, that from a different point of view 
could not be part of mainstream discussions in this field. I wish to make it clear that I am not 
simply arguing that H. P. Blavatsky’s works are internally coherent, and that her conclusions 
make sense within the bounds of her own Theosophical endeavour. I am also not arguing that 
sheer relativism justifies any perspective, and hence hers must be included. I am, instead, 
proposing that she made fair use of the general resources available to her in the late 
nineteenth century. That she made truth claims, selections, decisions, inclusions, and 
exclusions should go without saying. In these practices, however, she differed in no 
appreciable way from other actors in the same period, and from what theorists continue to do 
                                                          
21 This reflects the “rejected knowledge” thesis of Wouter J. Hanegraaff in his Esotericism and the Academy 
(2013).  With Michael Bergunder, however, I question the explanatory value of this perspective and, instead of 
multiplying binary distinctions such as accepted/rejected, prefer to shift the focus on how participants made 
use of the material at hand. (Bergunder 2010, 18). It might be noted that if I can successfully write H. P. 
Blavatsky into the history of comparative religion as a legitimate participant I will have challenged Hanegraaff’s 
general thesis, at least in this instance. 
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to this day.22 I am also not suggesting that Blavatsky be incorporated into the debate by being 
given a Theosophical (read here Theological) seat. Though justifiable, this is insufficiently 
revisionist. My position is that she was working sufficiently within the paradigms of larger 
discourses, particularly the sciences, to avoid her work being designated as “theology” in any 
simplistic manner. My thesis will rest on the acceptance of the re-description of spiritualist 
and occult sciences as “emergent” sciences instead of marginalised delusions. Inherent in this 
position is that history always reveals a range of responses to any issue as it unfolds. 
Retrospectively one position may win out and the losers of the debate will be re-described in 
unflattering terms – irrational, subjective, ignorant, amateur, and so on. 
 
7.4) Examining the Hermeneutic Method of H. P. Blavatsky 
My work will identify various tools utilised by H. P. Blavatsky in her interpretive endeavour. 
These would include such devices as analogy, symbol interpretation, allegory, geometric 
keys, and any number of such interpretive mechanisms. A predicament arises at this point for 
the contemporary scholar. Either one accepts Blavatsky’s explanation for the origin of her 
system or one imposes one’s own on her. In essence, while I might record that Blavatsky 
claims to have learnt the parameters of the Theosophical teachings from mahatmas and lost 
esoteric records, I must present a different explanation for the origin of her system. I set aside 
then the Theosophical discourse of the ancient wisdom tradition and its carriers, and regard 
Blavatsky as the originator and builder of the Theosophical system (which is not to argue 
there were no other actors involved in the production.) Siv Ellen Kraft has raised many of 
these issues in her article “To Mix or not to Mix” (2002). This article, so reasonable in a 
certain light, betrays in my reading a failure of nerve. Kraft is caught between an inherited 
scholarly view of Theosophy as being beyond the academic pale and the inherently 
reasonable nature of the work. So often can Kraft suggest that Theosophy mirrors scholarly 
works and concerns, so often can Kraft suggest that academics of the era had the same 
impulses and failings that the works of H. P. Blavatsky seem to display. Yet, despite this, she 
can still separate Theosophical comparative religion from its more mainstream version. She 
                                                          
22On the idea of a de-contextualised narrative selection David Chidester, referring to the “imperial comparative 
religion,” argues that, “Second, by contrast, imperial comparative religion, as practiced in European 
metropolitan centers from the 1850s into the twentieth century, showed no concern with religions as 
coherent, integrated systems. Rather, theorists in Europe, especially during the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century, arranged disparate evidence from all over the world into a single, uniform temporal sequence, from 
primitive to civilized, that claimed to represent the universal history of humanity” (1996, 3). 
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notes Blavatsky’s inadequate philological skills, her reliance on mahatmas for information, 
and her lack of procedure according to “academic methods of interpretation” (2002, 154). 
The second of these I reject outright, as there can be no Theosophical mahatmas in the 
current academic world and H. P. Blavatsky cannot, therefore, have actually met them. The 
first and the third objections I would argue could be applied to any number of mainstream 
scholars, and that they presuppose a value in these activities which, in fact, may not exist. In 
specific reference to the third shortcoming, I am thinking of notions of the arbitrary selection 
of data and of the de-contextualising of data. Pragmatically, no method assures us of anything 
like the certainty assumed by many nineteenth century actors. Witness Kraft’s summing up of 
H. P. Blavatsky’s strategies: some material is just adopted as it coheres with her opinions; 
contradictory material is either discarded or interpreted to “fit” her scheme; and there is 
appeal to an inner, esoteric meaning, the original intent of the text and author (2002, 157). 
She notes that Blavatsky’s method ignores the “religio-cultural context” of the data (2002, 
157). I would suggest that these interpretive manoeuvres characterise much academic 
scholarship. Kraft picks up on Hanegraaff’s opinion that H. P. Blavatsky’s Theosophy is “an 
example of Comparative Religion on occultist premises,” but fails to detail what those 
premises might be, or how they differ from others’ premises (2002, 152). Kraft is caught 
between Theosophy as a religion, a “religio-scientific” mixture, a “spiritual science,” and a 
“scientific spirituality” (2002, 143, 156). Perhaps, Blavatsky’s Theosophical work challenges 
the usefulness of these distinctions and categories. Such is my argument. 
H. P. Blavatsky’s writings give the impression that she is searching for something in religious 
texts, the ancient wisdom tradition. We might think in terms of metaphors such as 
“injecting/inserting” or “uncovering.” In the former, the Theosophical system is imposed on 
the data, in the latter the Theosophical system actually inheres in the data in some manner. 
While both movements are at play in her work in particular instances, in general, 
sympathisers might argue that she felt she was finding something (i.e. revealing something 
which is really there), while academics might feel she is inserting something foreign to the 
texts and traditions. With Rorty, however, I suggest the debate be shifted away from 
“finding” or “making,” and towards her “use” of the materials at hand. I ask myself, what is 
guiding this process? What consolidating praxis is behind Blavatsky’s selections? I would 
like to propose a possible answer to this question. It is my position that this answer justifies 
much of H. P. Blavatsky’s work, a justification based on the very processes of science which 
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she supposedly transgressed.23 Justification works on two levels, that of method (organising 
epistemic code) and that of statement. I will examine both. 
An examination of H. P. Blavatsky’s writings as efforts in comparative religion is the central 
focus of my thesis. In later chapters I will reference individual interpretive methods while 
here I propose the guiding principle which informs her work. It is important to note that this 
does not explain why she chose this particular vision of religion as opposed to any other. 
Confronted with the same context and data another person may well move in a different 
direction – we cannot hope to find mechanical causation. Jonathan Z. Smith presents four 
modes or styles of comparison, the ethnographic, the encyclopaedic, the morphological, and 
the evolutionary (Smith 1971, 71). Specifically, the morphological method can be identified 
in H. P. Blavatsky’s works, most elaborately in her magnum opus The Secret Doctrine, but 
originally in Isis Unveiled. Illuminatingly, Smith notes, “The rise of the ‘science’ of 
Comparative Religions cannot be separated from nineteenth-century scientific thought in 
general” (Smith 1971, 81). He goes on to mention specifically the importance of comparative 
anatomy and Goethe’s search for the Urpflanze in comparative botany. We could add here 
the European search for the original perfect language, the Ursprache (Eco 1997; Olender 
1992, 1-3). Goethe’s original form or prototype was an intellectual idea, a heuristic ideal 
based on inductive observation, and not an historical ancestor. Eric Csapo and Angus 
Nicholls elaborate on the development of this comparative theme in the study of religion and 
mythology. Both identify the diachronic search for an urform, a result of deductive reasoning, 
as a basic value in the nineteenth century engagement with these fields. Csapo, discussing 
specifically myths notes, “the comparatist Urmyth is an actual historical entity which is 
identified as the cause of all derivative myths” (Csapo 2005, 182, 203; Nicholls 2015, 220-4). 
What is it about these comparative fields that influenced religious studies? Beyond 
individuals who straddled both fields, an underlying epistemic base has been identified. 
Daston and Galison’s Objectivity (2007) traces the emergence of objectivity in the sciences 
from the nineteenth century to the present. They present three epistemic regimes, “truth-to-
                                                          
23 As I lack the space to discuss it in detail, I must make brief reference to a recent competing contribution to 
the study of H. P. Blavatsky’s hermeneutic method. While I find much to disagree with, J. Barton Scott presents 
a coherent and explanatory theory of her interpretive stance. Focusing on her comparative religion, both Scott 
and I attempt to explain the same characteristics in her writings, though we do so differently. Scott points to 
Blavatsky’s “erasing,” “effacing,” “negating,” “cancelling,” and “renouncing” of “particularities,” in both 
religions and their texts (2016, 199-204). She is looking for the universal “truth” behind individual religions and 
“peels” back the husk to reveal the “universal secret.” Scott’s underlying explanatory mechanisms include a 
textual “asceticism,” an “allegorical renunciation,” and anticlericalism. As I will outline in this section, my 
underlying explanatory mechanism is Daston and Galison’s “truth-to-nature” epistemic code.  
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nature,”“mechanical objectivity,” and “trained judgement.” Each orientation is tied to 
different conceptions of the self, and each has different epistemic virtues and dangers. 
Mechanical objectivity, exemplified by the use of the camera and photography, aims to 
capture the particularities of nature. The move here is to attempt to capture nature as it really 
is, without any imposition of the scientist affecting what is there. Trained judgement revolves 
around the “expert” who is trained to interpret an image, that is, to see what is valuable in 
what is captured in the image. It is, however, their “truth-to-nature” epistemic code which I 
propose underlies Theosophical typological thinking. These three epistemic codes existed in 
various observational sciences and examples mentioned include anatomy, botany, 
mineralogy, zoology, and palaeontology (Daston and Galison 2007, 60). These three codes, 
while building on each other serially (truth-to-nature, mechanical objectivity, trained 
judgement), never actually fully replace one another, and exist side by side (2007, 28). 
Daston and Galison produce the following diagram,  
Epistemic virtue Truth-to-nature Mechanical 
objectivity 
Trained judgement 
Persona Sage Worker Expert 
Image Reasoned Mechanical Interpreted 
Practice Selection / Synthesis Automated transfer Pattern recognition 
Ontology Universals Particular Families  
          (2007, 371). 
Two examples of the truth-to-nature regime given for this underlying orientation of science 
are from botanical atlases and fluid dynamics in the mid to late nineteenth century (up to 
1895 at least). Botanical atlases were produced showing “ideal” leaves of various plants. 
Researchers did not present any one particular leaf as it actually appeared in nature. Any 
“errors” and contingencies of nature were erased by the artist to present nature as it was 
meant to be. A similar activity is noted with certain experimenters in fluid dynamics. One 
scientist recorded the effects of a drop of milk or water falling into a pool of the same liquid. 
While thousands of non-ideal splashes were recorded, they published and worked with only 
the ideal ones (2007, 11). They corrected nature and rejected “errors” in the natural world. 
The underlying methodology which replaced this was “mechanical objectivity” – represented 
in part by the camera’s attention to individual details (Daston and Galison 2007, 55-113). The 
truth-to-nature epistemic code is characterised by the following ideas – ideal, typical, 
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characteristic, and average – and evokes notions of the original type or archetype. It seeks the 
essence and the perfect form of specific phenomena and is enacted through selection, 
comparison, and generalization (2007, 42, 69, 59, 70). In this mode, the scientist, who has 
reviewed thousands of examples, corrects the imperfections in nature by seeing the 
underlying structure intended by nature. Referring to atlas makers and the artists involved, 
Daston and Galison note, “For naturalists who sought truth-to-nature, a faithful image was 
emphatically not one that depicted exactly what was seen. Rather, it was a reasoned image, 
achieved by the imposition of reason upon sensation and imagination and by the imposition 
of the naturalist’s will upon the eyes and hands of the artist” (2007, 98). I argue that this 
search for the underlying unity of types is the guiding principle in H. P. Blavatsky’s 
comparative religion. There is a structural homology with the Theosophical orientation, and 
the idea of the “sage” with the emphasis on “universals” is suggestive. Her link, possibly 
unconscious, to the scientific world was at an epistemic level. It is not a causal link I aim to 
present; it is an interpretive or explanatory link. Truth-to-nature was one option that was open 
to her, the other being that of mechanical objectivity. The various codes in play would 
necessitate different positions, in part explaining some of the arguments of the time. As some 
scholars of religion turned towards the specificity and uniqueness of differing religions 
(mechanical objectivity), others, like H. P. Blavatsky, retained an interest in truth-to-nature 
codes. 
In H. P. Blavatsky’s Theosophical endeavour in comparative religion, I read the 
Theosophical teachings as an intrinsic component of the method itself. That is, the 
Theosophical doctrines are the parameters of the ideal type of religion. Theosophy attempts 
to recapture the first, the primal, and the original religion. All later religions are only partial 
reflections, degenerated forms, and distorted versions of this complete pattern. The 
Theosophical doctrines themselves are the template against which all traditions are measured. 
The original pattern is, then, represented by the Theosophical system itself, and individual 
teachings are fillers on the map or grid of Theosophy. The organizing structure in one sense 
takes precedence over the actual content, though the shape and content form an indivisible 
whole. It is my intention to examine the content, the specific statements made, and to assess 
them for justifiability in the late nineteenth century. I ask then, in what way was H. P. 
Blavatsky’s organisation of nineteenth-century knowledge justifiable?  
H. P. Blavatsky’s hermeneutic depends on the status of her Theosophical statement. This 
statement evolved over time. In Isis Unveiled we see little of the mature language of 
48 
 
Theosophy contained in The Secret Doctrine. Blavatsky’s mature Theosophy is contained in 
a number of terms, expressions, and patterns – a “Theosophical vocabulary” – which was not 
developed in Isis Unveiled. This developed, mature Theosophical vocabulary includes terms 
and concepts such as the One Life, root-races, rounds, the logoi, seven principles, jivatman, 
parabrahman, planetary chains, and many more.24 This mature Theosophy is interpreted into 
world religions in The Secret Doctrine, which is a work involved in appropriating authority 
and prestige, as well as presenting the system of H. P. Blavatsky. Central sections of this 
Theosophical language were first revealed in 1881 by A. O. Hume, and then in 1883 by A.P. 
Sinnett, in his Esoteric Buddhism (Hume 1881, 17-22; Trompf 2011, 57). Between 1877 (Isis 
Unveiled) and 1888 (The Secret Doctrine) we can see the gradual development of the 
Theosophical parameters, language, system, and intentions. I will trace this development 
through these key works in relation to H. P. Blavatsky’s concern with comparative religion. 
Important to this enterprise will be the understanding of the nature of various statements 
made in H. P. Blavatsky’s works, and the nature of her works themselves. Can we recover the 
intended audiences at whom these works were aimed? Are her works simply “religious” 
books? Or, do they contain aspects which might fit the description of reasoned study and 
argument, of the comparative endeavour in short? Isis Unveiled and The Secret Doctrine are 
texts which are usually described as esoteric or religious works. Precisely what these terms 
mean, and what this means for the study of Theosophy, needs to be reviewed.   
 
8) CHAPTER OUTLINE: 
 
8.1) Chapter One - Introduction 
This chapter encompasses the literature review, research objectives, and the methodological 
foundations of this study. I draw on a number of theorists to open the field and allow for the 
recognition of a new actor in the field of comparative religion, H. P. Blavatsky. Rorty’s 
pragmatist critique of epistemology, Gieryn’s discussion of boundary-work in the formation 
of science, Munslow’s narrative history, and Daston and Galison’s epistemic codes form the 
basis for a questioning of received teleological understandings of the late nineteenth century. 
I aim to show that H. P. Blavatsky produced a justifiable enterprise in comparative religion 
                                                          
24 Many of these terms can be easily reviewed in G. de Purucker’s The Occult Glossary (1933). 
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when her work is contextualised in light of new readings of past debates around spiritualism 
and the occult sciences. Once we wrench ourselves from normative and one-dimensional 
histories of the past, a rich variety of perspectives become available which reveal various 
ways of being human in the world. 
 
8.2) Chapter Two–Isis Unveiled and Comparative Religion 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first involves a discussion of various responses 
to the séance and spiritualist phenomena. In the second I discuss H. P. Blavatsky’s enterprise 
in comparative religion as presented in Isis Unveiled (1877). I enter the debate around stances 
in comparative religion by re-reading nineteenth-century scientific responses to séance and 
spiritualist phenomena. Specifically, I juxtapose the responses of A. R. Wallace, E. B. Tylor, 
and H. P. Blavatsky to these phenomena and will argue that all presented legitimate, rational, 
and reasoned responses to them. A re-description of marginalised scientific perspectives as 
“emergent” allows me to present Isis Unveiled as a reasoned, rational, literary, and rhetorical 
study of religion. While this work lacks the mature Theosophical vocabulary and developed 
morphological structuring that her later works will display, and which is the foundation of her 
developed comparative religion enterprise, it is central to my argument. I will show that the 
roots of H. P. Blavatsky’s comparative endeavour are established in this work, and many of 
the strategies embraced are here displayed.  
 
8.3) Chapter Three – The Secret Doctrine and Comparative Religion 
The first section of chapter three traces the development of H. P. Blavatsky’s mature 
comparative statement during the years between the publication of Isis Unveiled and The 
Secret Doctrine. This period between her two main works (1877-1887) is important for the 
development of the Theosophical system and vocabulary. Three texts were presented during 
this period, none attributed to Blavatsky, which contained significant steps forward in 
Theosophical thought. It is an irony of Theosophical history that the system of thought 
associated with H. P. Blavatsky was first presented in texts she did not apparently author 
(Hall 2007, 5-38; Trompf 2011, 57).  
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The second section of the chapter focuses on The Secret Doctrine which is H. P. Blavatsky’s 
defining work (Goodrick-Clarke 2004, 14). It is in this text that her mature vocabulary and 
structuring interpretive scheme is definitively stated. Her authority is announced, her 
hermeneutic methods made apparent, and I will argue that this work contains Blavatsky’s 
grand attempt to interpret and explain the religions of the world, and indeed the world itself. 
Theosophical doctrine is the “original” or “primordial” religion, full, correct, and of which 
derivative religions are corruptions, degenerations, or masks, and it becomes the measure 
against which all knowledge is assessed. The Secret Doctrine is a sustained, rational, and 
literary text which presents a theory of comparative religion. An examination of the various 
types of statements made in the work will show the propositional nature of the sentences and, 
as such, they can be assessed as rational against the broader environment. Blavatsky intended 
for this work to be engaged with by the scholarly community, among other communities, and 
judged on its merits.  
 
8.4) Chapter Four–H. P. Blavatsky and Comparative Religion 
Chapter four involves a broad contextualising of H. P. Blavatsky’s interpretive enterprise in 
relation to late nineteenth-century movements, trends, and knowledge fields. I discuss the 
implications and consequences of the “professionalising” of the field of comparative religion 
and question inherited exclusions which persist to this day. A significant portion of this 
chapter involves a discussion of how Blavatsky “intersected” with a selection of late 
nineteenth-century theorists of religion. Working outward from her own references to these 
scholars, I focus on her “use” of these actors in the field of comparative religion. 
 
8.5) Conclusion 
The late nineteenth century was a formative period in the history of comparative religion. I 
argue that reviewing this period in the light of a pragmatic and narrative methodology will 
open the field, allowing for the insertion of new actors excluded for various reasons that are 
no longer philosophically sustainable. In particular, I have examined the works of H. P. 
Blavatsky as an enterprise in comparative religion, one which has been excluded from 
mainstream histories. Part of this work has involved understanding the reasons for the 
exclusion of Theosophical work, both in the late nineteenth century and in current 
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scholarship. While a pragmatic reading of the ideas of the period opens the field, a narrative 
understanding of history allows for new stories of the past to be told. Creative and situated 
author-historian readings of the texts, the contexts, and the participant’s various intentions 
allow for new theories and perspectives. There can be no final narrative or meta-narrative, 
only justifiable and novel presentations of historical facts and events, assessed for their use. 
We, and I mean both academics and non-academic commentators on religion, tell stories 





















CHAPTER TWO – ISIS UNVEILED AND COMPARATIVE RELIGION 
 
1) INTRODUCTION AND ENTRY 
This chapter is aimed at an elucidation of H. P. Blavatsky’s interpretive engagement with 
religion as outlined in Isis Unveiled (1877). Instead of sketching a broad contextual 
background, I begin by focusing on a central entry point, that of the séance phenomena and 
“occult sciences” as they were conceptualised in the late nineteenth century. To reiterate, for 
the sake of argument I treat the séance phenomena and occult sciences as a single category, 
though my survey will emphasise the former. The debates surrounding these phenomena 
create a pivot against which the broader historical background, including the new 
ethnographic data, archaeological finds, translations of Asian texts, internal developments in 
European philosophy, history, and sciences, and colonial encounters, can be read. The reason 
for selecting this point of entry is Blavatsky’s distinct concern with spiritualism and its 
associated phenomena in Isis Unveiled. Furthermore, the manner in which these marginal 
sciences and phenomena are read can have a determining influence on the nature of theories 
of comparative religion. Specifically, I argue that various perspectives on the nature of the 
mind (psychology), the nature of the world (natural sciences), and of evolutionary processes 
were being negotiated in the late nineteenth century. This array of positions resulted in 
varying conceptions of religion.  
The larger part of the chapter will involve presenting H. P. Blavatsky’s comparative religion 
enterprise, including the strategies she invoked, and the assumptions on which it was built. It 
is my contention that Blavatsky and her works existed in the fullness of the late nineteenth 
century and not in any particular “esoteric” or “occult” current. This chapter will not, for 
practical reasons, be able to cover every field of nineteenth-century knowledge in any depth. 
Instead, I emphasise the spectrum of responses in the latter half of the nineteenth century to 
the séance phenomena and stress a pragmatic, that is, for my purposes, an anti-foundational, 
historicist, and non-hierarchical perspective. This undoing of normative and essentialist 
readings of the late nineteenth century will allow for Blavatsky’s writings on religion to be 
reassessed, showing them to be rational, rhetorical, and strategic. Read in this manner, her 
ideas are not to be gauged as marginal or peripheral to other pursuits in comparative religion 
of the time. Instead, I show her to be an intelligent and reasoned participant who presented 
justifiable assertions when they are placed in a pragmatic-based historical context. 
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To summarise, I aim to present and justify H. P. Blavatsky’s engagement with religion, that 
is, her comparative religion enterprise. The process of justifying her work requires two 
movements. Firstly, her work must be located and contextualised within the debates of the 
late nineteenth century. Secondly, the underlying ontological and metaphysical assumptions 
of other endeavours of the time in various fields, including comparative religion, need to be 
brought to the fore. This emphasis on the scientific background requires explanation. It is not 
simply that H. P. Blavatsky’s theories are built on general nineteenth-century naturalistic or 
supernatural orientations towards the world. For Blavatsky, Theosophical statements are 
propositional statements about the world and humanity. Many of her positions are drawn or 
inferred from existing positions of the time. She repeatedly enters debates on a wide variety 
of issues of scientific interest, and by making this move she challenges the binary 
presentation of religion/science. True religion, in Isis Unveiled, is a body of truths and facts 
about the world, and she ties her work to scientific and philosophical assessments in various 
ways which I will explore throughout this study. It is only once this division, between 
religion and science, was settled in our particular way that we now assess religion 
sociologically, psychologically, and philosophically, instead of as a body of propositional 
statements about the world. Isis Unveiled challenges, then, the binaries of studying 
religion/being religious, scientific/religious, and professional/amateur. Theosophical doctrine 
and teachings do not pre-exist their presentation by H. P. Blavatsky and they are, therefore, 
not some “thing” thinly clothed in scientific discourse or vocabulary, or any other 
vocabulary. Instead, they are an outgrowth, a rhetorical construction, an assemblage, based 
on the various knowledge fields of the late nineteenth century. In this I echo Santucci who 
notes, “The roots of the Theosophical Society may be found in the fascination with science 
and the increasingly popular view during the second half of the 19th century that the spiritual 
realm was scientifically verifiable and that its inhabitants – spirits – were in communication 
with the physical realm” (2006, 1114). Theosophy is the result of Blavatsky’s engagement 
with the late nineteenth century as a whole, and demands assessment in a holistic manner. 
 
1.1) An Entry 
It has become increasingly clear that spiritualism and the occult sciences were an integral part 
of late Victorian society (Winter 1998; Luckhurst 2002; Noakes 2008; Pels 2008; Ferguson 
2012; Sommer 2014). In this section I review three engagements with and assessments of the 
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spiritualist séance and its related phenomena. The protagonists are E. B. Tylor, A. R. 
Wallace, and H. P. Blavatsky. There were certainly other perspectives, ranging from 
disinterested agnosticism (Huxley) to dismissal (Carpenter) of the phenomena, and 
judgements ranging from conscious and unconscious fraud to works of the devil.25 Through 
this particular selection of participants I hope to gain an insight into various orientations 
towards the mind, physics, and evolution that were possible in the late nineteenth century. It 
may be tempting to argue that doubters of séance phenomena remained doubters after 
investigation and that believers remained believers irrespective of the proven frauds exposed. 
What, however, do we make of sceptics who changed their opinions after investigation, 
credible scientists who “converted” to spiritualism? Often, recourse is made to biography as 
scholars scramble to explain why otherwise “rational” people accepted the reality of such 
phenomena. This, however, begs the question. Biography cannot be the sole cause of belief 
and theory, and if it were adherence to naturalistic theories, so much more amenable to us 
now, would be explained away by the same logic.26 It seems more fruitful to me to argue that 
it was not stupid, crazy, irrational, or stubborn to accept that the boundary between the 
natural and supernatural was under negotiation in the mid to late nineteenth century and that 
the causes of certain phenomena was invisible intelligences. 
A few preliminary points can be noted. H.P. Blavatsky was an outsider who made use of the 
tensions flowing from the boundary negotiations internal to the scientific community. It is 
sufficient for my purposes to show that tensions within the sciences existed in the late 
nineteenth century, and that certain phenomena were sufficiently arresting and credible to 
require confrontation and engagement. Secondly, a Rortyan perspective on debates allows me 
to assess both the conditions of arising, that is, the context, and the fruit of this process – the 
actual theories and statements themselves. Rorty’s anti-essentialist, historicist, and pragmatic 
perspective emphasises the historical context and the produced knowledge equally. 
Knowledge is assessed for its pragmatic use, although this assessment is primarily done 
retrospectively. At the time of its production a new theory or branch of knowledge is still to 
be tested for fruitfulness and use. They are emergent fields. One linchpin of my argument is 
that there is no single “History,” there are only various “histories.” The past is open to 
                                                          
25The irony that recent research into Carpenter reveals an ambivalent attitude towards certain phenomena is 
not lost on me (Delorme 2014, 57-66). 
26See Sommer, Andreas. 2016. “Are you afraid of the Dark: Notes on the Psychology of Belief in Histories of 




various narrative emplotments which allow for a variety of justifiable outgrowths of 
perspective in a particular period. The range of potential readings of the late nineteenth 
century is wider than sometimes presented. Thirdly, Blavatsky challenges any simple 
science/religion or professional/amateur binary based on essential positions. She 
accomplishes this by presenting all religious statements as propositional statements about 
humanity and nature. H. P. Blavatsky’s ideas, the result of her reflection on religion, science, 
and philosophy, are a body of statements to be assessed for their truthfulness against the 
world (see Harrison 2006). The fruit of her enterprise becomes truth statements about the 
world and humanity. This emphasises the notion that for her Theosophy is a scientific, i.e. 
true, body of statements (Smith 2014, 462). The science/religion binary is challenged in a 
further respect. One frequently comes across statements indicating that phenomena are 
regarded as “religious.” It would, however, make little sense to describe phenomena 
established by science as “religious,” and this is precisely the debate around phenomena in 
the late nineteenth century. Many phenomena were proposed as evidence for associated 
emergent sciences, and once they met that threshold the denominating term, “religious,” loses 
its descriptive value.  
It is important that scholars “beat the bush” and chase into the open residual normative 
understandings of this historical period. Reference to the gullibility of scientists engaging 
with spiritualistic phenomena, or to the willingness to believe of supporters of phenomena, 
should be challenged. Both of these tendencies, I suggest, are partly the result of 
retrospectively viewing the debates of the past in light of present values. Scientific naturalists 
in the nineteenth century were as open to extra-scientific influences as any supporters of 
“esoteric” phenomena. Depending on what one meant by the terms, “occult” or “esoteric” 
phenomena were sufficiently plausible in the late nineteenth century to warrant investigation 
and acceptance or rejection on a rational and scientific basis. 
 
1.2) E. B. Tylor 
Edward Burnett Tylor (1832-1917), one of the founders of anthropology, though longer-lived 
than H. P. Blavatsky, was a direct contemporary of hers. It is worth noting for two reasons 
that his major work, Primitive Culture, was published in 1871. The first is that it is near 
contemporaneous with Blavatsky’s Isis Unveiled (1877). The second reason is that 1871 
predates his recorded investigations into spiritualism, which were undertaken in 1872 
56 
 
(Stocking 1971). How, then, can we account for the differing stances of these two works on 
the issue of spiritualist phenomena, one which became a founding text of the field of 
anthropology, the other destined for marginalization in the realm of the esoteric? By 
examining the variety of contextualised responses to spiritualism and the séance phenomena 
in the late nineteenth century, I suggest we can undo some of the distinctions of the past. The 
larger story of Tylor’s engagement has been told in a number of articles, my focus being on 
the question of what Tylor did with the séance phenomena (Stocking 1971; Pels 2003; Pels 
2008, 275-78; Schüttpelz 2010). How are they drawn into his larger narrative? 
The relatively slight ambiguity Tylor revealed towards séance phenomena is suggestive only 
insofar as it shows how arresting a spiritualistic séance could be when personally experienced 
in the context of broader social conversations. Stocking (1971) notes an evolution in Tylor’s 
assessment of the phenomena across his “notes.” Initially, Tylor’s assessment of the 
phenomena was that of fraud. This, however, evolved to an undecided position on some 
events, to an eventual “prima facie” case based on the evidence. It was an assessment, as 
Stocking shows, based more on hearsay than on his actual personal experiences (Stocking 
1971, 100). In Primitive Culture, Tylor works to separate an ethnographic evaluation of the 
phenomena from a possible investigation of (“spirit-manifestation”) “facts insufficiently 
appreciated and explained by science” (1873, vol. I, 142). Such an investigation may “throw 
light on some most interesting psychological questions” (1873, vol. I, 142). Despite this 
noted ambiguity Tylor is, however, clear on the implications of his ethnographic assessment 
of spiritualism (Pels 2003, 257-8).  
Tylor proposed an evolutionary development from animism to modern science. This sets up a 
homology between early humankind, savages, barbarians, the uncivilized, persons of low 
intellectual condition, and lower races. These are set up in opposition to nineteenth-century 
Western European civilization. He further makes a rhetorical link between Magic and the 
“Occult Sciences,” both of which characterize the “lower races” of the past and the present. 
His further move is to link these to the spiritualistic phenomena of the late nineteenth century. 
The belief in magic, he notes, is “one of the most pernicious delusions that ever vexed 
mankind” (1873, vol. I, 112). The ancient magician is both a “dupe” and a “cheat,” and magic 
is a pseudo-science and superstition, a sincere but false system of philosophy (1873, vol. I, 
134). From this evolutionary stance flow any number of distinctions, including that of 
religion as delusion versus science as objective, and the notion that material culture is the 
gauge of moral and mental evolution (Pels 2003, 258; Chidester 2014, 95). The same 
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assessment of ancient magic is then applied to spiritualistic phenomena. Mediums are 
conscious or unconscious frauds, displaying hysterical symptoms and having, possibly, 
mesmeric capacities to lull the senses of the investigator. Spiritualism was, then, a revival 
and/or survival of an earlier stage of human thought based on, amongst other things, the basic 
error of mistaking internal (subjective) and external (objective) life (Chidester 2014, 94). 
When not deliberately deceiving, mediums have a delusional belief in their own phenomena 
and have a capacity to mesmerise and delude others. Tylor’s basic problem was that 
according to his evolutionary theory these phenomena should only have gained acceptance 
amongst the “lower classes,” the contemporary savages. Instead, individuals from all levels 
of nineteenth-century society managed to become convinced of the reality of the séance 
phenomena. I noted at the beginning of my discussion of Tylor that Primitive Culture was 
originally published in 1871, a year before his investigation of spiritualism. He was, 
therefore, already invested in a particular conception of the phenomena. Spiritualism 
threatened the foundation of his theory, the implications of which, were the phenomena to be 
real, would be to question the whole Enlightenment movement and suggest that European 
society was in some ways possibly degenerating (1873, 156). The most Tylor could allow 
himself in his published works was a slight ambiguity. 
 
1.3) A. R. Wallace 
Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913) is an interesting figure not simply because of his link to 
E. B. Tylor and spiritualism, but because of his importance to H. P. Blavatsky. Wallace’s 
story has been told a number of times and I mention here only those parts relevant to my 
broader argument (Turner 1974; Kottler 1974, 144-92; Oppenheim 1985, 296-325; Pels 1995, 
69-91; Fichman 2001, 227-50; Pels 2003, 241-71). Wallace, a biologist and anthropologist, is 
remembered to history for, among other things, being the co-founder of evolution with 
Darwin. Despite an early interest in mesmerism and phrenology, he was, by his own 
admission, initially a “philosophical sceptic” and a “materialist” (Wallace 1955, 8). Between 
1865 and 1869, however, Wallace underwent a profound change of mind and became 
increasingly involved in spiritualistic phenomena, the implications of which began to 
infiltrate his theories.  
After attending a series of séances during the late 1860s Wallace became convinced of the 
reality of spiritualistic phenomena, and of the spiritualist explanation of these phenomena. In 
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short, he accepted that disembodied spirits of the deceased, or other disembodied 
intelligences, could affect the material world and communicate with the living. The “facts” of 
the séance, as scholars are so wont to quote, “beat him” (Wallace 1955, 8; Pels 1995, 69; Pels 
2003, 241). Once he had become convinced of the reality of séance phenomena, a change in 
his anthropological opinions was practically inevitable. No longer could the materialistic 
assumptions of natural selection explain what he was experiencing in the spiritualist 
environment. This is, it should be noted, the essence of my argument around the work of H. 
P. Blavatsky. Once one admits the reality of an invisible side of nature, and a mind 
independent of the body and which survives death, one’s perspective on religion would need 
to begin to reflect this. Materialistic theories, obviously, need to contend with the universal 
error of the mind/body problem and a spiritual world. Wallace attempted to convince a 
number of fellow scientists, including Darwin, Huxley, Tyndall, and Carpenter, of the reality 
spiritualist phenomena, but failed. We might note that despite this failure to convince these 
prominent scientists he could, and did, reference many scientists and other luminaries who 
had been so convinced, including, Varley, Crookes, Lodge, and others (Wallace 1955, 41). 
By 1869 Wallace had come to believe that natural selection as a principle of present utility 
and relative perfection could not explain a number of things, including the origin of 
consciousness, the origin of the moral and intellectual natures in humanity, the human hand, 
external form, organs of speech, and the large brain (Kottler 1974, 150).27 Prehistoric peoples 
and savages, for example, seemingly had a brain the same size as modern humanity, but did 
not require it to be so. Savages had these latent capacities but did not require them for 
survival. It is important here to recall Stephen Jay Gould’s assessment of Wallace’s 
perspective. It is not simply that Wallace abandoned natural selection for spiritualist theories. 
Wallace stuck to a particular “hyper-selectionist” and rigid understanding of natural selection, 
a version which could not explain the existence of the human mind and other qualities (Gould 
1982, 53.) For Gould, Wallace’s perspective is “logical” but flawed. The perceived 
shortcomings of natural selection in explaining various problems were resolved by Wallace 
by arguing for the existence of “higher intelligences” that could influence humanity and 
evolution. These were conscious beings that were able to influence matter through the use of 
will-power or force. 
                                                          
27Peter J. Bowler has highlighted the general nineteenth-century concerns over “man’s mental and moral 
attributes” in relation to evolutionary theories (1989, 229). 
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Alfred Russel Wallace dismissed Theosophical works for being “imaginative” and not 
“rational,” terms loosely associated with some of his own ideas in the estimation of scientists 
who found his “conversion” difficult to accept (Oppenheim 1985, 321). The liberal use of 
notions of standards of rationality and imagination to judge ideas and theories shows little 
more than that these terms are used as weapons as much as objective assessments. It is useful 
to review the ideas of Wallace that H. P. Blavatsky would have had little problem in 
accepting, or incorporating into her work, in one form or another. These include: 
- Miracles are attested in all ages, and provide proof for contemporary spiritualistic 
phenomena (Wallace 1955, 16, 199) 
- The notion of degeneration of races (Kottler 1974, 160) [Only a conceptual step from 
cycles.] 
- Two lines of evolution – spiritual/mental and physical (Wallace 1955, 207; Turner 
1974, 74; Oppenheim 1985, 311, 319) 
- Will force (cosmic and human) influencing matter (Kottler 1974, 156; Oppenheim 
1985, 317) 
- There is life after death (Wallace 1955, 207; Kottler 1974, 184) 
- Seeking truth for oneself, democratic epistemology (Wallace 1955, 216; Pels 1995, 
76) 
- Humanity will become a homogenous race in the future (Turner 1974, 76) 
- The laws of nature are rational, a rational religion (Turner 1974, 90) 
- There are disembodied intelligences and higher intelligences which supervised the 
emergence of the human organism (Kottler 1974, 156; Oppenheim 1985, 303; 
Wallace 1955, 9, 47) 
- Reality of clairvoyance, and of higher senses in the human being – superior modes of 
sensation, more developed in some than others (Wallace 1955, 29, 50, 51, 57, 101; 
Pels 1995, 82) 
- The spirit survives in an ethereal body after death (Wallace 1955, 108; Kottler 1974, 
162) 
- The spirit can partially or totally leave the body and return to it – there being an 
ethereal link to the body (Wallace 1955, 101) 




It is not my suggestion that H. P. Blavatsky remained within the parameters of Wallace’s 
speculations. Jeffrey D. Lavoie’s criticism of her, that she misused/misquoted Wallace’s 
work, falls short (2012, 326-9). I am arguing that her speculations and inferences remained 
with the parameters of what logic allowed. In this she is no different to, for example, 
Foucault or Rorty, who were similarly criticised for their “misuse” of historical and 
philosophical sources. H. P. Blavatsky quite clearly made use of the material available in 
original, creative, and specific ways. It is the case that she, like Wallace and others, 
speculated in reasoned, logical, rhetorical, and literary ways to produce their theories and 
perspectives. While they may have moved in different directions, they were not doing 
radically different things. Reading Wallace’s Miracles and Modern Spiritualism, I am struck 
by its theoretical, speculative, rhetorical, and argumentative nature. Wallace was 
philosophising his way forward, as was Blavatsky in Isis Unveiled. 
 
1.4) H. P. Blavatsky 
In 1876, in a moment of frustration, H. P. Blavatsky posed a question, the import of which we 
can begin to appreciate from a Rortyan perspective. She asked, “Now, arguing from the 
standpoint of strict justice, in what respect is a Materialistic theorist any better than a 
Spiritualistic one?” (1977, 228) From her earliest recorded writings in 1874, she revealed a 
distinct sympathy for spiritualism and its attendant phenomena. Many of the main points she 
raised in her pre-Isis Unveiled writings were developed in this first major work. I have, 
therefore, chosen to begin my investigation with this work. There are, though, also important 
statements prior to 1877. For example, she claims to have been “sent” to America to defend 
spiritualism in light of recent exposures of fraud. She further claims responsibility for some 
of the phenomena which occurred at the sittings of the Eddy’s and Holmes’s (Blavatsky 
1977, 53, 73). This reveals a move to appropriate authority, and to displace and decentre 
alternative explanatory discourses around spiritualistic phenomena. The issues raised by these 
interventions will be brought into relief through a discussion of spiritualism and its 
phenomena as they are presented in Isis Unveiled. 
Blavatsky sets up a rhetorical opposition between Science and Theology. The first is 
materialistic and dogmatic, the second is simply dogmatic. She presents spiritualism as a 
possible compromise between these two. It is a compromise as its promise was to use the 
methods of science to prove the statements of religion. She suggests, however, that 
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spiritualism is “uncouth” and “shapeless.” Nevertheless, “Spiritualism has never pretended to 
be anything more than a science, a growing philosophy, or rather a research in hidden and as 
yet unexplained forces in nature” (Blavatsky 1988a, vol. I, 83). Lamenting the way 
spiritualists and scientists, whose methods are conservative and dogmatic, have engaged with 
the phenomena of the séance, Blavatsky anticipates a time in which spiritualism will be 
regarded as a true science (1988a, vol. I, 84; vol. II, 637). The notion of spiritualism and the 
“occult sciences” as being emergent sciences was current among sympathisers at the time, as 
well as being reflected in contemporary research (Luckhurst 2002, 2). 
H. P. Blavatsky separates the actual séance phenomena from the spiritualistic, scientific, and 
theological explanations of them. According to Blavatsky, spiritualists misunderstand and 
incorrectly explain the phenomena, which remain authentic (Blavatsky 1988a, vol. II, 636). 
In opposition to these positions she inserts her Theosophical, occult, and esoteric explanation. 
She rejects the theory that disembodied spirits of the deceased are responsible for the all the 
phenomena. Theological responses, including the “devil theory,” fraud, and partial and 
uncritical acceptance, also lack the scientific and explanatory force that she is aiming for. 
Much of her writings on spiritualism in Isis Unveiled are, however, rooted in the varied 
responses of science to the phenomena. Her insights revolve around various strategies, which 
are of some relevance to my argument. Pointing to the “conflicting opinions of our men of 
science about certain occult phenomena,” she distinguishes between scientific defenders and 
detractors of the phenomena. The latter group include Huxley, Tyndall, Faraday, Carpenter, 
Agassiz, Mendeleyeff, and others. Defenders she identified include Wallace, Crookes, 
Wagner, Butlerhof, Varley, Buchanan, Hare, Reichenbach, Thury, Perty, de Morgan, 
Hoffmann, Goldschmidt, Flammarion, Aksakof, and Sergeant Cox. These latter scientists are 
more courageous, honest, and have more integrity than those opposed (1988a, vol. I, 44, 54, 
63). Blavatsky further explains that scientists who have rejected the phenomena as evidence 
of an unseen universe and of an invisible mind are characterised by a number of limiting 
assumptions. For one thing, Materialism as a philosophy is a “vicious circle” from which, by 
its very nature, it cannot escape. It does not contain the possibility within it of an invisible 
side to nature hence it cannot properly engage with phenomena (Blavatsky 1988a, vol. I, 
114). For another, they either lack, or refuse to acknowledge, personal experiences of the 
various phenomena. Finally, and ironically in light of the criticisms aimed at believers of the 
phenomena, some scientists who did engage with the phenomena on a personal basis were 
either prejudiced or deeply sceptical of the reality of the phenomena. A deeply sceptical 
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frame of mind would prevent the objective investigation of the séance events (1988a, vol. I, 
74-5). Assessing the denouncers of phenomena, Blavatsky refers to various scientists “own 
confessions of failure in experimental research,” of mysteries which baffle them, of missing 
links in their theories, of their inability to understand phenomena, and of their incapacity to 
research the laws of the causal world (1988a, vol. I, xlv). Repeatedly, and erroneously, she 
will claim that scientists cannot explain the phenomena. Scientists, obviously, produced any 
number of explanatory theories and, in truth, she simply cannot accept the various 
materialistic interpretations they presented.  
What then is the Theosophical, occult, esoteric, and true explanation of the séance 
phenomena? Blavatsky presents a number of solutions to this question. She rejects any notion 
of miracles beyond the domain of science and human reason. Drawing on the definition of the 
word “miracle” from Webster’s American Dictionary, she suggests that scientists have not 
infallibly established anything, and that they have not discovered every law of nature.28 
Secondly, she links phenomena to the field of psychology – which she suggests is a “terra 
incognito” for nineteenth-century science (1988a, vol. I, 46). Thirdly, though related to the 
second point, she links the phenomena to powers of the soul. She writes, “Call the 
phenomena force, energy, electricity or magnetism, will, or spirit-power, it will ever be the 
partial manifestation of the soul, whether disembodied or imprisoned for a while in its body” 
(1988a, vol. I, 58). Fourthly, she argues that the human will is involved in the production of 
the phenomena, and she is opposed to any passive mediumship. Fifthly, she disputes the 
spiritualist’s explanation that all communication is from disembodied human spirits. She 
proposes the existence of non-human intelligences, such as elementals and elementaries, as 
being behind phenomena, and the existence of adepts who can consciously produce certain 
phenomena at will (1988a, vol. I, 67). Finally, Blavatsky admits that fraud is an explanation 
for many of the phenomena, though she disputes that it is explanatory of all phenomena, 
current and historical. 
The implications of the above moves are important as they lead into H. P. Blavatsky’s 
perspective on, and interpretation of, religion. One strategy in supporting the reality of 
phenomena is to create a link between her personal experiences, contemporary reports 
supporting the phenomena, and the reports of “universal testimony” of the past. In 1874 
Blavatsky declared, “I am far from being credulous. Though a Spiritualist of many years 
                                                          
28Webster’s dictionary definition of a “miracle” is, in part, “Specifically, an event or effect contrary to the 
established constitution and course of things, or a deviation from the known laws of nature” (1865, 842). 
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standing [glossed by her as “occultist”], I am more sceptical in receiving evidence from paid 
mediums than many unbelievers” (1977, 34). It is a dead-end to doubt her honesty, or to 
suggest that she had vested interests in the phenomena being true. Once one heads down this 
avenue, one would need to apply the same criteria to non-believing scientists and 
investigators. If it is one’s position that “interests” determine belief, then this assumption 
would need to be uniformly applied. To take an example, Frank M. Turner notes, “The 
naturalistic publicists sought to expand the influence of scientific ideas for the purpose of 
secularizing society rather than for the goal of advancing science internally. Secularizing was 
their goal; science, their weapon” (1974, 16). Blavatsky repeatedly refers to her personal 
experiences of phenomena (1988a, vol. I, 43, 69, 368, 474). She is also prepared to accept the 
testimony of acquaintances and members of the Theosophical Society (1988a, vol. I, 66, 
121). Her important move is to expand these endorsements of the reality of phenomena to all 
ages and times – a “universal testimony” (1988a, vol. I, 49, 50, 53, 71, 117, 340). She makes 
a further important rhetorical move by linking the contemporary spiritualistic phenomena to 
the “magic” of the ancients, as had Tylor, though with opposite results.29 The flow of her 
argument is that contemporary phenomena are real, that the same phenomena pertained in the 
past in all ages and climes and, therefore, the “ancients” were in a similar position in terms of 
knowledge potential as the late nineteenth century (1988a, vol. I, 30, 42, 49, 50, 53, 117, 127, 
205, 220, 305, 486). This vindication of the past and its phenomena lead into her 
understanding of religion. In particular, these strategies enable her to challenge materialistic 
theories of the mind and physics, and the paradigm of evolution. If the phenomena are real 
now, and were real in the past, and the true explanation of phenomena is an invisible side to 
nature and a mind/soul separate from the body, then evolution is challenged in various ways. 
The implications of an anthropology which posits a physical, mental, and spiritual nature of 
the individual, coupled with a cosmology which included invisible intelligences beyond the 
material, will insist on a perspective on religion different to those which posit theories based 
on naturalistic and materialistic philosophies. Not only did Tylor, Wallace, and Blavatsky 
read the world in different ways, they were, in some sense, differently constituted types of 
people with differing capacities. With Rorty, we do not assess the truth to the world of these 
various positions; instead, we look to their justifiability in their historical context. 
I would like to briefly draw these issues together before turning to Isis Unveiled and 
comparative religion. For my purposes, all these issues become concentrated in a primary 
                                                          
29H. P. Blavatsky had forcibly made this claim at least as early as 1875 (1977, 101, 137). 
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concern, that of epistemology. Negotiations over who had the right to speak, what were valid 
concerns and objects of investigation, what questions were the sciences promising to answer, 
on what foundations and assumptions were positions based, and what counted as knowledge 
all centre around the question of epistemology. There are various strands which form the 
background of the late nineteenth-century engagement with religion, including archaeological 
finds, encounters with new cultures during colonial expansion, the new texts being translated, 
internal developments in European philosophical, scientific, and historical thought, issues of 
professionalising and disciplining, and the hidden relations of power projected by the various 
groups. The manner in which these strands unfolded can be brought into focus by entering the 
debates through the nineteenth century engagements with the séance phenomena. I am not 
arguing that all these concerns were necessarily or exclusively focused around psychical 
phenomena. I am, instead, suggesting that many of the relevant issues can be brought into 
relief by centring my study on the engagements with these phenomena. It is here that the 
boundary of many fields were worked out, applied, and reflected. 
Frank M. Turner notes that the 1860s and 1870s were the “halcyon” years of scientific 
naturalism (1974, 17; Luckhurst 2002, 12). Scientific naturalism invoked empiricism along 
with an adherence to Dalton’s atomic theory of matter, the theory of conservation of energy, 
and evolution (Lightman 2001, 346). Research has shown that scientific naturalism was not 
the sole player in the field. It needs to be distinguished from Positivism, a strict Materialism, 
the popularizers of science, as well as from the “North British” scientists who challenged its 
basic assumptions and whose influence faded only in the 1880s (Lightman 2001, 343-66; 
Turner 1993. 17-8). H. P. Blavatsky frequently referenced The Unseen Universe (1875) by 
Balfour Stewart and Peter Guthrie Tait, members of the latter group.30 Frank M. Turner’s 
Between Science and Religion discusses a specific selection of individuals who cogently 
challenged scientific naturalism. Two assessments summarise the general state of the 1870s. 
Luckhurst writes, “I want then to read the 1870s less as a passage of secularization than as a 
confused and confusing series of engagements over the relative value of ‘spirit’ and ‘matter’” 
(2002, 12). Janet Oppenheim, discussing Wallace, notes “It was not yet impossible in the late 
nineteenth century to call oneself an empiricist and still maintain the independent role of the 
mind, or spirit, in the physical world” (1985, 324). This position is further bolstered by 
                                                          
30For short discussion of H. P. Blavatsky’s use of this work, and her general comments on electricity, one may 
refer to Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke’s two articles, “The Esoteric uses of Electricity: Theologies of Electricity from 
Swabian Pietism to Ariosophy” (2004, 69-90), and “The Divine Fire: H. P. Blavatsky and the Theology of 
Electricity” (2003, 4-20). 
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Matthew Stanley’s study which frames the debate not in terms of religion versus science but 
between theistic science and naturalistic science, both of which shared almost identical 
methodological values (2015, 4, 80). 
The second half of the nineteenth century saw the disciplining and professionalising of a wide 
variety of fields. Some of the characteristics of professionalization are outlined by Turner. 
They include a generalized and systematized knowledge, an orientation towards larger 
society over individual interests, a notion of self-control through codes of ethics often 
embodied in professional organisations, a system of rewards, attempts to have one’s ideas 
taken up in the wider educational system, and methods to distribute knowledge into society 
(1993, 175).31 From this flows the polemical distinction between professionals and amateurs, 
insiders and outsiders, with H. P. Blavatsky usually cast into the amateur mould (Godwin 
1994, 311; Hanegraaff 2013, 154, 221, 239, 254-5). In relation to séance phenomena this shift 
in, and appropriation of, authority in the direction of naturalistic visions of the world repeated 
itself in many countries. The breakdown into scientific critics and defenders of psychical 
phenomena has been discussed by a variety of scholars and the 1870s has been highlighted as 
such a period of negotiation (Rawson 1978; Oppenheim 1985; Noakes 1999, 2004, 2004a, 
2005, 2007, 2008; Staubermann 2001; Wolfram 2012; Sommer 2014). The bare process of 
professionalising implies boundary work but not content. That is, disciplining inevitably 
excludes that which falls outside the new codes, but this is not linked to specific a-historical 
content. Any field can professionalize, from sports codes to scientific fields to astrological 
societies. Psychical research itself professionalized as a field in 1882 with the founding of the 
Society for Psychical Research. Initially the society contained both spiritualists and scientists 
with the latter eventually coming to dominate. Professionalizing, furthermore, implies no 
value to the new regime adopted beyond that which the new regime has now itself imposed. 
Scientists sympathetic to spiritualism are often explained away as attempting to reassert a 
“religious” impulse. This evaluation is problematic for a variety of reasons. Firstly, it ignores 
the real epistemological issues that underlay the competing visions of science, a point raised 
                                                          
31See also Poovey, Mary. 1998. A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth 
and Society. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Poovey also identifies the 1870s as the period during 
which the sciences professionalised and the issues associated with interpreting the “fact” was increasingly 
referred to professional and disciplinary bodies (1998, 3). Ruth Barton, discussing the period between the 
1850s and 1880s, has challenged the validity of the professional/amateur distinction, arguing that it was not 
reflected in the vocabulary of the time. She proposes a notion of hierarchical negotiation within each discipline 
in its place (2003, 73-119). My broader rhetorical point is that within this period various negotiations are still 
under way, resulting in inclusions, exclusions, and evaluative placing. Teleological impulses should be read out 
of our constructions of the past, and this, combined with the unsettled nature of the period, suggests that 
there is no convincing reason to continue to exclude H. P. Blavatsky from our histories. 
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by Lamont with his argument that a “crisis of evidence” was instituted by the séance 
phenomena (Lamont 2004, 897-920). It also ignores the non-religious impulse which 
questioned scientific naturalism and pointed to its inherent shortcomings as a theory. 
Secondly, it masks the subtle assumption that science or naturalism is more objective and true 
than other impulses. Opponents of the reality of séance phenomena and “occult sciences” 
were as motivated by extra-scientific concerns as any other participant. As referenced above, 
Turner notes, referring to scientific naturalists, “Secularization was their goal; science, their 
weapon” (1974, 16). Matthew Stanley has also pointed to a naturalist near “conspiracy to take 
over science” which was accomplished not because of a methodological superiority but 
because of extra-scientific strategies (2015, 4, 8, 242). 
We can extend this observation to Max Müller and comparative religion when Olender refers 
to his “theological presuppositions” which “determined his approach to linguistics and 
religious history” (1992, 87). It is difficult to decide now which we find less problematic, 
Tylor’s arbitrary classificatory impulse or Wallace’s notion that “facts” can speak for 
themselves. Pels is illuminating in revealing the shift from Baconian democratic, intuitive, 
domestic, and inductive epistemology to a more professional, positivist, laboratory ethos – 
Blavatsky falling into the former grouping (Pels 2000; Noakes 2002; Pels 2003; Porter 2006, 
1-5; Pels 2008). Blavatsky’s constant reference to “personal experience,” both her own and 
that of others, as a guarantor of facts further supports this observation.32 Pels has dealt in 
depth with Wallace and Tylor and less with, for example, Crookes, Varley, and Barrett, who 
brought laboratory techniques into investigative procedures. Also missing in the debate thus 
far is Daston and Galison’s study of objectivity and the underlying epistemic codes they 
identify. Much of the philosophical foundations of strict naturalism and empiricism are 
undone by the truth-to-nature impulse of the scientist “sage” who could divine what nature 
intended. These scientists looked beyond what they saw and recorded, and portrayed what 
was meant to be–what nature intended. This is a move away from pure perception into the 
realm of reasoned images, virtually a Platonic search for original forms. Rorty’s critique of 
epistemology enables one to bypass foundational claims to knowledge and allows us to 
review this past in non-evaluative ways. There is no privileged position, no neutral space, and 
                                                          
32Olav Hammer discusses in detail “narratives of experience” in New Age discourse in his Claiming Knowledge 
(2004, 331-453). However, his comments miss the point in relation to H. P. Blavatsky’s appeal to experience in 
relation to séance and spiritualistic phenomena, as found in Isis Unveiled. These were not elitist or privileged 




no infallible theory with which we can assess events and theories. There are, however, 
justified positions and their assessment for use. In this work I focus primarily on the former, 
the justification. Use is a retrospective evaluation. 
The assumptions of the late nineteenth century are undone; many barely outlived the century. 
Its epistemological assumptions, its general notion of progressivist history, and its 
justifications for marginalizing various perspectives have been challenged. Kuhn, Rorty, 
Foucault, and others have created a space to reread the past. I move now to occupy a section 
of that space by assessing H. P. Blavatsky’s enterprise in comparative religion as presented in 
Isis Unveiled. 
 
2) INTRODUCTION TO ISIS UNVEILED 
The general background and the details surrounding the writing of Isis Unveiled: A Master-
key to the Mysteries of Ancient and Modern Science and Theology (1877) have been well 
presented in a number of works on Theosophy (Zirkoff 1972, vol. I, 1-61; Olcott 1974, 202-
19; Ryan 1975, 61-78; Gomes 1987, 110-58; Godwin 1994, 277-306). Rather than repeat 
these well-documented details, I will focus on the basic points relevant to the present study, 
giving voice to H. P. Blavatsky on the subject of comparative religion. Isis Unveiled 
represents one particular response to the constellation of competing forces, ideas, intellectual 
positions, and cultural stances in the late nineteenth century. It would be going too far to say 
that H. P. Blavatsky presented a unique position with no points in common to earlier or 
contemporary theorists. Her views are, however, distinct and deserve a more nuanced 
assessment than they have thus far received. 
 
2.1) Production of Authority 
I am interested here in assessing various statements H. P. Blavatsky, and others, made 
concerning the writing and inspiration of Isis Unveiled. My aim is to give her a voice without 
the restraints often imposed by normative judgements. In the background, we need to keep in 
mind the situated nature of academic perspectives. For example, Blavatsky referred to the 
idea that discoveries are made through a “flash” of intuition and not through inductive 
methods (1988a, vol. I, 513). This is a version of the Context Distinction – the distinction 
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between the context of discovery and the context of justification – which though now 
challenged, is still suggestive (Salmon 1984, 10-4; Arabatzis 2006, 215-30). We need, 
therefore, to invoke other mechanisms to undo the constraints of the past. I have proposed the 
narrative production of knowledge, the anti-essentialist perspective of Rorty, the boundary 
work outlined by Gieryn, and the observations of Daston and Galison as potential tools to 
allow this voice. 
H. P. Blavatsky concedes that various persons were involved in organising, editing, writing, 
abridging, proofreading, and giving inspiration for parts of Isis Unveiled (Wilder 1908; 
Zirkoff 1972, 43; Olcott 1974, vol. I, 217; Blavatsky 1988c, vol. II, 45-53). However, 
referring to her major works, she notes, 
What I claim in them as my own is only the fruit of my learning and studies in a 
department hitherto left uninvestigated by Science, and almost unknown to the 
European world. I am perfectly willing to leave the honor of the English grammar in 
them, the glory of the quotations from scientific works brought occasionally to me to 
be used as passages for comparison with, or refutation by, the old Science, and finally 
the general make-up of the volumes, to every one of those who have helped me. 
But that which none of them will ever claim from first to last, is the fundamental 
doctrine, the philosophical conclusions and teachings. Nothing of that have I 
invented, but have simply given it out as I have been taught; or as quoted by me in 
The Secret Doctrine (Vol. I, p. xlvi) from Montaigne: “I have here made only a 
nosegay of culled [Eastern] flowers, and brought nothing of my own but the string 
that ties them.” (1988c, vol. II, 53) 
She refers to her “learning” and “studies,” and her imagery of the “nosegay of culled flowers” 
seems a fitting metaphor for the narrative quality her work displays. This passage, however, 
also hints at the unconventional nature of production, to which I now turn. 
Theosophical scholars are quick to reference the occult production of Isis Unveiled. We 
might surmise that for them, besides being believable, these claims enhance the authority of 
the work and the charisma of the author. As an example we might note, 
From the ordinary worldly standpoint, Isis Unveiled was of course written by H. P. 
Blavatsky, and on that, exoterically, nothing more needs to be said. From the 
viewpoint of occult fact and doctrine, however, the authorship of this remarkable 
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work is not so easily determined, and requires careful consideration of little-known 
and rather abstruse teachings of the Esoteric Philosophy. (Zirkoff 1972, 11)  
Additional claims of special production are listed by Boris de Zirkoff as including 
“precipitation” and clairaudience (1972, 11). Blavatsky subsumes many of these claims into 
the fields of hypnotism and thought transference. For her, no “supernatural claim” is made, 
and no “miracle” performed. She remarks that hypnotism and related fields are “now 
accepted by science and under full scientific investigation” (1988c, vol. II, 48). Academic 
scholars too note these special claims, but in this context the references serve a different 
purpose. In academic studies, claims of special production serve to delegitimize and reduce 
the authority, if not the rationality, of the author. Lavoie can argue that Isis Unveiled was in 
part “channelled,” and notes, “Blavatsky composed this work by using her psychic senses to 
peer into the astral light guided by her masters” (2012, 178). 
The different interpretive environments, Theosophical and academic, are thrown further into 
stark contrast by H. S. Olcott when commenting on the various hypotheses concerning the 
inspiration of Isis Unveiled. He proposes seven possible hypotheses, the first five are psychic 
based, while the last two are rational based. The latter are,  
 6. Or was it written by several alternately latent and active personalities of herself? 
7. Or simply by her as the uninspired, uncontrolled and not obsessed Russian lady, 
H.P.B., in the usual state of waking consciousness, and differing in no way from any 
author doing a work of this class? (Olcott 1974, 221) 
Olcott dismissed these two in favour of the psychic-based explanations for the inspiration of 
Isis Unveiled. 
These special claims must be referenced as they are made by and on behalf of H. P. 
Blavatsky. These claims, however, should not be used to delegitimize her works. In the 
current academic climate, scholars should but record, determine their function in a particular 
context, and then ignore these special claims. To act in any other manner, that is, to take the 
claims seriously enough to exclude her work from normal consideration, would risk them 
having to take such psychic claims as plausible. Academics cannot make this move, and as 
such can only regard the book as being produced in a normal, naturalistic, and rational 
manner. Once this is admitted the work is open to assessment, review, and acceptance or 
rejection as a body of ideas by the academic community. It is this latter task I undertake. 
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Blavatsky’s Isis Unveiled is a rhetorical, rational, and reasoned argument on those topics of 
the day which she judged important. Additionally, she made use of increasingly common and 
obligatory scholarly legitimising techniques, for example, the use of footnotes and references 
(Munslow 2003, 53-4; Chidester 2014, 277-8, 285; Stuckrad 2014, 102).33 I suggest that she 
“played the game” and her non-materialistic theory of religion reflected the ambiguity and 
potential that existed in the late nineteenth century. A further important point, habitually 
ignored by academics, is the exact nature of the psychic inspiration as detailed by Blavatsky. 
Many of her supernormal episodes reveal a distinct literary and non-gnostic quality. I mean 
this in a literal sense, for example, when she explains how she “reads” books in the astral 
light to the point that page numbers can be identified. In another instance she sees in the 
astral light “large and long rolls of paper on which things are written” (Bester 2012, 52-4). 
While it may seem trite, we are forced to ask ourselves: Is reading a published book in the 
astral light different from reading the same book in the hand? In terms of the practical result, 
perhaps it is not. 
The production of Isis Unveiled can be examined from various perspectives but, in the final 
analysis, H. P. Blavatsky’s ideas are to be assessed for novelty, coherence, justifiability, and 
pragmatics. Emphasising a point made by Barthes and reiterated by Munslow concerning the 
“death of the author,” it is I, the academic and historian, who produces this reading of H. P. 
Blavatsky. I too, with H. P. Blavatsky, conjure a work, a text with meaning, one which 
presents itself for assessment and evaluation. H. P. Blavatsky did not fix the meaning of her 
writings; rather, they can be seen as causal, and remain open to investigation, evaluation, and 
appreciation (Barthes 1988, 166-72; Munslow 2003; Munslow 2011, 77-9). 
 
2.2) Academic Assessments of Isis Unveiled 
While the qualities characterising scholarly writing span both Theosophical and university-
based academic publications, I will focus on standard academic views of Isis Unveiled. I have 
found a number of Theosophical assessments quite balanced, but they do exist within a 
relatively uncritical environment that accepts the larger Theosophical claims. The range of 
positions proposed in academic presentations, however, leads me to suspect that more is at 
play than simple objective description. Many scholars have successfully identified the main 
                                                          
33See Anthony Grafton The Footnote (1997) for a study of this device, a consideration of which would reveal H. 
P. Blavatsky’s conventional use of it. 
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themes of Isis Unveiled. However, there is a recurring tendency to judge the work and find it 
wanting. I challenge the norms and standards against which a work like this has been 
measured, and against which it falls short. 
Isaac Lubelsky’s work, Celestial India: Madame Blavatsky and the Birth of Indian 
Nationalism (2012) consolidates many of the negative scholarly criticisms of H. P. Blavatsky. 
Lubelsky has not decided if Blavatsky’s claims are based on revelation or are pseudo-
scholarly in nature. For Lubelsky, her works display an “irrational character,” pose questions 
they then set out to answer, present ideas that are a “mind-boggling,” are a “hodge podge,” 
use “doubtful evidence,” and mix sources in a way which produces “incoherent passages.” 
He further claims that Isis Unveiled became a Theosophist’s “Bible” (2012, 118, 121-6). 
None of these claims should remain unchallenged. To begin with, normative standards of 
rationality are simply unhelpful and unsustainable (Rorty 1980, 11, 333; Davidson, 1990, 
450; Evnine 1991, 11-14; Rorty 1991, 35, 37; Godlove 2002, 14-16). To label a text a 
“Bible” is a distancing technique, and this accusation will not withstand historical scrutiny. I 
would like to propose, that Theosophical ideas were no more only “religiously” accepted by 
sympathisers than were those of, for example, evolution by its sympathisers, a point made by 
Mary Midgley (1985). A similar point is implied by Rorty where he argues that we should 
reject the notion of the scientist as “priest,” the interpreter of the “real” world (1991, 35-36.). 
Walter E. Houghton can refer to the intellectuals of the nineteenth century as “prophets” and 
Ruth Barton records the term “votaries of science” in the period (Houghton 1975, 138; 
Barton 2003, 73-119). That Blavatsky “framed” the debate in a particular way is true. Yet, is 
this not the nature of argumentation? Isis Unveiled might be assessed as disorganised after a 
cursory glance. A proper study of it reveals, however, a clear argument which will be 
developed over her writings. 
Jeffrey D. Lavoie, in his work The Theosophical Society: The History of a Spiritualist 
Movement, reflects Lubelsky’s position. Isis Unveiled is “disorganised,” has “rambling 
tirades,” and attempts to bring together various incompatible subjects. Perhaps most 
problematic is his charge that Blavatsky “picked and chose the parts that defended her pre-
conceived philosophy” (2012, 181). This is no doubt true, as it is of a great many works, 
academic and otherwise. It is more profitable to regard Isis Unveiled as a sustained argument, 
outlining a position based on a holistic use of the resources available.34 
                                                          
34See Tim Rudbøg’s (2012) critical review of Lavoie’s work in Theosophical History vol. xvi, 2. 
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Olav Hammer, in his Claiming Knowledge: Strategies of epistemology from Theosophy to the 
New Age, notes that both Isis Unveiled and The Secret Doctrine have “shortcomings as 
religious literature” (2004, 222). Precisely what “shortcomings” religious literature may have 
is not clear. This evaluation, however, reflects Hammer’s general opinion that “The Esoteric 
Tradition can hardly be said to be supported by profound philosophical arguments,” an 
unhelpful statement in my reading (2004, 339). Hammer, like Lubelsky, has not quite decided 
if Isis Unveiled is revelatory text or an example of pseudo-scholarship. 
These scholars present useful insights into Isis Unveiled.  Many identify the main themes and 
topics. It is the value judgments that betray their own foundations, and reveal the problematic 
nature of their engagement with a work such as this. Most of these studies accept and 
perpetuate the current exclusionary historical narrative which predominates, the origin of 
which was the late nineteenth century. It is precisely this narrative which is to be re-
evaluated. 
Four scholars to have presented more balanced perspectives on Isis Unveiled are Joscelyn 
Godwin in his The Theosophical Enlightenment (1994), Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke in Helena 
Blavatsky (2004), Wouter J. Hanegraaff in New Age Religion and Western Culture: 
Esotericism in the Mirror of Secular Thought (1998), and Bruce F. Campbell in his Ancient 
Wisdom Revived: A History of the Theosophical Movement (1980).35 Their works are more 
balanced because they lack the more obvious normative valuations that characterise the three 
earlier writers discussed. Both Goodrick-Clarke and Hanegraaff rely on Godwin’s The 
Theosophical Enlightenment for their general perspectives. Goodrick-Clarke is the most 
sympathetic, and can note Blavatsky’s “original insights,” which were supported by 
contemporary scholarly and scientific works (2004, 9). Comparing this with Lubelsky’s 
assessment of her works having an “irrational character,” there is no doubt that Goodrick-
Clarke is more in harmony with the subject. Campbell’s work is non-judgemental, calling Isis 
Unveiled a “landmark in the history of Western occultism” and noting that it reflects the 
controversies of the time (1980, 32-9). He also notes, correctly, that it outlined the themes 
later developed in Theosophical literature. All four locate Blavatsky’s works in a stream of 
speculation on religion and mythology flowing from the Age of Enlightenment and the 
eighteenth century. This stream is well chronicled in Godwin’s work and includes writers 
such as Godfrey Higgins, Hargrave Jennings, and Emma Hardinge Britten, whose works have 
                                                          
35Other scholars to have dealt with Theosophy and H. P. Blavatsky in a nuanced and sensitive manner include 
James A. Santucci in various works and Robert Ellwood (1986). 
73 
 
obvious similarities with Blavatsky’s. I would not, however, confine her works to any one 
stream. H. P. Blavatsky engaged with many subject fields of the late nineteenth century. 
Significantly, Hanegraaff points out that many of these theories from the eighteenth century 
were not originally regarded as esoteric, but that as the field of religious studies 
professionalised in the nineteenth century they became so consigned (2013, 154, 221, 239, 
254-5). Jeremy Naydler, in his Shamanic Wisdom in the Pyramid Texts (2005) details a 
similar process in the field of Egyptology in the nineteenth century. The rationalization of the 
field entailed deliberate exclusions of perceived “esoteric” themes.  Esoteric, however, is not 
an essential category; it is political and situational.   
The consequences of a pragmatic and anti-foundationalist/anti-essentialist perspective are far 
reaching and require a re-reading of existing historical narratives. An undoing of previous 
historical assumptions, exclusions, and inclusions will become inevitable. The field will 
level, as normative judgements are rooted out, and marginalized perspectives from the past 
are allowed to take breath. 
A point should be made concerning the oft-repeated charge of plagiarism against H. P. 
Blavatsky, which was originally raised by William Emmett Coleman in an appendix to 
Vsevolod Sergyeevich Solovyoff’s A Modern Priestess of Isis (1895).36 The precise details of 
the charges are not of central relevance to my discussion. Of interest to this study is that there 
are differing assessments of the charge by scholars engaging with her works. Opinions are 
varied and include: uncritical brief repetition (Hanegraaff 2013, 273); guilty most of the time 
(Lavoie 2012, 271); “not germane” (Goodrick-Clarke 2004, 52); misleading half-statement, 
and “par for the Nineteenth Century course” (Gomes 1994, 144, 494); legally not guilty 
(Erixson 2006); guilty, but her original insights not invalidated (Campbell 1980, 35); 
“ingenious example of plagiarism” from a “discursive point of view” (Stuckrad 2014, 98); 
and, essentially not guilty (Cranston 1994). The diversity of views suggests that there are 
various perspectives from which this issue can be approached.  
In sympathy with Goodrick-Clarke, I regard the charges of plagiarism as basically irrelevant 
in an assessment of Blavatsky’s work and ideas. The value in Coleman’s review is his 
identification of textual sources from which she drew. It is admitted by most parties that she 
inadequately referenced, though a term like “borrowing” seems just as appropriate in this 
                                                          




context as that of plagiarism. This is a term Blavatsky uses herself in her explanatory article, 
My Books (Blavatsky 1988c, vol. II, 50). Isis Unveiled can best be seen as a narrative re-
working of a wide variety of ideas, primary and secondary sources, and contemporary 
theories. This narrative use has resulted in a new statement which demands assessment on its 
own terms. The claim of plagiarism based, in this instance, on such a wide variety of textual 
sources is also, in a sense, self-defeating. It is simply impossible for her to take ideas, 
sentences, or facts from so many different sources and present them all as they exist in their 
original settings. The narrative ordering and holistic setting which I propose here solves the 
problem by indicating the new environment within which statements take on new semantic 
value and purpose. 
 
2.3) Motivation and Aim 
The motivation, intent, or “aim” of an author can be difficult to ascertain. Given the 
consequences of the intentional fallacy, death of author narratives, implications of reader-
response theories, and a pervasive Rortyan anti-essentialism the debate shifts from “correct” 
interpretation to use. We shift to the use that Blavatsky made of the resources available and 
the use that I am making of her work. Certainly, I myself read Blavatsky in a particular 
manner and have multiple intentions of my own. For my purposes, I see no need to go 
beyond the surface statements of the text. 
H. P. Blavatsky reveals two recurring concerns in Isis Unveiled: 
1) That the population was losing belief in ‘God’, and 
2) The population was losing belief in personal immortality and in a life after death. 
Both of these beliefs, she argues, are innate in man and she intends to restore and sustain 
these views (1988a, vol. I, 36, 76, 222, 467). Pels notes that these two common concerns 
were provoked by the new materialistic orientations which many doubted could provide a 
stable basis for morality in society (2008, 273). Isis Unveiled is a work aimed, in part, at 
responding to these basic concerns. These issues intersect with comparative religion through 
Blavatsky’s interpretation of religions to sustain her position. She hoped to accomplish this 
re-orientation through a “brief summary of the religions, philosophies, and universal 
traditions of human kind, and the exegesis of the same, in the spirit of those secret doctrines, 
of which none – thanks to prejudice and bigotry – have reached Christendom in so 
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unmutilated a form, as to secure it a fair judgement” (1988a, vol. I, xliv). She engages in the 
interpretation of religion to draw out the essence and the truth of religions, and shows these 
truths as universal, consistent, scientific, and relevant.  
H. P. Blavatsky restates the fundamental ideas of Isis Unveiled in 10 propositions. In 
summary they are,   
1) There are no miracles, 
  2) Nature is triune, 
  3) Man is triune, 
 4) Magic is a science, the knowledge of which gives a person control 
   over nature, 
  5) True knowledge misused is ‘sorcery’, and compassionately used is  
   ‘wisdom’, 
  6) Mediumship is different to adeptship, 
  7) The astral light contains a record of things that were, are, and will  
   be, 
  8) The races of humanity differ both in natural properties and spiritual  
   gifts, 
  9) The separation of the astral from the physical is possible, and 
  10) Knowledge of magnetism and electricity is one foundation of   
   magic. (1988a, vol. II, 587-90) 
Boris de Zirkoff, quoting H. P. Blavatsky from 1886, notes that she retrospectively presented 
the objectives of Isis Unveiled a being to show,  
(a) the reality of the Occult in nature; (b) the thorough knowledge of, and 
familiarity with, all such occult domains amongst ‘certain men,’ and their 
mastery therein; (c) hardly an art or science known in our age, that the Vedas 
have not mentioned; and (d) that hundreds of things, especially, mysteries of 
nature – in abscondito as the alchemists called it – were known to the Âryas of 
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the pre-Mahâbhârata period, which are unknown to us, the modern sages of the 
XIXth century. (1972, 44-5) 
We are tempted to see these concerns as simply religious or theological, in opposition to 
scientific. This habitual classification, however, is neither explanatory nor obvious. It reifies 
positions of the past which were, in fact, more intertwined, unsettled, and unclear than at first 
appearance. To continue to simply impose a religious/scientific binary on the past is to 
idealise the past in a way that reinforces the assumptions of the past. Blavatsky’s aims and 
concerns segue with the pervasive concerns in the late nineteenth century over the basis for 
morality. 
 
3) H.P. BLAVATSKY AND INTERPRETING RELIGION 
Interpreting religion and engaging in a comparative agenda requires a set of strategies and 
orienting conceptions leading to interpretation as both possible and inevitable. I discuss, 
firstly, H. P. Blavatsky’s enabling assumptions that underlie her comparative method. I move 
then to outline her interpretive strategies as presented in Isis Unveiled.  
 
3.1) Interpretive Background and Enabling Assumptions 
I begin at the end. I am proposing that H. P. Blavatsky was engaged in a search for the first, 
original, primordial, proto-typical, and complete religion– the original pattern, the “mother-
trunk”– of which historical religions are reflections or offshoots of varying completeness. Her 
search resulted in a diagrammatic representation of the ancient wisdom tradition, which will 
achieve its maturity in The Secret Doctrine. I will discuss the diagram as found in The Secret 
Doctrine in the following chapter. Of relevance here is that the first sketches of this diagram 
are found in Isis Unveiled (1988a, vol. II, 264-5).37 From Isis Unveiled, I reproduce below 
these two anticipatory diagrams which represent the “Hindu” and “Chaldean” systems as 
conceived by Blavatsky: 
                                                          
37In Isis Unveiled Blavatsky gives an additional prose description of an image in a “subterranean temple,” which 










I am not aware of any earlier versions of these diagrams in or out of Theosophical literature 
and at present I regard them as composite glyphs with elements drawn by H. P. Blavatsky 
from various possible sources. For example, I identify the “Sri Iantra” diagram in Inman’s 
Ancient Faiths Embodied in Ancient Names as sharing many unmistakable points of identity 
with the mid-part of her Hindu-based diagram above (1872, vol. I, 147). Establishing 
potential sources is, however, only partially satisfying. H. P. Blavatsky transforms what she 
adopts, and what on the surface may seem familiar becomes something quite different when 
properly situated within her larger narrative. Urpflanze, primordial leaf, ideal drop, original 
religion – these diagrams, reflecting Daston and Galison’s truth-to-nature epistemic code and 
later consolidated into one in The Secret Doctrine, are a summary of Blavatsky’s insights. In 
its final form in The Secret Doctrine it will contain in germ all her ideas on cosmogony and 
anthropology, and many prominent Theosophical writers succeeding her will present a 
version of this diagram. Whatever the metaphor we choose, whether 
“inserted,”“injected,”“found,”“made,”“constructed,”“drawn,”“assembled,”“distilled,”“appro
priated,”or “imposed,” these diagrams are the result of Blavatsky’s meditation on religion. 
With this end in mind, I turn to her interpretive moves. Before detailing specific techniques 
of interpretation, however, I will outline some of her basic assumptions that enable her 
interpretative moves. 
 
3.1.1) Binary Homologies 
Earlier I argued that Tylor, Wallace, and H. P. Blavatsky could read the world in different 
ways based on their response to séance phenomena. Not simply could they read the world 
differently, they were, in a theoretical sense at the very least, different persons. The reality of 
an individual spirit associated with the human body would have resulted in a different subject 
position. I am not suggesting that they lived in different “worlds;” rather, I propose that the 
late nineteenth century could be read justifiably in different ways. These three figures existed 
contemporaneously in the late nineteenth century but emphasised and valued its various 
domains differently. Pels, discussing materiality and materialism, proposes four basic binary 
orientations - abstract/concrete, spiritual/material, subject/object, and culture/nature (2008, 
270-2). It is the second of these which was of central concern in the nineteenth century. 
Philosophical nuances concerning Blavatsky’s ontological stance aside, her response to the 
séance phenomena embraced the vocabulary of a basic spiritual/material opposition, the 
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implications of which are reflected in a wide variety of related oppositions. It is difficult for 
us to relate to this distinction so far have we turned from it in the academic setting. Unlike 
today, however, in the late nineteenth century the envisioning of an immaterial, spiritual 
world was still a justifiable proposition upon which various positions could be based. 
Flowing from the fundamental spiritual/material dyad we might tabulate some of the more 
important binary homologies relating to interpreting religion as they are found in Isis 
Unveiled,  
Inner  Outer 
Esoteric Exoteric 
Spirit/Soul  Body 
Intuitional Rational/sensual 







Esoteric dogma  Human dogma 
Spirit of a 
text/teaching 









Inner senses Outer senses 
Primary  Secondary 
 
These oppositions pervade Isis Unveiled and lead to a basic assumption that religious texts 
and actions are not only open to interpretation but positively require interpretation for their 
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original, occluded meaning to be revealed.38 This reasoning is not essentially different to a 
perspective in which meaning is not literal or obvious, or that a theory or methodology is 
required to reveal the actual meaning of a text. This assumption is, however, worked out by 
Blavatsky in a particular way related to the basic binary of spiritual/material which she 
invoked. Once the radical orientation of H. P. Blavatsky is acknowledged, we can identify the 
trajectory of the ideas which flowed logically and coherently from it. For example, not only 
did certain types of interpretive strategies become preferential, but the literary sources 
brought forth to support her endeavour were of a specific nature. In particular, she referenced 
interpretive studies which were non-materialistic in origin. In many instances these were 
older studies before naturalistic interpretations of religion began to proliferate during the late 
nineteenth century.  
We recall here the sympathy between Daston and Galison’s scientific “sage” of the truth-to-
nature epistemic code and H. P. Blavatsky’s “adept.” The practical result of this is two-fold.  
On the one hand, it makes interpretation inevitable, while on the other it frames the nature of 
her interpretive strategies. Both the creating of space for interpretation and the hierarchical 
nature of the binaries reveal the “politics” of Blavatsky’s work that will come into play. It is 
not simply a “politics” though, as there is no reason to suppose she did not honestly accept 
the reality of séance phenomena, and every reason to think she did. She will align Theosophy 
with the true, the real, the hidden, and the complete side of the binary, claiming the mediating 
centre of authority in these issues. It is important to recognize that her “esoteric” position or 
statement is characterised by a set content, a collection of true propositional statements. What 
makes a religious doctrine or statement true is whether it matches the content of the esoteric 
doctrine. In this sense, an esoteric doctrine may not actually be hidden from sight; it may be 
quite plainly stated in a religious text. It is knowledge of the esoteric statement that allows 





                                                          
38See Sinha “Corrigibility, Allegory, Universality: a History of the Gita’s Transnational Reception, 1785-1945” 




 3.1.2) Theosophical Ancient Wisdom Tradition 
For H. P. Blavatsky there is a universal Theosophical wisdom tradition, the existence of 
which supplies a partial answer as to what is guiding her selection process.39 She is locating 
and revealing this “secret doctrine” wherever it may be found. This only defers our inquiry. 
We seek to specify the source and content of this tradition. The wisdom tradition is made up 
of the term and a set of associated concepts. The source, in the sense that I mean it here, of 
Blavatsky’s Theosophical wisdom tradition is the composition of her own selections. That is, 
she is the source of her wisdom tradition. Her vision did not pre-exist her presentation of it, 
and did not survive her in its original form. What is the nature of this wisdom tradition, her 
“occult tradition”? I suggest that it is a body of truths and a recording of its movements 
through history. H. P. Blavatsky is “constructing a tradition” and, as Munslow suggests, this 
is the natural activity of history-making. 
The concept and term “secret doctrine” is found throughout Isis Unveiled. As one example 
we might note, “for the Secret Doctrine is the Truth, and that religion is nearest divine that 
has contained it with least adulteration” (Blavatsky 1988a, vol. II, 292). As a second 
example, “This ‘secret doctrine’ contains the alpha and the omega of universal science; 
therein lies the corner and the keystone of all the ancient and modern knowledge; and alone 
in this ‘unphilosophical’ doctrine remains buried the absolute in the philosophy of the dark 
problems of life and death” (Blavatsky 1988a, vol. I, 511). Many other instances could be 
quoted and there are a number of related terms, including, “ancient universal 
religion,”“universal tradition of mankind,”“universal wisdom religion,”“divine 
religion,”“ancient wisdom,”“primitive source,”“primitive wisdom religion,”“primitive 
faith,”“ancient doctrine,”“primeval Asiatic philosophy,” and “universal doctrine.” Three 
special and related terms are “Magic,”“Hermetic philosophy,” and “Universal Kabala.” The 
latter two can be used in a dual sense as they can also refer to Hermeticism and the Kabbalah 
as historically understood. Her orientation to Magic is particularly important, bearing in mind 
her assessment of the séance phenomena and how this justified ancient claims of magical 
powers. Magic, she affirms, has an origin coincident with the “first man,” and is consequently 
difficult to trace; it appeared on earth with early, spiritual races of men; it can be equated with 
modern spiritualism and was a universal science (Blavatsky 1988a, vol. I, 18-9, 35, 40, 247). 
                                                          
39I insert the word “Theosophical” here to make the point that I do not want to conflate H. P. Blavatsky’s 
conception with any diachronic based essentialist notions or scholarly constructs of “a” or “the” wisdom 
tradition or perennial philosophy. This point should be kept in mind throughout the thesis. 
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Tellingly, Blavatsky also referred to magic as being “occult psychology,” which linked it to a 
field of nineteenth century knowledge which she, and others, believed held promise (1988a, 
vol. I, 612). This “esoteric tradition” was the “mother trunk” of both pre-historic Buddhism 
and (Pre-Vedic) Brahmanism, from which world religions are derived (1988a, vol. II, 639). It 
is the “parent cult”, the “prototype,” from which historical religions spring (1988a, vol. II, 
216). The doctrines of the original source are the standard by which religions (religious 
statements) are to be measured (Blavatsky 1988a, vol. II, 2). The existence of this primordial 
prototype, the first and original religion as a body of truths, poses the question of its origin 
and spread. H.P. Blavatsky pursues these questions in a variety of ways, which I now outline. 
 
3.1.3) Origins and Beginnings– Diffusion and Psychology   
Michael Stausberg suggests that a theory of religion could be expected to respond to four 
areas of inquiry, the specificity of religion, the origin of religion, the function of religion, and 
the structure of religion (2009, 1-21). Almost inevitably, he concedes that many theories of 
religion do not cover these four aspects, which suggests that for something to be regarded as 
a theory of religion it need not, in fact, deal with all four points (2009, 6). Here I outline H. P. 
Blavatsky’s theory of the origin of religion as presented in Isis Unveiled. Stausberg astutely 
highlights the difference between the origin of religion and the beginning of a religion, and 
we pose the basic question: What is the origin and beginning of the wisdom religion and of 
the various historical religions? When, for example, Buddhism historically began – the 
beginning – is a different question to what the conditions may be for the arising or origin of 
religion as a cultural phenomenon. In Blavatsky’s conception the origins and beginnings of 
religion appear to merge into one another once the idea of knowledge descending from higher 
beings is conceded. We might begin with an understanding of what “religion” is for H. P. 
Blavatsky.  
I have proposed that the simplest way to conceptualise the category “religion” in Isis 
Unveiled is as a body of factual and propositional statements about nature and humanity. 
Religion, then, is divided into “esoteric” and “exoteric” categories. Esoteric religion is the 
“Truth,” and is conceived of as a body of true propositional statements. The “Truth” is the 
way nature actually works, the history of life on earth, and what the fullness of being human 
actually entails. It encompasses, then, the “laws of nature” and the proper description of 
being fully human as having a body, soul, and spirit. Referencing later Theosophy, the 
84 
 
important Theosophist, Boris de Zirkoff, can speak of Theosophy as “Truth, though 
expressed in human language, however inadequate it may be” (1983, 37). In Isis Unveiled 
Blavatsky does note that language may change over time, complicating interpretation, and 
that language may be inadequate for expressing certain truths (1988a, vol. I, 37, 308). Neither 
of these promising semantic insights is followed through on and they function simply as entry 
points for her own perspectives to be presented. For H. P. Blavatsky, ancient religions were 
more in harmony with nature, were “taught,” and were based on a proper understanding of 
the occult powers of humanity. They were also the fruit of the highest philosophical 
speculations (1988a, vol. I, 25, 38, 567; vol. II, 70). She suggests that “true philosophy” and 
“divine truth” are synonyms, and true religion is based on these foundations (1988a, vol. II, 
121). Not essential to “true religion” are ceremonialism, fetish worship, superstition, and 
“vain human dogmas” (1988a, vol. II, 41, 81). These truths are the result of experience and 
investigation, of scientific endeavour. Fundamental, then, to her theory is the idea that every 
religion has an esoteric and exoteric aspect. So fundamental is this notion in Isis Unveiled 
that I feel there is no need to reference it. Esoteric religion is the body of true statements, 
while exoteric religion is, for a variety of reasons both positive and negative, a falling away 
from this.40 In Isis Unveiled, esoteric also conveys a sense of being “restricted.” This body of 
truths is withheld from certain people (the masses) by a limited group of people (initiates). 
Restriction carries various senses: 
- Geographical restriction – truths in the East not the West. 
- Physical restriction in terms of personal distance from remote initiates and teachers. 
- Physical restriction in terms of lack of access to occult texts.41 
- Interpretive restriction in terms of a hidden meaning in religious texts. 
- Psychological restrictions in terms of those individuals unable to awaken their innate 
intuitive capacities – including varying evolutionary rankings of races. 
- Educational and cultural restriction in terms of a lack of inherited knowledge or 
educational preparation in these truths. 
The notion of “restricted knowledge,” a term I have adopted from the Egyptologist John 
Baines, is linked to a hierarchical structuring of society or of the group under review (Baines 
                                                          
40This interpretation is reflected in, for example, G. de Purucker’s Occult Glossary, see entries for “esoteric 
doctrine,” and “exoteric.” 
41Despite H. P. Blavatsky stating in Isis Unveiled that the esoteric doctrines were never committed to writing 




1990). Certainly, the early Theosophical Society was a hierarchical organisation with its three 
degrees of membership and certain restricted teachings being confined to the members of the 
Esoteric Section and the Inner Group. Esoteric knowledge was reserved for the few in the 
Theosophical Society, as it was in Blavatsky’s reading of history and religion. 
In terms of the origin of religion as a cultural phenomenon of humanity, H. P. Blavatsky is 
clear. The need for religion – the truths of religion – is innate in every human being. This 
need is built on an individual’s intuitive and instinctive knowledge of two principles, that 
“God” exists, and that the human being is immortal.42 These two principles are the foundation 
of all religions, and any religion must satisfy this “craving” to be regarded as properly 
functioning (1988a, vol. I, 76; vol. II, 124). No “creed, no false philosophy, no religious 
exaggerations, could ever destroy that feeling” (1988a, vol. II, 121). Among the binaries 
Blavatsky repeatedly invokes is that between spiritual and physical man, which indicates for 
her a distinction between intuitive knowledge and rational/sensual speculation. This is further 
expressed as a difference between reason as the “eye of the mind,” and intuition as the “eye 
of the soul” (1988a, vol. I, 16). The origin of religion, then, is based on every human being’s 
innate unconscious or conscious knowledge of the reality of “God” and of the immortality of 
the individual. It is a yearning for the truth of nature and the human being.  
This knowledge, universal in testimony according to H. P. Blavatsky, is rooted in the idea 
that the human soul is in natural communion with the inner worlds. A loss of this knowledge 
signals a descent, while a regaining of this knowledge, through initiation, evolution, 
philosophy, science, or otherwise, signals an ascent. I suggest, then, that Blavatsky presents a 
psychological – “psycho-spiritual” in her conception – theory for the origin for religion. Her 
position is based on two perspectives. The first is a particular anthropology, a three-fold 
understanding of the human being as body, soul, and spirit, which was itself underpinned by 
her reading of the spiritualistic phenomena. The second is her understanding of the 
evolutionary origin of humanity, to which I now turn. At issue here is the question: Why is a 
particular knowledge universally innate in every individual? We shall see how the answer to 
this coalesces into the beginnings of the ancient wisdom tradition and of the various historical 
religions. 
Having declared the existence of an ancient wisdom tradition, conceived of as a body of true 
statements about humanity and nature that is complete in the beginning though variously 
                                                          
42I place the word “God” in inverted commas due to the complexity of its use and meaning in Isis Unveiled. 
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expressed in different times by different groups, Blavatsky must then outline its beginning 
and spread. She does not do this in any consistent or focused manner, and we must extract 
various statements in an attempt to reconstruct the flow of her narrative. In my reading of Isis 
Unveiled, the beginnings of religion can be explained in terms of a theory of diffusion. Both 
the psychological and diffusionistic themes are rooted in her conception of the individual as a 
spiritual and physical entity. This is in turn premised upon, among other things, her 
acceptance of spiritualistic phenomena as real and on her reading of ancient philosophy and 
religion. We might recall at this point that I am arguing that the existence of spiritualistic 
phenomena in the late nineteenth century gave material support to the idea of a separate soul 
linked to the physical body which, in turn, underscored Blavatsky’s reading of religion. In 
fact, I do not require this link to propose my reading of her work. Isis Unveiled can be viewed 
simply as Blavatsky’s interpretation of religions, ancient and modern, which traditions, in her 
understanding, included a body-soul distinction in their teachings. I feel, however, that she 
was rooted in the various knowledge streams of her time and made use of them in her 
engagement with religion. 
I note a few orienting positions. Firstly, Blavatsky suggests that primitive/savage peoples 
existed simultaneously with civilized peoples in all ages (1988a, vol. I, 4). She does not 
accept the progressive evolutionary model of: heathen/pagan to Christianity to science, 
proposing instead a cyclic view of history, and a conception that “humanity” cannot emerge 
from “animal brutality” (1988a, vol. I, ix, 4). We notice that she does not reject the 
primitive/civilized distinction. Instead, she appears to challenge the idea that “civilization” 
could grow from a lower level of development. Secondly, she posits an immaterial existence 
of primordial humanity before a material/physical existence (1988a, vol. I, 149, 293, 295; 
vol. II, 276). Thirdly, she links the ancient wisdom tradition to the concept of magic, to the 
point that they become synonymous (Blavatsky 1988a, vol. I, 18, 24). Magic she defines as 
“spiritual wisdom” (Blavatsky 1988a, vol. II, 590). This link to magic—we might read here 
as including the “occult sciences” of the nineteenth century—is important, as she suggests 
that magical powers, and the religious texts (including mantric texts) propounding them, are 
ignored and ridiculed by the scholars of her day (Blavatsky 1988a, vol. I, 64; vol. II, 409). 
For Blavatsky the reality of the séance and spiritualistic phenomena legitimised a reading of 
ancient claims to the reality of supernatural powers. She remarks, “If the narratives of Owen 
and Hare, of Edmonds, and Crookes, and Wallace are credible, why not those of Herodotus, 
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the ‘Father of History’, of Iamblichus, and Porphyry, and hundreds of other ancient authors” 
(1988a, vol. I, 334)? 
On the question of ultimate beginnings, Blavatsky proposes no definitive answer. Magic is 
coeval with humanity and, like humanity, has an origin which cannot be uncovered. 
Understanding the wisdom tradition as purest in the beginning and degenerating with time, 
she looks to the earliest sources and earliest humanity for the clearest expressions of that 
tradition (Blavatsky 1988a, vol. I, 19, 25). The more ancient a claim for a text the more it is 
prized. We could, with some justification, reverse this formula, the more a text or concept is 
prized (based on the accessibility of the Theosophical truths) the more ancient it is for her.43 
It should also be noted that every new religion, if founded by an initiate, as many were in her 
view, is also based on a portion of the complete wisdom tradition. If ultimate beginnings are 
lost to us, broad historical beginnings are not. Blavatsky too consistently points to the East as 
the historical origin of religions to doubt her opinion on this point. She refers to the “sages of 
the Orient” (1988a, vol. I, vi); proposes the source of the secret doctrine in India and 
Turkestan (1988a, vol. I, 135-36); presents a progression from the East (pre-Vedic India) to 
Egypt to Greece to Rome (1988a, vol. I, 589); and identifies India as the “Alma-Mater” of 
civilization, arts, sciences and religion (1988a, vol. II, 30). She further finds the Mysteries 
and the first traces of the wisdom religion in pre-Vedic India (1988a, vol. II, 39, 98), traces 
the source of the secret doctrine to “both sides of the Himalayas,” and quite clearly states that 
Egypt owes its knowledge to “pre-Vedic India” (1988a, vol. II, 361). Blavatsky holds that 
there is a “transcendental philosophy of Oriental Gnosis,” a “primeval Asiatic philosophy,” 
which is the origin of later developments (1988a, vol. II, 192, 205). Expanding the notion of 
the Kabbalah from a Judaic setting, she refers to the “oldest oriental Kabala” (1988a, vol. II, 
212). She suggested that the East had answers to scientific problems (1988a, vol. I, xlv) and 
lauded the knowledge of the Brahmans and Gautama Buddha (1988a, vol. I, 442). Finally, 
she argues that the key to later religions is to be found in Hindu texts and refers to scholars 
who she feels support her, including, Burnouf, Colebrooke, Inman, King, Jacolliot, and 
“other Orientalists” (1988a, vol. II, 227, 259). 
In one instance she hints at beginnings upon which she will elaborate in the Secret Doctrine. 
She writes,  
                                                          
43Her misreading of the Egyptian Book of the Dead as representing the oldest strands of thought in Ancient 
Egypt instead of the later speculations as now thought is an example of this. Her ideas on Ancient Egypt, 
however, need to be carefully historically located for a reliable assessment to be made (Bester 2012, 65-69). 
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To continue the tradition, we have to add that the class of hierophants was divided 
into two distinct categories: those who were instructed by the “Sons of God,” of the 
island, and who were initiated in the divine doctrine of pure revelation, and others 
who inhabited the lost Atlantis – if such must be its name – and who, being of 
another race, were born with a sight which embraced all hidden things, and was 
independent of both distance and material obstacle. (Blavatsky 1988a, vol. I, 592-3) 
In this passage she introduces both Shambala (unnamed) and Atlantis as originating places 
for the wisdom tradition. We must stress two ideas due to the fact that they are elaborated on 
in the Secret Doctrine. The first is that primordial, original humanity was non-physical in 
nature and gradually descended into physicality with an attendant loss of intuitive spiritual 
knowledge. Secondly, in a few places, H. P. Blavatsky refers to “instructors” of early 
humanity who are also sometimes referred to as pitris (1988a, vol. II, 107, 114). The various 
classes of these ancestors of humanity form a central theme in her later works. 
For Blavatsky, both the esoteric wisdom tradition and the historical religions traverse history 
and the world through what I have labelled a diffusionism and psychological theory of 
origins. The simplest way to track the origin of religion is to regard the wisdom tradition as a 
body of truths about humanity and nature. It is an objective description of reality as it is and 
as such the same throughout history when faithfully presented. The ancient wisdom tradition 
is the source of the historical religions, which evolve from it as either degenerate versions or 
as local adaptations to suit individual circumstances. With exact beginnings lost to the past it 
is carried through history and geography by the Mysteries and through Initiations. This 
complete knowledge is carried by chosen initiates and secret schools in a pure form. The 
wisdom religion, as a body of truths about the world, has the following potential beginnings. 
Firstly, it was given to an early humanity by higher beings. Secondly, these truths have been 
carried secretly through history and civilization through oral traditions and mystery schools. 
These truths are periodically released into the world through the founders of new religions, 
most, if not all, of whom were initiates of varying degrees. Thirdly, individuals, through 
purity and honest scientific research, can uncover these truths to various degrees. Fourthly, 
certain individuals can contact higher beings at any point and, under certain specific 
conditions, acquire aspects of these wisdom truths. Lastly, the knowledge of certain truths is 
simply innate in the human being. 
For the sake of completeness, I identify a seemingly anomalous counter-narrative in H. P. 
Blavatsky’s works relating to the origin and beginnings of religion. While on the one hand 
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Blavatsky looks backward in time for the complete wisdom tradition, on the other hand she 
writes that the “marvellous perfection” (of the wisdom tradition) could only have been 
attained after a “succession of ages;” it is the fruit of no single generation or epoch; “Facts 
were piled upon facts,”“deduction upon deduction,” and “science upon science” (1988a, vol. 
II, 99). Reflecting the methods of the natural sciences, knowledge is portrayed as being 
cumulative. Certainly this position has echoes The Secret Doctrine, where the Theosophical 
truths are the “Accumulated wisdom of the Ages.” Elsewhere Blavatsky can refer to a 
“reform” of the wisdom tradition by Tsongkapa. There are various ways to resolve this 
dichotomy, however, and in principle what I believe is indicated is that Blavatsky is caught 
between two competing discourses. She is trying to link the scientific discourse of knowledge 
accumulation through experiment and testing with her ancient wisdom tradition notion of a 
handing down of knowledge from superior beings in the distant past. 
I conclude this short section with an observation. What is it that consigns H. P. Blavatsky’s 
speculations above to the “esoteric” and “occult” sphere? Many of the themes raised, issues 
discussed, and positions taken were integral parts of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
intellectual debates. The primacy of Sanskrit as a parent language and an Indian origin of 
religion, the search for cultural origins in Central Asia and India, the debates over whether 
Egypt and the earliest religion was originally monotheistic or polytheistic, the search for an 
ur-tradition, the idea that emanation and transmigration were intrinsic features of an oriental 
doctrine, a hidden esoteric knowledge for elites and common exoteric knowledge for the 
masses, all these were basic positions of European speculation at different points in time, as 
they were for H. P. Blavatsky (Manuel 1967; Bernal 1991; App 2010). I suggest that 
Blavatsky reflected and participated in the general debates of the late nineteenth century. The 
“colouring” of her works with descriptive terms like “esoteric” and “occult” is a distancing 
technique which, in effect, excludes and separates them from their historical place. 
 
3.1.4) De-contextualising and Re-contextualising 
H. P. Blavatsky’s work involves a radical de-contextualising of ideas, statements, doctrines, 
teachings, and individual sentences from the sources in which they are found. This is true of 
both primary religious texts, scientific works, and of the secondary literature with which she 
engages. Such radical de-contextualising is a re-contextualising of the isolated elements into 
her Theosophical whole. With her insight into the parameters of truth shining through the 
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dross, she wrenches this truth from religious, philosophical, and scientific texts. The large 
number of texts she quotes, whether on a second-hand basis or not, suggests that she feels no 
need to engage with a specific text in its entirety.44 The important question to ask in this 
context is: what is guiding her selection? In the Secret Doctrine the same question can be 
posed, but the answer is apparent in that work. The mature Theosophical system, vocabulary, 
and language are in place by the writing of the Secret Doctrine (1888) and it is this pattern or 
grid which guides her selections. In 1877, with Isis Unveiled, this is not yet fully the case and 
the Theosophical terminology is not yet established.  
Richard Rorty’s re-description and recontextualising, Gavin Flood’s notion of narrative in 
both the emic and etic description of religion, and Munslow’s narrative selection in the 
making of history all suggest that re-contextualising is an ordinary part of intellectual 
activity. The notion of narrative cuts deep. Not only am I, as a scholar, selecting and 
narrating, but we must admit that Blavatsky was involved in the same activity. Furthermore, 
we must acknowledge that the sources H. P. Blavatsky drew on were also weaving narratives 
and assembling stories. We should not look for the “true” story as a foundation; instead, we 
should embrace well-designed narratives in the hope and expectation that they may broaden 
our horizons. We are obliged to also admit that there is rarely a single narrative and that in 
any period there are competing narratives, each potentially justifiable. A specific advantage 
of a narrative view of history is that it provides an explanation for semantic shifts in words 
and concepts. As ideas and terms are extracted from a particular narrative, they are plotted in 
a new holistic presentation and obtain new semantic value. Blavatsky is conscious that she 
uses terms outside of their more traditional meaning contexts (Bester 2012, 110). 
Gavin Flood invokes the concept of insider and outsider perspectives on religion as 
competing narratives. Both are situated, contextual, and work within the prescribed rules of 
their individual communities.  He can note that “religion” can be seen as a “cultural text” 
with boundaries defined by set and identifying narratives (Flood 1999, 121). He further 
argues that rationality is a function of the larger narrative of the tradition within which one 
acts, be it a religious tradition or a scientific community (1999, 140-41). This, however, is not 
the basis of my argument for the inclusion of H. P. Blavatsky in the larger field of the history 
of comparative religion. Firstly, there was no firmly established Theosophical tradition at the 
writing of Isis Unveiled. Isis Unveiled becomes one of the pillars of this tradition, and its 
                                                          
44Sustained engagement with a single text is, however, not entirely unknown and H. P. Blavatsky produced a 
detailed commentary on the first book of the Pistis Sophia (Blavatsky 1982, 1-81).  
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rationality or otherwise cannot be situated in a tradition not yet formed. Blavatsky’s works 
are understandable and interpretable in terms of the broader concerns of the late nineteenth 
century. Secondly, I am arguing that to broadly categorise Blavatsky’s works as “religious” 
ignores the larger debates within the late nineteenth century about where the boundaries 
between science and religion lay. I see no reason, therefore, to assign value to her writings 
based on an idea that she wrote “religious” literature. Blavatsky’s works specifically 
challenge the now largely accepted boundaries between science, religion, and history. She 
accomplishes this by situating her works within the nineteenth-century debates of these 
fields, fields which were undergoing processes of intense boundary work. Referencing 
Donald Davidson and his rejection of the third dogma of empiricism, I suggest that Blavatsky 
was describing and working within the same world as every other actor in the late nineteenth 
century. Her historical context is surely the whole nineteenth century, with all its 
constructions, ambiguities, contradictions, and retrospective teleological interpretations. A 
review of her references reveals an interest in various fields, scholarly and otherwise. They 
are not confined to “occult” or “esoteric” literature, though clearly she had seen value in 
these. We remain with the dilemma of a certain vocabulary H. P. Blavatsky adopts, for 
example, that she was “initiated” into an ancient wisdom tradition.45 She then presented 
studies that reveal this tradition in historical works, philosophical texts, and religious 
literature. This claim is either true or, if it is not true, we must infer that Blavatsky’s works 
are the result of her own rational inquiry and research. In the latter case, her ideas must stand 
on their inherent value to the debates at hand. This is to ask the basic question, has H. P. 
Blavatsky presented a coherent theory of religion which is justifiable in its historical context? 
The answer I am proposing is, yes, she has. 
I am not suggesting that H. P. Blavatsky’s works are not subject to simple error, poor 
philosophical judgement, misreading, anachronism, parochialism, notions of trans-historical 
truths and ideas, reification of ideas, subjective assumptions, the creation of ideal types at the 
expense of historical specificity, “reading between the lines,” insufficient contextualising, 
lack of interest in an author’s intention, and many additional failings. Surely, she is guilty of 
                                                          
45While universities may drop terms like “initiation,” there is a similarity in being instructed in higher 
education, for example, the application of a theory of religion which unlocks the “true” meaning of religion 
which is not apparent to those outside the academy. Ironically, Josephson has noted that Max Müller 
recognized this similarity himself (Josephson 2013, 322). This is also a point made by Baines in his discussion of 
“restricted knowledge” in the academic field of Egyptology (1990, 1-23). It is of interest here that the concepts 
of “esotericism”, “initiation”, and “emancipatory knowledge” have been invoked in contemporary sociology of 
education (Beck 2013, 186-190). There is, in general, a functional and rhetorical equivalency between appeals 
to professionalism and esotericism. 
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many of these shortcomings. I have taken this list from Quentin Skinner’s “Meaning and 
Understanding in the History of Ideas” (1969, 3-53). Quentin Skinner was not addressing H. 
P. Blavatsky, but his own contemporary academic scholars and those in the generations 
immediately preceding him. The same critical point could be made in specific relation to the 
nineteenth-century theorists of religion. E. E. Evan-Pritchard reviewed the shortcomings of 
many early theories of religion, including those of the “comparative method” invoked in 
defence of these theories (1965, 1-19). He was, however, not critiquing H. P. Blavatsky. His 
attention was focused on his own academic lineage. Blavatsky’s works will show many of the 
same faults and strengths. This is one of the central themes I have tried to emphasise. H. P. 
Blavatsky engaged in the same debates as other notable scholars of religion, and her works 
reflect many of the same errors and strengths as other studies of the day.  
 
3.1.5) Religion as Science and a Body of Propositional Statements 
H. P. Blavatsky tips her hand on a number of issues related to science in the following 
passage, which I quote in full, 
Toward science as a whole, as a divine goal, the whole civilized world ought to look 
with respect and veneration; for science alone can enable man to understand the 
Deity by the true appreciation of his works. “Science is the understanding of truth or 
facts,” says Webster; “it is an investigation of truth for its own sake and a pursuit of 
pure knowledge.” If the definition be correct, then the majority of our modern 
scholars have proved false to their goddess. “Truth for its own sake!” And where 
should the keys to every truth in nature be searched for, unless in the hitherto 
unexplored mystery of psychology? Alas! that in questioning nature so many men of 
science should daintily sort over her facts and choose only such for study as best 
bolster their prejudices (1988a, vol. I, 88). 
H. P. Blavatsky fairly reflects Webster’s definition of “science,” and I propose that the best 
way to contextualise this passage of hers is in relation to her reading of the spiritualist 
phenomena as evidence for an invisible world populated by various intelligences, and of an 
immaterial aspect of the human constitution (Webster 1865, 1180). Her position is rooted in 
an understanding of the human being, in an anthropology, which simply does not allow for a 
purely materialistic conception of any subject. Materialistic scientists have, therefore, 
“daintily” selected positions which their materialism allows. This passage reveals: the 
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prestige of science that H. P. Blavatsky hoped to appropriate; the problematic areas under 
contestation within science, in particular psychology; an appeal to “truth” and the “facts;” and 
that honest science can guarantees its truths.46 
While H. P. Blavatsky may reveal a naive understanding of science, it is no more naive than 
many mid- to late nineteenth-century conceptions. Once one accepts the emergent scientific 
status of séance phenomena ones entire reading of the late nineteenth century will be 
affected. Science, for her, is both a method and the fruit of the method, a body of factual 
statements about nature and humanity. Discussing spiritualism’s shortcomings in attempting 
to be scientific, and apparently referencing Tyndall, Blavatsky outlines her understanding of 
the scientific method. Science involves the “observation of facts,”“induction of laws from 
these facts,” and “verification of those laws by constant practical experience” (1988a, vol. II, 
637).47 The result of the method is a body of true statements about nature, history, and the 
human being. We, of course, no longer see science as a body of eternal truths, but this has not 
always been the case. I draw a statement from Charles Singer’s A Short History of Scientific 
Ideas to 1900, where he notes, “Science is often conceived as a body of knowledge. 
Reflection, however, will lead to the conclusion that this cannot be its true nature” [Italics in 
the original] (1959, 1). Who was the target of the statement? H. P. Blavatsky? We presume 
not. There is no need to go sixty years back for such a conception of science. Richard P. 
Feynman, discussing the nature of science, notes, “Sometimes it means the body of 
knowledge arising from the things found out” (1999, 5). Where I, perhaps, differ from some 
academic commentators on Theosophy is that I suggest that her position is not an unjustified 
or illegitimate appropriations of science or some version of “scientism;” rather, her position is 
one of those possible within the realm of scientific thought and speculation of the late 
nineteenth century. 
                                                          
46Part of the appeal of a tradition like Buddhism to H. P. Blavatsky, and to many in our contemporary society, is 
its seeming potential compatibility with the field of psychology.  
47I have found H. P. Blavatsky’s conception of the “scientific method” in Isis Unveiled complicated to follow. 
Outlining how spiritualism might achieve a scientific status she presented the inductive method as the one to 
follow (1988a, vol. II, 637). Earlier in Isis Unveiled she has, however, rejected induction as a “defective method 
or reasoning” in favour of a “Platonic division of causes” (1988a, vol. I, 393, 513). Clearly, though, she does feel 
the body of universal truths she presents are founded on experiment and observation and on an “immense 
accumulation of facts” (1988a, vol. I, 613). I cannot propose a solution here, but, I suspect that the solution to 
her position may lie in the repercussions of the “higher human senses” as intimated by the séance and 
spiritualist phenomena. As the five known senses embrace the physical world, so do the “higher” senses 
embrace the spiritual world. Though he does not state it in these terms, I believe this is the implication of John 
Walliss’s notion of how spiritualism attempted to open the spiritual worlds to scientific research (Walliss 2006, 
32-43). Essentially, Blavatsky projects an empiricism and epistemic rationality explicit in the nineteenth 
century onto the inner worlds.  
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For Blavatsky, the ancient wisdom is a body of truths about nature and humanity. On the very 
first page of the Preface to Isis Unveiled she writes, “TRUTH, high-seated upon its rock of 
adamant, is alone eternal and supreme” (1988a, vol. I, v). The notion of “truth” is important 
to H. P. Blavatsky and it is repeated throughout the work in relation to the “secret doctrine” 
and the “ancient wisdom tradition.” Truth and “real knowledge,” or “facts,” concerning the 
immutable and eternal laws of nature are constant and invariable. A teaching which is true is 
always true, as the laws of nature are constant (Blavatsky 1988a, vol. I, 334). Truth appears 
to be a set of doctrines and teachings on various, perhaps all, topics. Truth remains “one,” 
that is, it is objective, and there is only one truth (Blavatsky 1988a, vol. I, 467; vol. II, 635). 
These truths concern the nature of the world and humanity. Objective truth being established, 
H. P. Blavatsky links it to the “secret doctrine, which is the truth” (1988a, vol. I, 574). She 
writes, “for the Secret Doctrine is the Truth, and that religion is the nearest divine that has 
contained it with least adulteration” (Blavatsky 1998a, vol. II, 292). 
From this we can appreciate that for Blavatsky an apprehension of unmediated reality is a 
possibility for humanity. That “the Truth” can be known is reflected in her reading of Plato. 
She notes that an aspect of the individual was “kindred” or “homogenous” with Divinity and 
was “capable of beholding the eternal realities” (1988a, vol. I, xiii). In a word for word 
unreferenced extraction from Cocker’s Christianity and Greek Philosophy (1870) – who in 
turn appears to be quoting without reference – she quotes, “The human mind has, under the 
necessary operation of its own laws, been compelled to entertain the same fundamental ideas, 
and the human heart to cherish the same feelings in all ages” (1988a, vol. I, xv; Cocker 1870, 
297). 
H. P. Blavatsky, in her work, is revealing the truth of reality as it actually is.48 All this 
referencing of “truth,”“dogma,” and “objectivity” in Blavatsky’s works is jarring to us. It is 
sometime since these words were used in academic scholarship in the uncritical manner of 
Isis Unveiled. This should not, however, blind us to the fact that Blavatsky was a child of her 
time. We need to attempt to recapture the habits of the past in order to better understand her 
behaviour, and a reading of Houghton’s chapter on “Dogmatism” in his The Victorian Frame 
                                                          
48I challenge studies which argue that H. P. Blavatsky made deliberate and conscious use of “poetic 
metaphors” in order to awaken the “intuitive” faculties in an individual, or those which pose her “esoteric 
language as poetics”  and as being deliberately unclear in order to increase authority (Algeo 1988, 4; Algeo 
2010; Gunn 2002, 193-227). That Blavatsky’s statements are intentionally metaphorically poetic is a different 
claim from the quite useful observation that Theosophical language, like all language, is inevitably and 
inherently metaphorical (Sorensøn 1999-2000, 229-31). 
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of Mind reveals that her vocabulary, tone, and attitude were not out of place in the Victorian 
era (1975, 137-60). 
Reflecting her anthropology, H. P. Blavatsky presents a polarity of intuition (the “divine 
outcome of our inner-self”) and reason. This distinction is reflected in various ways – inner 
senses/outer senses, instinct/reason, and intuition/rationality. This binary reflects the others of 
her position, for example, “divine” religion/“human” religion, and spiritual/sensual-material. 
Reason is “purely human” and misapplied can lead to dogmatic religions, while instinct or 
intuition is rooted in the spiritual part of a person and nature and is the spontaneous 
recognition of the truth of things. This intuitional feeling is inherent in humanity and has been 
lost for a number of reasons. Firstly, humanity has entered the bottom of a cycle, that is, has 
entered a material period of a cycle. This has dulled the innate spiritual senses of humanity. 
Secondly, civilization itself in some way closes off access to the inner senses. Thirdly, 
soulless reasoning “stifles” humanities spiritual senses (Blavatsky 1988a, vol. I, 145, 247). 
All this can be viewed as the logical consequences of her particular conception of the human 
subject. The human being, and nature itself, is triple-fold and poses a basic material and 
spiritual binary. This “Truth,” the “secret doctrine” now revealed, as a body of facts about 
nature and humanity, is “found on an immense accumulation of facts” (1988a, vol. I, 612). 
Enhancing this basic duality, she refers to the “spirit of the teachings” as being opposed to the 
words in a book (Blavatsky 1988a, vol. I, 291, 308). This concept will inevitably link to a 
notion of “keys,” which are required to access the truths hidden in ancient texts and 
teachings. By creating a space between meaning and expression, between intention and word, 
she opens a gap which allows for interpretation. A space is now available for the insertion of 
her ideas and perspective. Still rooted in her basic binary of spiritual/material she lauds the 
initiate (and theurgist) over the uninitiated. A theurgist is someone who has “awakened the 
inner senses” common to humanity. Early humanity (or portions of it), being innately of a 
more spiritual type, and initiates into the mysteries, have the capacity to see things as they are 
and to recapture the truth of nature and humanity. Their innate intuitional capabilities allow 
them a spontaneous grasp of things as they are, of the truth of things.  
We must be cautious here: Isis Unveiled is a polemical and rhetorical work, produced to 
persuade through logical argument. Adopting a scientific discourse, she suggests that 
knowledge is found through experiment, reason, and experience (her own, of her 
contemporaries, and of the ancients). Isis Unveiled is intended for the “logician, the 
investigator, the dauntless explorer,” and I argue that the work is a rational, literary, and 
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rhetorical production which aims to present a position and to persuade the reader into 
accepting it. There is little in Isis Unveiled which we cannot understand, though there might 
be much that we cannot accept. A doctrine of “emanations” does not require special insight, a 
mystical non-rational consciousness, or some Gnostic experience in order to understand its 
general character, while, in H. P. Blavatsky’s mind, this may be required to accept it as “the 
truth” (Bester 2012, 52-3; Stuckrad 2014, 98). The innate intuition for truth that she refers to 
is evidenced by the acceptance of a set of ideas which she designates as the “secret doctrine” 
and which is the truth of nature and humanity.  
Anticipating hostility to her work, H. P. Blavatsky notes that truth is something which needs 
nurturing and preparation, its positive reception is not guaranteed in a “materialistic” 
atmosphere. In this we would likely agree with her. The underlying assumptions or 
paradigms of a culture would in part determine what is allowed or sanctioned as knowledge. 
As scientific naturalism and materialistic philosophies and sciences began to dominate, so 
proportionally would diminish the respectability of dualistic perspectives such as hers. The 
door on the “other world” had, however, not yet quite closed, and, in fact, appeared to many 
to be opening. 
 
3.2) Supporting Interpretive Strategies 
H. P. Blavatsky proposes a “secret doctrine,” a body of true statements concerning the true 
nature of the world and of humanity. This secret doctrine is, perhaps, known in varying 
degrees by different cultures and individuals, but it is a body of objective statements, facts, 
and truths about nature and humanity. In addition to this, I am arguing that this body of 
statements has been diagrammatised by her. This picture is shorthand for the structure she 
saw displayed in the religions of the world. The diagrammatic structure and the body of 
statements are, then, two ways of representing the same Theosophical truths. We have, 
therefore, three pillars basic to her interpretive engagement: the underlying structural pattern, 
the body of truths about the world, and the supporting techniques of interpretation invoked. 
We confront two issues at this point. These are the nature of the complete, original religion 
and the extent to which its parameters were known by Blavatsky in 1877 and, the techniques 
she invoked to read the body of Theosophical facts into the religious traditions of the world.  
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Referencing the substance, the content, of her work I have proposed that it is in The Secret 
Doctrine that her mature thoughts are definitively declared. It is in this work that the content, 
the structure, and the vocabulary are drawn together into a holistic system. There is, then, an 
evolution in her work. For example, the marginal place of karma in Isis Unveiled does not 
reflect the centrality of this concept in The Secret Doctrine. A second example of this 
evolution is shown in the lack of a developed seven-fold human constitution in Isis Unveiled. 
To respond to my first point above, the nature of the complete and original religion is the 
totality of H. P. Blavatsky’s statements on nature, history, and humanity. Whatever the nature 
of this totality is, with all its possible ambiguities, contradictions, and shortcomings, this 
body of statements is the secret doctrine as it stands in 1877. In 1888, following 
developments, amplifications, additions, and subtractions, this body of truths will be restated 
in The Secret Doctrine. It is these truths that Blavatsky will look for in religious texts, and 
this seeking is her interpretive enterprise, which is supported by a number of strategies. To 
restate this, we might ask ourselves: How is a statement in a religious text turned into a 
Theosophical truth? 
Underlying the interpretive engagement is an organising structural pattern, which itself is 
unfolding and evolving. This type form is supported by a number of subsidiary or supporting 
techniques deployed by H. P. Blavatsky. These include: a functional assessment; a ranking of 
religions; allegory; analogy; symbolism; parable and metaphor; equivalencies/synonyms; 
fables, magic, and myth as science; keys; blinds; emblematical devices and peculiar 
phraseology of the ancients; philological speculations; gods as personified powers of nature; 
a universal solar worship; zodiacal symbolism and Sabeanism; euhemerism; reflex images of 
human types; arguments against anthropomorphism; a microcosm/macrocosm sympathy; 
number symbolism; and literalism. All these strategies and techniques are aimed at 
accomplishing an overarching interpretive aim: that of revealing the original, true religion 
that is hidden in exoteric traditions. Many of these tools are not original, and a number are 
clearly recognizable from the eighteenth century, and well before. Some of these techniques 
enable a placing on the structure while others enable the insertion of content, and some do 
both. Space constraints prevent me discussing these in detail. As a very brief example we 
might note the mechanisms of keys, blinds, allegory, and symbolism. These mechanisms of 
interpretation are not original and many are clearly recognizable from the eighteenth century 
and earlier. They suggest the need for interpretation and few reflect actual content 
themselves. By this I mean that the notion of “blinds” in a text, for example, does not in itself 
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suggest what is being concealed. That which is concealed is to be revealed by the interpreter. 
Similarly, the fact that a text is “allegorical” or “symbolical” does not reveal what has been 
allegorized or symbolized. The full content of the “mysteries” concealed will only be fully 
revealed in Blavatsky’s The Secret Doctrine, where the mature Theosophical vocabulary and 
system is presented.  
We might pause here to reflect on what is happening. H. P. Blavatsky is engaged in 
interpreting religions and traditions, primarily through an engagement with written texts. 
Implicit in this is the idea that texts are open to interpretation. Religious texts do not speak, 
and do not explain themselves. If they did there would be, perhaps, more agreement as to 
what they are saying. Adopting a Davidsonian distinction between causing and justifying, I 
propose that texts cause beliefs to form around them. These beliefs, the meaning of the text, 
are a coming together of the text, the interpreter’s existing webs of belief, and the world at 
large. Texts do not justify these interpretive opinions concerning them. Justification is a 
function of other beliefs held by those engaged in interpretation. Blavatsky is presenting her 
conclusions, the results of her insights. The outcome is a universal wisdom tradition that is 
the same through all traditions in all ages to the extent that it was represented in any 
particular tradition originally. There are two basic ways to proceed here. Either there is a pre-
existing fully formed wisdom tradition which she is locating in historical religions. Or, the 
result of her research into world traditions has led her to believe there is such a wisdom 
tradition. In both cases, the universal wisdom tradition is proposed. When I refer to the 
“wisdom tradition” in these instances, I am referring not only to the idea of a perennial or 
wisdom tradition, but also to the specific content or propositional statements of that tradition. 
In terms of the actual content, we might reduce this to a simple option, either H. P. 
Blavatsky’s tale of Masters and her initiation into the wisdom tradition is true or, her work is 
the result of her own research and imagination. Either way, we can still identify characteristic 
interpretive strategies in her comparative religion. 
 
4) ORIGINS OF THE THEOSOPHICAL TEMPLATE 
My reading of H. P. Blavatsky’s oeuvre proposes that her mature Theosophical system and 
technical vocabulary is presented in The Secret Doctrine. It is in this work that she reveals the 
dimensions and parameters of the ancient and universal wisdom tradition, the “secret 
doctrine.” The complete Theosophical system that she presents is the original body of truths, 
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the primal religion as a body of knowledge about the cosmos, humanity, and history from 
which all historical religions descend, or are reflections of, in one way or another. This 
Theosophical system is the result of her comparative religion exercise and her engagement 
with various nineteenth-century fields of knowledge. She has distilled, located, and we might 
add, inserted and constructed, the essential core of religions. Below, I sketch in brief the 
extent to which this final system and vocabulary is anticipated in Isis Unveiled. I will be 
looking for the implicit structures or patterns as well as presentiments of the vocabulary that 
we see presented in The Secret Doctrine. It is, again, not my intent to be comprehensive, but 
rather indicative. A simple perusal of the index of Isis Unveiled reveals a broad array of terms 
taken up in her later works which I have not mentioned below. We might not, however, 
expect to find the complete system presented in Isis Unveiled. Blavatsky suggests she was not 
sanctioned to reveal the whole system at the time it was written, and as academics we might 
expect an author’s work to evolve over time. 
In terms of the basic patterning, we see numerous “sevening” moves throughout Isis 
Unveiled. Macrocosmically, the basic structure, reflecting the Pythagorean tetraktis 
(1+2+3+4 = 10) and the Kabbalistic tree of life, is presented in the double-page diagram 
presented earlier. This basic pattern makes extensive use of trinities, septenaries, and 
ternaries, all fundamental features of mature Theosophical thought. Linked with this is a 
doctrine of emanations involving a descent from spirit into matter and a re-ascent to the 
spiritual state. There is mention of the “days and nights of brahmā,” pralayas, sapta-lokas, 
and the idea of alternate destruction of the world by fire and water. Isis Unveiled references 
the “Central Spiritual Sun,” primordial substance, the “point in the circle,” and the 
“androgynous duality” which characterises nature. This duality is reflected in the highest 
conceptions of deity and the lowest entity conceivable. We find references to the astral light 
and Ākâśa, to cycles, and to globes, the latter of which is a fundamental term associated with 
the later idea of planetary chains. The microcosm/macrocosm homology is present, but, it is 
only in The Secret Doctrine that the links, sympathies, and influences between the individual, 
the planetary chain, and the solar system are fully developed.  
Historically, a number of elements are in place for later development by Blavatsky. For her, 
there is a double or triple evolution, reflecting the spiritual, mental, and physical aspects of 
humanity and nature. The evolution of humanity from an immaterial state into physical 
matter, with a cyclic re-ascent into spirit, is outlined in Isis Unveiled. She presents a history 
of humanity which includes pitris (ancestors), “sons of god,” giants, the “sacred island,” and 
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Atlantis. Included in this story is reference to “races” of humanity, which divide into the 
smaller units of family, nation, and tribe. Implicit in the history of humankind are the mystery 
schools, initiations, and the adepts, all central elements of her narrative.  
Anthropologically, it is generally conceded that H. P. Blavatsky presented a three-fold 
division of the individual – spirit, soul, and body – in Isis Unveiled. The later seven-fold 
division is, however, hinted at in her comments on the constitution of the individual in the 
Egyptian religion (Blavatsky 1988a, vol. II, 367; Bester 2012, 138). The idea of an originally 
androgynous humanity which split into male and female is presented, as is the notion that less 
evolved cosmic spirits failed in attempting to endow early humanity with a spiritual 
component. It is not my intent to enter the debate over H. P. Blavatsky’s conception, 
understanding, rejection, or acceptance of reincarnation of metempsychosis (Chajes 2012; 
Sender 2016). It is sufficient here to note that she introduced the terms, and, like many 
themes in Isis Unveiled, they will be reworked and developed in her later writings. While the 
mature vocabulary is lacking, she clearly presents various post-mortem states which are 
rooted in a basic dualistic understanding of the individual. Presaging the Third Fundamental 
Proposition of The Secret Doctrine, she outlines an idea of “absorption,” in which the human 
being possesses a spark of the Central Sun, and that the soul is absorbed into the one spiritual 
principle at the end of a manifested period. Also present is the idea of recapitulation. Later to 
become a part of her esoteric instructions, this is the notion that past evolutionary phases are 
recapitulated in the womb by the embryo. Finally, the term “monad” is introduced, a basic 
term of later Theosophy. 
There are a number of additional terms and concepts that will be developed by Blavatsky. 
The “secret doctrine” or ancient wisdom tradition, flowing from the East to the West, and 
rooted in earlier, lost civilizations is important. Blavatsky makes reference to Sansar 
(language of the Sun), which seems a probable precursor of the Senzar, the mystery language, 
in The Secret Doctrine. The term bodhisattva, while not specifically mentioned, is 
conceptually outlined. Karma, a central term and concept of The Secret Doctrine, is 
associated in Isis Unveiled with notions of “revolutions of a wheel,” successions of life and 
death, moral cause, merit and demerit, a “power that controls the universe,” and successive 
self-procreations in future embodiments. 
It is not within the scope of this thesis to examine earlier works which reflected similar 
concepts as above and which may have been specific resources or precursors for Blavatsky’s 
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speculations. An example of such a source is Isaac Preston Cory’s Ancient Fragments (1832), 
a source acknowledged by Blavatsky, which proposes the following characteristics as 
components of Heathen or Ancient Theology – a microcosm/macrocosm sympathy, human 
nature the same in all ages resulting in identical truths, a hermaphroditic deity – the One, 
male and female conceptions of the gods, three hypostases (trinity speculations), the monad, 
and a concept of the succession of worlds which are alternately destroyed by flood and fire 
(1832, xxxiii-lix, 333-58). Other works which have been proposed as precursors to her 
writings include Godfrey Higgin’s Anacalypsis (1836) and Emma Hardinge Britten’s Art 
Magic (1876). 
In Isis Unveiled, Blavatsky is already working with many of the terms and concepts of her 
mature Theosophy. It is surprising the extent to which the seeds of her later vocabulary and 
conceptions are already present in this, her first major work. Her later writings appear, in 
many instances, to be essentially elaborations on and developments of positions already 
hinted at. The chief implication of this is that the origins of her Theosophical thought needs 
to be pushed back to Isis Unveiled and before. The Secret Doctrine is the culmination of a 
process, not the beginning. Certainly, in Isis Unveiled, her basic orientation to the various 
knowledge fields of the late nineteenth century is already in place.  
 
5) CONCLUSION 
James Gleick offered a description of the “butterfly effect” of chaos theory as the “sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions” (1993, 8). My appreciation of H. P. Blavatsky’s 
engagement with religion requires an understanding of both my own entry point and 
selections and Blavatsky’s use of the resources available to her in the nineteenth century. The 
consequence of this is a suspension of hierarchical assessments of the various knowledge 
fields of the late nineteenth century, which will result in, among other things, a questioning of 
teleological and normative narratives of the history of comparative religion.  
In the next chapter, I undertake two tasks. Firstly, I pursue the development of the technical 
Theosophical vocabulary, system, and by implication, its methodology, by tracing key texts 
in the interim years between Isis Unveiled and The Secret Doctrine. While the works to be 
examined are not attributed to Blavatsky they are so intimately connected to her that they 
cannot be separated from her. Secondly, I examine the culmination of her work as an 
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enterprise in comparative religion as it is presented in The Secret Doctrine. My focus shifts 
from justifying and sourcing Blavatsky’s ideas towards an examination of her Theosophical 
system as an interpretive tool. Like any interpretive theory, her system unlocks the hidden 
meaning behind religion and religions. The search for an original prototype of religion will 
result in a classificatory exercise in which historical religions are measured and assessed 
against the original. As H. P. Blavatsky’s system takes shape, it becomes self-supporting and 
takes on a life of its own. It no longer needs to justify itself and it becomes, instead, a self-
sufficient system. This Theosophical classificatory exercise, therefore, is to be evaluated for 



















CHAPTER THREE – THE SECRET DOCTRINE AND COMPARATIVE RELIGION 
   
1) INTRODUCTION 
I am arguing that H. P. Blavatsky established an interpretive position with respect to religion 
as a category and in relation to the various religions of the world. The two main components 
of her comparative stance are the identifying of an underlying template, an ur-form, and the 
development of a technical vocabulary to express her ideas. I have worked to show that the 
seeds of these strategies were sown in Isis Unveiled. In the first section of this chapter I trace 
both the germination of this pattern or grid and the development of this language between the 
years 1877 and 1888. As it is my position that her system was definitively stated in its mature 
form in The Secret Doctrine (1888) I will engage with this major work of hers in the second 
section of this chapter. I track the trajectory of her ideas chronologically, dealing with each 
year separately or, where practical, by grouping years together. The primary sources I will be 
drawing on are Blavatsky’s Collected Writings for the years 1877 to 1887/8, A. O. Hume’s 
“Fragments of Occult Truth” (1881), A. P. Sinnett’s Esoteric Buddhism (1883), and the 
Mahatma Letters to A. P. Sinnett (1880-1886). While the latter three works are not attributed 
to Blavatsky they are the works in which, during this interim period, the Theosophical system 
unfolded. 
Specifically, I am looking for the holistic integration of the Theosophical cosmological 
speculations with the seven-fold human constitution and the evolution of the human being 
through history, including through the various kingdoms of nature. Once this scheme is 
presented in the recognizably mature Theosophical vocabulary, I will regard the template as 
being in place and move to a discussion of The Secret Doctrine. We shall see that Blavatsky’s 
holistic system is essentially established by 1882/3, being first sufficiently presented for my 
purposes in the Mahatma Letters. My review of the interim years will, therefore, terminate in 
1883, at which point I pick up the thread in 1888 with The Secret Doctrine. It must be noted 
that I am privileging the development of the seven-fold constitution of the individual due to 
its centrality in Theosophical thought. It is also not compulsory that the final terminology of 
cosmogenesis and the evolution of the human race be fully presented. Partial, specific 
statements are evidence of the complete system. For example, if humanity can be said to be in 
the “fifth” race I will assume the races doctrine is in place even if no specific mention of the 
other six races are made. My comments below will become increasingly focused and limited 
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to the scope of this thesis as the decade of the 1880s unfolds. What follows in the years from 
1883 to The Secret Doctrine, and after, is a series of refinements, amplifications, debates, 
alternate variants, and contestations over specifics and it becomes impossible and 
unnecessary, for my purposes, to track these in any detail.  
The two primary interpretive tools, the Theosophical vocabulary and the unfolding of the 
basic typology, are inherently bound to each other. For example, Theosophy proposes a 
seven-fold division of the human constitution which devolves from a spiritual component to a 
physical body. This is the basic pattern, or type, of the human being and of all entities, 
including planets, solar systems, and so on. The classic Theosophical terms for these seven 
human principles are: atman, buddhi, manas, kama, prana, linga-sarira, and sthula-sarira,49 
and each term has a place in the structure. I am aware that there are various versions, 
interpretive refinements in my estimation, of this seven-fold division within Blavatsky’s 
writings and, therefore, varying vocabularies. However, the basic pattern of seven must 
remain or the Theosophical edifice risks disintegration. As these terms are recognizably 
Asian, how then does one identify a vocabulary as Theosophical? The answer is two-fold. 
Firstly, the denotation of a set term must reflect the basic attributes that Theosophy attaches 
to that concept and, secondly, the specific term must be understood within a holistic structure 
and be surrounded by other identifiable Theosophical terms. For example, should atman be 
discussed outside of the broader context of the Theosophical seven-fold constitution of the 
individual, we may assume that it is not necessarily, or obviously, being used in the sense of 
the primary Theosophical vocabulary. It is difficult to specify set conditions on this issue and 
each instance of use should be individually assessed. 
 
2) THE INTERIM YEARS 
It is not my intention to trace in any detail continuity in various themes that underwrite H. P. 
Blavatsky’s comparative religion, but it is worth recording that a number of them are carried 
through. Importantly, she retains her stance on the séance phenomena. These phenomena are 
real and authentic and many of her positions flow from this understanding. The ambiguous 
and ambivalent relation of science and scientists to these phenomena allow her to accept 
some of the scientific endeavours of her day while at the same time rejecting those limiting 
                                                          
49 I copy Sanskrit terms directly as I find them in the source literature and make no attempt to harmonise, 
correct, or update them. 
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and materialistic versions which she abhors. The rhetorical linking of séance phenomena and 
occult sciences to ancient magic still allows her to read religious scriptures, when properly 
interpreted, as true descriptions of the world which enables her search for the pure, archaic, 
and original system. Blavatsky displays a confidence in the emerging field of psychology– a 
field she believes will eventually lead to a conception of the individual person as multi-
dimensional instead of as just a material entity. That the “soul” or “mind” exists independent 
of the body leads into her argument that the more subtle dimensions of the mind can know 
reality as it really is and present the “Truth” of the world and the human being. The East is 
still the origin of the wisdom religion and holds the keys to unlock later historical traditions. 
Theosophical statements are the result of honest and reflective research which involves 
“studying,”“seeking,” and “comparing” various systems and philosophies (Blavatsky n.d., 66, 
108). Theosophy is an “analytical science,” an intuitive “spiritual knowledge,” and the result 
of free and fearless investigation (Blavatsky nd., 23, 32, 44). Furthermore, she writes, “The 
religion of the Society is an algebraical equation, in which so long as the sign = of equality is 
not omitted, each member is allowed to substitute quantities of his own, which better accord 
with climatic and other exigencies of his native land, with the idiosyncrasies of his people, or 
even with his own” (Blavatsky n.d., 101). The Theosophical Society can have no dogmas, but 
still claim the Truth in the conception of H. P. Blavatsky. 
 
2.1) Interim Years - 1877 - 1880 
H. P. Blavatsky does not present the seven-fold human principles in the years 1877-1880 
though she had numerous occasions to do so. We have noted the ambiguity in Isis Unveiled, 
where the three-fold division is generally proposed but that this division is complicated by 
her discussion of the Egyptian principles. In 1878 she can still reference the three parts of the 
individual, though this is complicated by her statement that the “soul” can be divided into 
“several parts, and have names for each of these and their functions” (Blavatsky 1977, 292, 
365.) In 1879 she refers to “man” as a Tetraktys or “quaternity” (Blavatsky n.d., 15). In two 
1880 articles on the symbolism of the number seven she signally fails to mention the seven-
fold human principles (Blavatsky n.d., 409, 448). This omission is striking when one reviews 
all the “sevens” which are listed. 
In terms of the vocabulary the situation is similar. Many technical terms are mentioned 
though their use is outside of a tightly interwoven, holistic Theosophical structure. 
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Interestingly, Blavatsky is aware that a technical terminology needs to be developed and 
mentions the need for the “invention of special words” (Blavatsky 1977, 336). Examples of 
specific terms referencing the individual that do appear include jîvâtman, paramâtman, 
atman, mahatmas, Kama-Rupa, Mayâvi-Rupa, avatars, moksha, and astral forms. There are 
also examples of what might be called a failed vocabulary. There is mention of Iśvara-Bhava 
and Jiva-Bhava (Blavatsky 1977, 335). While Iśvara and jiva became elements of the 
standard Theosophical vocabulary, the terms as presented here did not. 
In terms of cosmology, there are intimations of the seven-fold division of the universe and the 
solar system, though there is no tightly integrated system of the mature Theosophy of later 
works. Blavatsky’s Theosophical structure is absent at this point in my reading of these 
works, though the seeds are sown and are germinating. Terms reflecting historical and 
cosmological concepts include mâyâ, pralaya, bhût, svabhavat, manu, akasa, globes, dhyâni, 
and universal soul. These scattered references are not embedded in the holistic system, which 
will give them the semantic value that I am looking for. Nor do I find the dramatic corrective 
workings of the template. In this I would expect to find wholesale re-descriptions of religious 
statements and texts after having been assessed against the complete grid.  
 
2.2) Interim Years – 1881 
As scholars have pointed out it is neither in Isis Unveiled nor The Secret Doctrine that the 
Theosophical scheme is first presented (Hall 2007, 5; Santucci 2008, 41, 52-4; Trompf 2011, 
57; Crow 2012, 710). The first statement of the seven-fold constitution of the human being is 
to be found in A. O. Hume’s “Fragment of Occult Truth” (1881), and versions of the mature 
Theosophical scheme are found in Sinnett’s Esoteric Buddhism (1883) and in the Mahatma 
Letters to A. P. Sinnett (1880-1886), texts I will reference below. 
In a sense we are building up to October 1881, which is the date Hume’s “Fragments of 
Occult Truth” was published in The Theosophist journal. Prior to October 1881 we do not see 
definitive evidence for the developed Theosophical template and vocabulary. H. P. 
Blavatsky’s scheme would be a tight analogous relation between the human principles, 
cosmic infrastructure, and the root-races, rounds, and globes (the principles of a planet). 
Clues for the existence of this scheme would be a tendency to correct, amplify, and reread 
religious terms and doctrines against this template and language. To simply refer to a 
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macrocosm/microcosm link in general would not be sufficiently unique an idea to call it 
specifically Blavatskyian or Theosophical. I am seeking the particularities of the 
Theosophical typology and terminology. 
Despite this, prior to the publishing of Hume’s article, I do find a movement, a circling 
towards a point. H. P. Blavatsky references a number of what will become specific 
Theosophical terms, including atma, Parabrahman (Parabrahm), nirvana, Paramâtmâ, 
Purusha, jîvâtma, pralaya, Maha-Pralaya, Planetary Spirits, planetary system, “Day of 
Brahmâ,” and Devas. Glaring omissions remain; for example, there is a footnote with 
philological speculations on the Sanskrit root budh but, curiously, no mention of the central 
Theosophical term buddhi. Some of the terms under examination are contained in quotes 
from third party works, and we must assume that by extracting the passages Blavatsky was 
familiar with them. Examples of this include the following phrases, “spiritual or monadial 
plane of existence” and the “material or sensuous plane” (Blavatsky 1968, 21). Blavatsky 
quotes these in a passage drawn from Jacob Dixen’s Hygienic Clairvoyance (1859, 20-1). 
The importance to the later Theosophical language that the term “monad” and the idea of 
“planes of existence” assume is suggestive.  
Two instances relating to the evolving vocabulary might be specifically noted. The first is in 
an article published in September 1881. Blavatsky makes reference to the “Astral Soul,” 
Kama-rupa, and Kama (desire) (1968, 282-3). This can be seen as a development, 
refinement, and amplification of the body, soul, and spirit division of the individual. She is 
consolidating and developing her multi-dimensional understanding of the individual. The 
second point of importance is more of an omission than a positive step forward. Blavatsky 
had ample opportunity to present the developed technical Theosophical terms, and she 
discusses in various places the after-death states of the individual. Yet, there is no mention of 
classic Theosophical terms such as, devachan50 or kama-loka (1968, 189, 210). In another 
place she discusses various ideas in Tibetan Buddhism, but she retains the number five in 
relation to certain concepts. In later works, this would be fleshed out to an “esoteric seven.” 
The corrective element, indicative of a weighing and measuring, is still unfocused at this 
point. 
Chronologically, we turn to A. O. Hume’s “Fragment of Occult Truth” (No. 1) which Julie 
Hall references as the first Theosophical statement of the complete seven-fold constitution of 
                                                          
50 A mention of Deva-Chan in brackets in an article is a later commentary by one of the mahatmas (1968, 287).  
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the individual (2007, 5). The codifying of the number seven in relation to the individual, 
coupled with a microcosm/macrocosm homology, would signal an important development in 
the Theosophical scheme. Copying the vocabulary of Hume’s seven-fold “subdivisions of the 
Occultists” we can note: (1) the Physical Body; (2) the Vital principle (Jiv-atma); (3) the 
Astral body (Linga Sharira); (4) the Astral shape (kama rupa); (5) “the animal or physical 
intelligence or consciousness or Ego, analogous to, though proportionally higher in degree 
than, the reason, instinct, memory, imagination, &c., existing in the higher animals;” (6) “the 
Higher or Spiritual intelligence or consciousness, or spiritual Ego, in which mainly resides 
the sense of consciousness in the perfect man, though the lower dimmer animal 
consciousness co-exists in No. 5;” and (7) “The Spirit – an emanation from the ABSOLUTE; 
uncreated; eternal; a state rather than a being” (Hume 1881, 18-19). We immediately note one 
thing: though this is certainly the seven-fold Theosophical scheme, it is not the completed 
vocabulary. Omitted in Hume’s article are the Sanskrit names for the fifth (manas), sixth 
(buddhi), and seventh (atman) principles. I believe this is important as I am looking for the 
coming together of the underlying typology and the associated vocabulary.  
Following Hume’s October article we anticipate H. P. Blavatsky developing the seven-fold 
scheme, in particular referencing the constitution of the individual, and terminology. In 
October 1881 she mentions “Atma” as the “highest Spiritual Soul” (Blavatsky 1968, 304). 
Why, we might ask, did Hume not present this term? In November, discussing among other 
topics Haug’s translation of the Aitareya Brâhmanam, she mentions “manas (mind).” In the 
same article, in the context of a microcosm/macrocosm link, she writes, 
These three spirits are described as double: (1) the spirit of the Elements (terrestrial 
body and vital principle); (2) the spirit of the stars (sidereal or astral body and will 
governing it); (3) the spirit of the spiritual world (the animal and the spiritual souls) – 
the seventh principle being an almost immaterial spirit or the divine Augoeides, 
Atma, represented by the central point, which corresponds to the human navel. This 
seventh principle is the Personal God of every man, say the old Western and Eastern 
Occultists. (1968, 319-21) 
She continues by presenting a correspondence between five cosmic elements, five organs of 
action of the individual, five limbs of the individual, and five senses of the individual. These 
“five elements” enter into the “composition of man” and, importantly, are quickly completed 
into the “seven principles” (Blavatsky 1968, 322). We see here the beginnings of the specific 
homological conceptualisations of Blavatsky’s Theosophy. Missing are links to the root-races 
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and rounds. Once the cosmic and human principles are linked to the historical periods, with 
the specific technical vocabulary, the Theosophical scheme is in place. In the balance of her 
articles of 1881 there are references to the seven principles, Atman, Kama-rupa, Kama, and 
Mayavi-rupa (“Illusionary Body”).  
What had the mahatmas revealed to A. P. Sinnett on the issues under discussion in 1881? 
They endorse a number of the themes we are discussing, including the notions of an objective 
primordial truth “impressed on plastic minds” of the earliest humans, cycles, karma, “chains 
of worlds,” Bodhisatwas, Kiu-te, Dhyan-Chohans, manvantaras, and pralayas. There are, 
however, some letters of specific interest in relation to the seven principles. In Letter no. 9, 
received by Sinnett on July 8, 1881, there is reference to an individual’s “astral soul,”“higher 
Self...divine atman,”“linga sarira or astral Soul,” and “Kama rupa/doppelganger” (1972, 43). 
Later in the same letter they refer to Anna Kingsford’s inability to discriminate between “the 
animal and spiritual Egos, the Jiv-atma (or Linga-Sharir) and the Kama-Rupa (or Atma-
Rupa)” (1972, 46). We come then to a small mystery. In Mahatma Letter no. 26 we read, 
“Please then, remember, what she tried to explain, and what you gathered tolerably well from 
her, namely the fact of the seven principles in the complete human being” (1972, 201).This 
letter is dated to “Autumn” in the Letters, and to “September (estimate)” in Linton and 
Hanson’s Readers Guide (1988, 8). This is interesting as if the September dating is correct it 
is possibly the first explicit Theosophical reference to the seven-fold constitution of the 
individual. 
Any references to the seven principles after October 1881 would be of lesser interest, as the 
principle had now been established. 1881 was then an important year in the development of 
the Theosophical grid and vocabulary. The introduction of the seven-fold constitution of the 
individual, the main terms of the technical language, and the elementary, idiosyncratic 
linking of the microcosm and macrocosm heralds the mature Theosophy of The Secret 
Doctrine. All the elements are in place for H. P. Blavatsky’s interpretive scheme and 
vocabulary, and we search for the harmonising of these elements into an interpretive strategy, 






2.3) Interim Years – 1882 
1882 is a pivotal year in the unfolding of Theosophical thought. It is in the Mahatma Letters 
that H. P. Blavatsky’s holistic Theosophical template is significantly presented, and by the 
end of the year the seven-fold human constitution and vocabulary is in place. Once these are 
formalised the interpretive movements of Theosophy are enabled. 
In January 1882 T. Subba Row, an important early member of the Theosophical Society, 
published an article, “The Arhan-Arhat Esoteric Tenets on the Sevenfold Principle in Man” in 
The Theosophist journal. In this article he presents the following table, 
I. Prakriti. Sthûlaśarîra (Physical Body). 
II. The entity evolved out of the 
combination of Prakriti and Śakti. 
Sûkshmaśarîra or Linga-śarîra (Astral 
Body). 
III. Śakti. Kâmarupa (the Périsprit). 
IV. The entity evolved out of the 




Brahman and Prakriti. 
Physical Intelligence (or animal soul). 
VI. Do. 
Brahman and Śakti. 
Spiritual Intelligence (or Soul). 
VII. Brahman. The emanation from the ABSOLUTE, etc. 
(or pure spirit). 
         (Blavatsky 1968, 407-14). 
This table displays a clear and specific conceptual link between cosmic and human principles. 
While not displayed in the table, the terms Buddhi and Atma are presented by Subba Row in 
relation to the seven principles further in the article. Still lacking in the seven-fold 
classification of human principles is the specific term manas, though “Mind” is specifically 
linked with the fifth principle. Subba Row’s article also references the Theosophical cosmic 
pattern when he speaks of the “MONAD,” from which evolve “three primary entities,” from 
which in turn “seven entities” are said to emanate (1968, 406). In an article on 
Zoroastrianism, Blavatsky appears to make reference to the “races of man” and to six and 
seven periods of world evolution (1968, 462, 465). In April 1882, in an article ironically 
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discussing the need for a “metaphysico-spiritual vocabulary,” she makes the noteworthy point 
that each of the “seven principles of living mortal man” are “subdivided in its turn into seven 
more” (Blavatsky 1969, 52). I believe this seven-fold subdivision of the seven basic 
principles is an important development, as it is a foundational idea of mature Theosophy. In 
May 1882 she is still referring to the “6th” and “7th” principle, but is not yet specifically 
calling them buddhi and atman (Blavatsky 1969, 101). In August 1882, while emphasising 
the idea of the seven aspects of the human constitution, she references the six chakras, 
mentioning Mûlâdhâra by name, all of which are “fed” by the “seventh” (Blavatsky 1969, 
165). 
In August 1882 we find what I have been anticipating – a clear statement of the seven-fold 
constitution of the individual in the almost settled Theosophical terminology. The following 
table is presented, 
GROUP 1. SPIRIT. 
7. Atma – “Pure Spirit.” 
6. Buddhi – “Spiritual Soul or Intelligence.” 
Spiritual Monad or “Individuality”- and its 
vehicle. Eternal and indestructible. 
GROUP II. SOUL. 
5. Manas – “Mind or Animal Soul.” 
4. Kama-rupa – “Desire” or “Passion” Form. 
Astral Monad – or the personal Ego and its 
vehicle. 
Survives Group III. and is destroyed after a 
time, unless reincarnated, as said, under 
exceptional circumstances. 
GROUP III. BODY. 
3. Linga-śarira – “Astral or Vital body.” 
2. Jiva – “Life Principle.” 
1. Sthula-śarira – “Body.” 
Compound Physical, or the “Earthly Ego.” 
The three die together invariably.  
         (Blavatsky 1969, 185). 
I say “almost settled” terminology because later Theosophy will largely replace the term jiva 
with prana. The principle and detail remain, however, the same. By October 1882 H. P. 
Blavatsky is using this template to interpret other scriptures – her primary comparative 
technique. Engaging with James Legge’s translation of the Yi King or Book of Changes, she 
makes the following interpretive equivalences: Kwei (physical body), Shin (vital principle), 
Kwei-Shin (linga-śarira, or vital soul), Zing (the fourth principle or Kama-Rupa), Pho 
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(animal soul), Khien (spiritual soul), and Hwân (pure spirit) (1969, 243). Completing her 
references in 1882, she makes note of the “races of men” of which, significantly, “we are the 
fifth,” and their relation to Atlantis and submerged continents and cycles (Blavatsky 1969, 
262-3). As I proposed earlier, to mention the “fifth” is to presuppose the others. 
In relation to cosmological terms, we find the first mention of “Deva chan” in 1882, as well 
as additional references to the Kama-Loka (1969, 121, 256, 189, 261). These become 
standard terms for the after-death localities and states. 1882 also sees the referencing of “Fo-
hat,” the “ONE LIFE,”“Space,”“Motion,” and “Duration” (1968, 405, 422-3; 1969, 220). 
These are foundational terms and concepts of The Secret Doctrine. Blavatsky, warming to her 
“sevening,” notes “there is nothing impossible that in time there will be discovered a fifth, 
sixth, and even seventh condition of matter, as well as seven senses in man, and that all nature 
will finally be found septenary” (1969 224). It is, perhaps, no surprise that this statement is 
made in reference to Zöllner’s and Crookes’ scientific researches into spiritualism and its 
attendant phenomena. 
The pivotal significance of the year 1882 is further highlighted in the Mahatma Letters. We 
can turn straight to Letter 13, dated to January 28, 1882 by Linton and Hanson (1988, 11).51 
The importance of this letter is not so much the developed vocabulary, which is in part there, 
but the fact that many of the statements made presuppose the existence of the Theosophical 
template. Individual statements, I argue, can only be properly understood in terms of the 
holistic Theosophical presentation. In relation to the seven-fold human constitution this letter 
is not yet displaying the complete mature Blavatskyian terminology, instead referring to 
“body”, “jivatma,”“linga shariram,”“Kamarupa,”“animal soul,”“sixth principle,” and the 
“seventh” (principle) (Barker 1972, 71-3). These individual principles are all linked to parent 
cosmic principles. What is of importance is that the complex seven-fold homology between 
cosmological (creation) processes, the physiological process of human birth, and the birth of 
a world or planet is developed. This intricate linking is fundamental to H. P. Blavatsky’s 
speculations in The Secret Doctrine as well as in her Inner Group and Esoteric Section 
teachings. Of particular interest is the development of the vocabulary around the evolution of 
the human being on the planet. We are introduced to the evolutionary terms of 
“rounds,”“races,” and “globes,” the idea of the ascending and descending arc of involution 
and evolution, and the cycling of souls through the various kingdoms of nature. If “present 
                                                          
51 Additional details are outlined in Section II of the Mahatma Letters, “Philosophical and Theoretical Teachings 
1881-1883”, however, the type is sufficiently outlined in this letter for my argument. 
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mankind is in its fourth round,” we can suspect that the rounds doctrine must be substantially 
in place. To know the fourth round, and link it to the fourth (kama) principle of the 
individual, is indicative of a developed, closely interlinked, self-referring, and self-justifying 
system. 
In brief summary of 1882, we realise that the seven-fold constitution of the individual and its 
specific terminology is in place. The seven-fold microcosm/macrocosm sympathy is detailed, 
and the complicated evolution of the human entity through the rounds and races on earth, 
linked to both seven-fold cosmic processes and the human constitution, is presented. What I 
expect to find from this point on is refinements of the system and contestations over 
terminology, much as one finds with the development of any theory. 
 
2.4) Interim Years – 1883 
As noted above, scholars have identified A. P. Sinnett’s Esoteric Buddhism (1883) as the first 
presentation of a mature Theosophy. I turn, therefore, to this book in search of the 
development of the Theosophical scheme and language as utilised by H. P. Blavatsky. 
We might quickly note what Esoteric Buddhism does not contain. The work does not contain 
significant developments in cosmological speculations. Lacking still are many key terms and 
ideas which assume prominence in The Secret Doctrine, for example, mulaprakriti, the One 
Life, Space, Motion, Duration, svabhavat, and the concept of the three cosmic Logoi. What 
Esoteric Buddhism does contain are important theoretical statements on the constitution and 
evolution of the individual and humanity. 
The chapter headings reveal the scope of Esoteric Buddhism: “Esoteric Teachers,”“The 
Constitution of Man,”“The Planetary Chain,”“The World Periods,”“Devachan,”“Kama 
Loca,”“The Human Tide-Wave,”“The Progress of Humanity,”“Buddha,”“Nirvana,”“The 
Universe,” and “The Doctrine Renewed.” The mature seven-fold constitution, with its most  
recognizable vocabulary, is detailed: The Body (Rupa), Vitality (Prana, or Jiva), Astral Body 
(Linga Sharira), Animal Soul (Kama Rupa), Human Soul (Manas), Spiritual Soul (Buddhi), 
and Spirit (Atma) (1987, 24). Of particular relevance to my broader argument is Sinnett’s 
outline of the evolution of the individual through the various kingdoms of nature, the races, 
the rounds, and the globes of a Planetary Chain, which itself is part of a Solar System. The 
unequivocal reference to the after-death states of Devachan and Kama Loka, and the way in 
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which these two concepts relate to the individual human principles, are intrinsic aspects of 
Blavatsky’s presentation of Theosophy. These teachings are all drawn into a tight, 
interconnected, and holistic body of statements which larger structure provides the semantic 
value of the individual component terms. 
 
2.5) Anomalous References 
For completeness sake I reviewed two separately published volumes of letters written by H. 
P. Blavatsky, The Letters of H. P. Blavatsky to A. P. Sinnett (1973) and The Letters of H. P. 
Blavatsky (2003), as well as her writings pre-dating Isis Unveiled. I am seeking early 
references to the Theosophical structure and terminology as they will be presented in her later 
writings. I had not anticipated finding much information on these themes in writings prior to 
Isis Unveiled, as the scheme and vocabulary were in development in this latter work. The 
scheme and content could not, presumably, predate its own development. However, two 
references caught my attention. The first is Letter 44, dated May 21, 1875 and addressed to 
H. S. Olcott, in The Letters of H. P. Blavatsky, which presents a number of intriguing 
concepts, some reminiscent of the ideas of Andrew Jackson Davis, that appear to presage in 
germ some of the later thoughts of H. P. Blavatsky. Speaking of “what is a man on Earth” it 
refers to seven “past, present and subsequent existences in different spheres;” of the “final 
formation of the real, complete man, who can become only on the Seventh Sphere a perfect 
microcosmos;” of man perfecting himself upon reaching the Seventh Sphere, and “Every man 
or person living on this Earth lives in the fourth sphere properly speaking. We reckon 7 
spheres from the 1st sphere we go to from here, but it’s an incorrect word. For every sphere 
has seven subdivisions or sections or regions; and when we say the ““spirit passed to the 
second or third Sphere”” we ought properly to say that he passed to the 2nd or 3rd region of the 
5th sphere (our Earth is the last region of the 4th)” (Blavatsky 2003, 164-168). The detailed 
specifics seem almost too precise to be chance. The second reference is found in H. P. 
Blavatsky’s Collected Writings volume I. In 1875, discussing both the Hebrew and Oriental 
“Cabala,” she makes reference to “our planet” which comes fourth in a series of seven 
spheres. The two or three pages discussing this “Oriental Cabala,” clearly linked to the 
Jewish Kabbalah, are reminiscent of the final scheme she will present (1977, 110-2). 
I terminate here my examination of the interim years 1877/8-1887 and, following a brief 




A number of points might be made as we move towards The Secret Doctrine of H. P. 
Blavatsky: Firstly, I have attempted to trace the origin and development of the Theosophical 
system from Isis Unveiled. The earliest detailed presentation of the Theosophical system is 
found in Esoteric Buddhism. Esoteric Buddhism, however, masks its origin. It is quite 
possible to read and understand Esoteric Buddhism without any reference to earlier 
Theosophical literature. In this work the Theosophical scheme exists as an “entity” and does 
not explicitly betray its developmental history.  
Secondly, related to the above, Esoteric Buddhism is not concerned with justifying its 
statements. Gone are the detailed arguments of Isis Unveiled and the heavy referencing of a 
wide number of works in support of an argument. Esoteric Buddhism is a straightforward 
expression of a body of thought, of a system, which is not purposely linked to other 
knowledge fields. Theosophy is now self-justifying, self-referencing, internally coherent, and 
self-sustaining. It is, in short, a theory of the world, humanity and, important for my 
purposes, of religion. 
Thirdly, flowing from the points above, the structure and vocabulary of Theosophy is in 
place. The implication of this is that it can now be applied as an interpretive tool and method. 
Theosophical statements are not simply a body of teachings, they are a yardstick against 
which religions will be measured and assessed. The Theosophical method will be applied by 
H. P. Blavatsky in The Secret Doctrine as an interpretive tool which can recover lost meaning 
in the religions of the world, and from various other fields of inquiry. 
For my purposes, there is little to be gained by further tracking these developments or 
refinements through the Blavatsky’s writings, or elsewhere, during the years of 1884-1887/8. 
Instead, I move directly to her magnum opus, The Secret Doctrine. This work is H. P. 
Blavatsky’s grand attempt to appropriate authority and to interpret religion through the 
application of her Theosophical theory and methodology. 
 
4) THE SECRET DOCTRINE (1888) 
The Secret Doctrine is the recognized magnum opus of H. P. Blavatsky. It is her most 
ambitious and characteristic work. It is not, however, unique in her oeuvre, as it shows much 
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continuity on many different levels with Isis Unveiled. I focus in the remainder of this chapter 
on this work as an enterprise in comparative religion. 
 
4.1) BACKGROUND 
In chapter two I outlined in some detail the background, nature of production, academic 
perspectives, and accusations of plagiarism as they related to Isis Unveiled. Many of the same 
issues and criticisms, raised often by the same actors, were made in respect of The Secret 
Doctrine. Certainly, a number of people were involved in the editing, collating, and 
organising of the work, including W. Q. Judge, T. Subba Row, H. S. Olcott, the Countess 
Wachtmeister, Archibald and Bertram Keightley, and G. R. S. Mead. The work also attracted 
the accusation of plagiarism from W. E. Coleman, and academic scholars of both the past and 
present are divided over its nature and quality. The clairvoyant and mahatmic claims of 
inspiration either add to the texts aura of authority or serve to disqualify it from positive, 
rational assessment. The stated aims of The Secret Doctrine are in continuity with Isis 
Unveiled and show that Blavatsky was concerned with opposing materialism and 
emphasising the “occult side” of nature. Linked to this she wished to correct materialistic 
speculations on the nature of humanity. Finally, and relevant to my thesis, she will work to 
rescue the “archaic truths which are the basis of all religions” and to uncover “the 
fundamental unity from which they all spring” (1988b, vol. I, viii). With this in mind, there is 
little to be gained by going into the same level of background and production detail here; 
instead I emphasis three points which relate to my broader narrative.52 
The first point concerns the dating of The Secret Doctrine. While notice of a general 
successor to Isis Unveiled was signalled as early as 1879, it is in 1884 that the first published 
notice for The Secret Doctrine is found (Zirkoff 1977, 2; Santucci 2016, 118-9). This links to 
my narrative as I locate the revealing of the mature Theosophical template and vocabulary in 
1883. From 1884 onwards Blavatsky is harnessing, elaborating, and refining her position– 
activity which will eventually result in the publication of The Secret Doctrine. 
The second point concerns the status of the Stanzas of Dzyan and the Esoteric Commentaries. 
For some academic scholars these works are sources of humour, de-legitimisation, and 
                                                          
52 A useful work discussing the historical production of The Secret Doctrine is Boris de Zirkoff’s Rebirth of the 
Occult Tradition (1977). 
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charlatanry; for Theosophists they are a source of authority and inspiration; for a sympathetic 
scholar like David Reigle they are historical works which may potentially be located; for the 
purposes of my thesis, however, I find them largely irrelevant (Campbell 1980, 31-51; 
Hanegraaff 1998, 453; Reigle 1999; Goodrick-Clarke 2004, 14, 131; Hammer 2004; Lavoie 
2012, 213; Lubelsky 2012, 118, 126-31; Reigle 2013). It is important to note that Blavatsky 
does all the conceptual work in her commentaries on the Stanzas and in the essays which 
form the second and third divisions of each volume of The Secret Doctrine. Were these 
explanatory sections not available there would be no way for anyone to reconstruct them 
from the Stanzas and Esoteric Commentaries alone. I argue, then, that the primary intellectual 
value is contained outside of the Stanzas and the importance of The Secret Doctrine lies in 
the explanatory sections where the details and parameters of the ancient wisdom tradition, the 
Theosophical template, are presented. 
The third point is the intended audience of The Secret Doctrine. To describe the book as 
esoteric, classify it as occult, or to study it exclusively within the academic field of Western 
esotericism serves, in part, to mask the fact that the work was intended for broader public 
consumption. It also obscures the fact that, for Blavatsky, revealed esoteric truths could no 
longer be regarded as “esoteric,” which alludes to the definitional debates surrounding the 
term (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, xvii; Blavatsky 1980, 350). She noted, “The Secret Doctrine is 
not an occult book, as I told you, but a printed work for the public” (2010, ix, 425). There 
were restricted teachings in the Theosophical Society but Isis Unveiled and The Secret 
Doctrine are not among them.  
It might, however, be conceded that there should be no normative way of engaging with a 
text. In practical terms a text can be read for any stated reason proposed. As an example, 
within the Theosophical Society one can find the notion that The Secret Doctrine is 
deliberately ambiguous and incomplete in its statements and, therefore, defies categorisation. 
This ensures that the process of reading is itself a meditative technique which is said to 
stimulate the intuition. It is also suggested that this is a safeguard against dogmatic 
presentations of Theosophy though, it might be noted, that this stance also ensures the book 
remains closed to critical and academic scrutiny. Proponents of this understanding of the text 





4.2) A RECAPITULATION: 
Before moving to a discussion of the comparative method of The Secret Doctrine it may be 
useful to close the circle on some of the orienting assumptions outlined in the previous 
chapter. The foremost, perhaps, is H. P. Blavatsky’s relationship to spiritualism as detailed in 
the work. We note that spiritualism is called on to do the same rhetorical work as in earlier 
works, though its explicit place in The Secret Doctrine is more marginal and references are 
few. While distancing herself from “crimped” spiritualist explanations and scientific 
perspectives she still embraces the “facts” of the séance room and presents the various 
scientific endeavours positively engaging with them as support for her theories. For example, 
she suggests that séance materialisations are similar to early modes of procreation in the 
human race (1988b, vol. II, 86). Blavatsky is concerned with presenting nature as being 
imbued with intelligences of various orders and powers. Occultists, according to her, are the 
“rational expounders” of ancient religions and she engages in a broad interpretation of 
religion in terms of hierarchies of intelligences, which are real and active in nature (1988b, 
vol. I, 287). Though the Society for Psychical Research was established in 1882 one might 
speculate that the late 1880s did not produce the definitive proof of phenomena many 
anticipated, though the efforts were far from being over.53 Blavatsky’s receding from the 
spiritualist discourse may reflect in part this disappointment, and also the fact that she had by 
this point developed her own vocabulary. Her Theosophical efforts then focused on a broad 
and sustained interpretive methodology of religion. 
The rhetorical linking of Theosophy to the broader scientific enterprise is apparent from the 
earliest writings. H. S. Olcott notes, “This Society was neither a religious nor a charitable but 
a scientific body” (1974, 156). William Q. Judge writes, “Embracing both the scientific and 
the religious, Theosophy is a scientific religion and a religious science” (1973, 1). H. P. 
Blavatsky made similar claims for Theosophy in Isis Unveiled, and The Secret Doctrine is in 
continuity with those earlier statements. The claim of being “scientific” was one of the 
currencies of authority in the late nineteenth century, and Theosophists, like spiritualists, and 
we might add students of religion, could see the value of adopting such a stance. Detailed 
studies of H. P. Blavatsky’s engagement with all the scientific fields of her day are still to be 
done, and here I make only some orienting comments. 
                                                          
53 The positive scientific impulse associated with spiritualism had certainly not been overcome by the end of 
the 1880s. For example, A. R. Wallace’s Darwinism with its well-known 15th chapter, wherein he excluded man 
from the general laws of evolution and natural selection, was published in 1889 (1889, 474, 476-78). 
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H. P. Blavatsky proposes “Truth” as the goal of science, a truth she will claim in the name of 
occultism. Occult truths, having a spiritual origin in the distant past, are “changeless” and err 
only in details, not in fundamental laws (1988b, vol. I, 509, 516; vol. II, 366). As she presents 
a cyclic descent from spirituality into matter, an involution back to spirit, and a staggered 
evolutionary trajectory, she can place knowledgeable adepts in the distant past. These are 
sages who anticipated the modern sciences – sciences which only in their future form will be 
able to vindicate the ancients (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 117, 296, 506-7, 602, 612; vol. II, 253, 
334, 451). We recall here the justifying link H. P. Blavatsky drew in Isis Unveiled between 
the séance phenomena of her day and the magic of the past.  
For H. P. Blavatsky, Theosophy and occultism offer a reasonable position between theology 
and materialistic science, an opposition which only Theosophy can resolve (Blavatsky 1988b, 
vol. II, 150, 322, 349). The sciences are “fallible” and a prominent technique she invoked to 
challenge scientific positions is to reference contradictions or disputes between and within 
scientific communities (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 279; vol. II, 316).54 Blavatsky’s concerns 
about a reductive and materialistic science revolve around the idea that it cannot explain the 
inner psychic and spiritual nature of humanity. Materialistic science, by definition, confines 
itself to the material world, a premise or hypothesis that she suggests closes the mind to other 
explanatory theories or models (1988b, I, 133, 262, 464-65, 477, 600, 617, 620, 636; vol. II, 
438, 592). She quotes Webster’s Dictionary for the definition of “empirical,” recording 
““Depending upon experience or observation alone, without due regard to modern science 
and theory”” [Emphasis in the original]. She further adds, “This applies to the Occultists, 
Spiritualists, Mystics, etc., etc. Again, ‘An Empiric – One who confines himself to applying 
the results of his own observations’ (only)” (1988b, vol. II, 664). It may surprise the reader 
that this is essentially the definition of “empirical” in Webster’s which states, “1. Pertaining 
to, or founded upon, experiment or experience. 2. Depending upon experience or observation 
alone, without due regard to science and theory” (Webster 1872, 244). A more recent Oxford 
English Dictionary makes additional reference to “sense data” in its definition, the obvious 
omission in Webster. The omission assists Blavatsky’s claim that the adepts are empirical, 
though using “higher senses.” All this, I wish to stress again, is to be understood in relation to 
her position on spiritualistic and clairvoyant phenomena and the implications flowing from it.  
                                                          
54 It is, perhaps, ironic that there were also disputes within late nineteenth-century “esoteric” movements 
concerning, for example, the relation of “Western occultism” to “Eastern occultism.” 
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According to Blavatsky, a mask was deliberately thrown over the ancient scientific truths that 
pertained to the invisible side of humanity and nature. The truths of the world and humanity 
are hidden or coded in the myths of the world and now require the correct “keys” to unlock 
their content (1988b, vol. I, 304; vol. II, 130). She gives an example of this coded meaning in 
what one might call a technique of “substitution.” Commenting on a scientific article by 
Crookes she remarks, “Replace the chemical terms “Molecule,” “atom,” and “particle,” etc., 
by the words “Hosts,” “Monads,” “Devas,” etc., and one might think the genesis of the gods, 
the primeval evolution of manvantaric intelligent Forces, was being described” (1988b, vol. I, 
548). The desire to ensure that these truths were not to be “desecrated” or shared with the 
“unworthy” was, in part, responsible for the establishment of a worldwide system of mystery 
schools and their attendant initiations. 
H. P. Blavatsky’s engagement with evolutionary theories of her day continued in The Secret 
Doctrine, though in a more elaborate manner.55 As my concern is with her enterprise in 
comparative religion this is not the place to present her observations in full, or to assess their 
place in late nineteenth-century speculations. Instead, I will outline a few of the general 
orienting positions as a background to her work in comparative religion. My entry point to 
these issues remains Blavatsky’s assessment of the spiritualistic phenomena. As these 
phenomena are evidence of an invisible world of intelligences, and of human existence after 
physical death, she cannot accept any solely materialistic version of evolution. Any theory of 
human or cosmic evolution must incorporate the “facts” of the séance room. Her partial 
rejection of an “Aristotelian/Baconian” method of inquiry in favour of a 
“Platonic/Pythagorean” one leads her to insist on a theory of universals and ideal forms, 
including of the human being (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. II, 153; Barborka 1992, 143-47). She 
continues in her basic strategy of pointing to disputes between competing scientific accounts, 
which serves to both undermine the authority of scientific thought on one hand and, on the 
other, to boost her arguments where scientific speculation makes this possible. She, further, 
invokes an argument from design to challenge materialistic evolutionary theories (1988b, vol. 
II, 348). Blavatsky simultaneously appropriates and distances with statements flowing from, 
“Both Occult and Eastern philosophies believe in evolution” to, “But no Occultist can accept 
the unreasonable proposition” (1988b, vol. II, 259). A different metaphor will see her 
                                                          
55 Theosophical engagement with evolutionary science continued from the beginning of the Society’s existence 
to the present. As and instance, a relatively recent work is W. T. S. Thackara’s Evolution & Creation: A 
Theosophic Synthesis (2004). 
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involved in a process of re-weaving selected elements into a new narrative, that is, making 
use of selected data. 
Blavatsky’s general position, in continuity with Isis Unveiled, is that material (Darwinian) 
evolution is only half the story.56 The broad parameters of her own presentation encompass a 
“double evolution in two contrary directions” in which spirit descends into matter, and 
physical development evolves from simple to complex forms. Evolutionary processes, 
additionally, happen on a spiritual, psychic, and material level (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 620; 
vol. II, 87, 109, 731). This pattern of cyclic descent and ascent is repeated throughout her 
system on both a cosmic and human level. The Secret Doctrine presents a number of other 
basic propositions, including a polygenetic origin of the humanity on seven different parts of 
the planet; that the astral body formed before the physical body; and, that “man” in the fourth 
round preceded the other mammalians (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. II, 1, 168). 
We saw in Isis Unveiled that H. P. Blavatsky proposed the existence of an immaterial, 
primordial humanity. This idea is thoroughly worked out in The Secret Doctrine with her 
planetary chains, rounds, root-races, and family races teachings. On the origin of humanity 
she proposes Occult philosophy as a middle ground between science and religion and notes, 
“It teaches that the first human stock was projected by higher and semi-divine Beings out of 
their own essences” (1988b, vol. II, 87). There is an intricate series of homologies between 
the sevenfold Solar System, the sevenfold Planetary Chains and globes, and the individual 
seven-fold human being. This homology includes a sympathetic link between the hierarchies 
of the “gods” and intelligences and the sevenfold human constitution.  
The Secret Doctrine concludes the topic of evolution with “five esoteric axioms” the 
acceptance of which, according to Blavatsky, would herald a welcome revolution in thought 
and dispel contemporary problems. In summary these five axioms are: the antiquity of the 
earth; the reality of the seven-fold rounds; the root-races teachings of which the “European 
race” is the fifth race; the great antiquity of humanity; and the cyclic evolutionary movement 
from ethereality to materiality and back again of all the kingdoms of nature pari passu with 
humanity (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. II, 697). Intimately intertwined with these ideas are her 
teachings of the Monads which cycle through the various kingdoms of nature. In specific 
relation to human evolution are the Divine Monads, the Intellectual (Agnishwātta Pitris), and 
                                                          
56 “Half the story” may well have been a standard phrase among those positing a spiritual dimension to the 
world and humanity when discussing evolution. Oppenheim quotes Gerald Massey, writing in 1871, to just this 
effect (1985, 270). 
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the Physical or Lunar Pitris (Barhishad Pitris) (1988b, vol. I, 174-5, 181). We might also 
recall that the second volume of The Secret Doctrine is entitled Anthropogenesis and is 
devoted to human origins and history. 
What is the relevance of these speculations on evolution to my thesis? H. P. Blavatsky will 
locate her statements about the world in the religious traditions and texts of the world. 
Challenging boundaries, her work suggests that all knowledge fields are to be assessed 
against the way the world really is. For H. P. Blavatsky, the study and purpose of religion is 
not separate from the sciences or philosophy. There is only one purpose for speculation, a 
movement towards the “truth” of things. A subsidiary purpose for detailing her orienting 
thoughts is to emphasise the rationality and coherence of her ideas once the underlying 
premises are brought to light. The development of her vocabulary further highlights her 
attempt to “cope” with the ideas with which she was grappling. 
Blavatsky continues to stress the idea of an ancient wisdom tradition, however, of the many 
synonyms presented in Isis Unveiled, the Secret Doctrine emphasises those of a “secret 
doctrine,”“occultism,”“esoteric” philosophy, and Theosophy. A prominent later Theosophist, 
G. de Purucker, gives a definition of Theosophy which I quote in full as it neatly encapsulates 
what I have thus far been proposing characterises Blavatsky’s work,  
Theosophy. A compound Greek word: theos, a “divine being,” a “god”; sophia, 
“wisdom”; hence Divine Wisdom. Theosophy is the majestic Wisdom-Religion of 
the archaic ages and is as old as thinking man. It was delivered to the first human 
protoplasts, the first thinking human beings on this Earth, by highly intelligent 
spiritual Entities from superior spheres. This Ancient Doctrine, this Esoteric System, 
has been passed down from guardians to guardians to guardians through innumerable 
generations until our own time; and, furthermore, portions of this original and 
majestic System have been given out at various periods of time to various races in 
various parts of the world by those Guardians when humanity stood in need of such 
extension and elaboration of spiritual and intellectual thought. 
Theosophy is not a syncretistic philosophy-religion-science: that is to say a system of 
thought or belief which has been put together piecemeal and consisting of parts or 
portions taken by some great mind from other various religions or philosophies. This 
idea is repudiated by Theosophists, for the simple reason that it is not true. On the 
contrary, Theosophy is that single System or systematic formulation of the facts of 
visible and invisible Nature, which, as expressed through the illuminated human 
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mind, takes the apparently separate forms of science and of philosophy and of 
religion. We may likewise describe Theosophy to be the formulation in human 
language of the nature, structure, origin, destiny, and operations of the Kosmical 
Universe and of the multitudes of beings which infill it.     
It might be added that Theosophy, in the language of H. P. Blavatsky, is “the sub-
stratum and basis of all the world-religions and philosophies, taught and practised by 
the few elect ever since man became a thinking being. In its practical bearing, 
Theosophy is purely divine ethics; the definitions in dictionaries are pure nonsense, 
based on religious prejudice and ignorance.” (See her posthumous work, 
Theosophical Glossary, page 328) (1933, 177-78) 
Theosophy is positioned as a body of propositional statements about the nature of the 
universe, the individual, and of the history of humanity. For H. P. Blavatsky the secret 
doctrine is the “accumulated Wisdom of the Ages,” a phrase we have met before in her 
writings.57 This system is: the most “stupendous” and “elaborate;” is hidden under “Occult 
symbolism;” is a body of “facts” recorded by the “flashing gaze of those seers;” is the 
“uninterrupted record covering thousands of generations of Seers whose respective 
experiences were made to test and to verify the traditions passed orally by one early race to 
another;” it’s logical doctrines were learnt, checked, tested, confirmed, and verified in every 
department (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 272-73; vol. II, 3). It is presented, in short, in opposition 
to and in continuity with late nineteenth-century science, religion, and philosophy. 
Continuing the themes of Isis Unveiled, the secret doctrine is the “Parent Doctrine” which is 
the “one fountain head, the ever-flowing perennial source, at which were fed all its streamlets 
– the late religions of all nations – from the first down to the last” (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 
xliv-xlv). It is the common property of humanity and reconciles world religions, a “thread 
doctrine;” its dogmas are unaltered, and its primitive truths shine through exoteric religions 
for those with the interpretive keys (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 77, 312, 678, 610; vol. II, 794). 
Importantly, Blavatsky writes, “The Secret Doctrine, correcting the unavoidable 
exaggerations of popular fancy, gives the facts as they are recorded in the Archaic symbols” 
(1988b, vol. II, 96). Correcting and corrective, this is my estimation of the Theosophical 
template. Its interpretive patterns sift the wheat from the chaff, the Theosophical method 
leaving only the facts and truths of nature and humanity. 
                                                          
57 A distinction is to be made between the “secret doctrine” as the body of all truths of the ancient wisdom 
tradition, and the book by H. P. Blavatsky, The Secret Doctrine, which is a selection of these truths presented 




I want to draw together a number of related themes found in H. P. Blavatsky’s writings on 
religion. These include recovering her conception of religion, the origin and beginning of 
religion and individual religions, and the historical spread of religion. 
I have argued that Blavatsky presents her Theosophical statements as a body of true 
propositions about the world and humanity. For Blavatsky, the world preceded any 
propositional expression, symbolisation, or communication and exists independently of our 
linguistic descriptions. Despite its limitations, language can accurately describe the reality of 
the associated manifested planes on which it is used.58 If these privileged descriptions were 
not possible it is difficult to explain the corrective and correcting nature of the Theosophical 
enterprise. Sanskrit is the language most perfectly developed to express the truth of things, 
other languages being less evolved and of humbler origins. Theosophy is, then, the 
expression of the “Truth” in any language and, we might add, on any plane. This conception 
explains two sentences found in The Secret Doctrine: “The silent worship of abstract or 
noumenal Nature, the only divine manifestation, is the one ennobling religion of Humanity,” 
and “Finally, that no human-born doctrine, no creed, however sanctified by custom and 
antiquity, can compare in sacredness to the religion of Nature” (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 381; 
vol. II, 797). The worship of “noumenal” nature, that is nature as it is in itself, the “religion of 
nature,” is a “worship” of the way the world is, the Truth of the world in its essence. We 
should not become confused at this point. Theosophy, in Blavatsky’s conception, is not a 
“human” dogma.59 “Human” in this context would be the human being at the evolutionary 
stage of lower mental development, the Theosophical kama-manas. The origins of religion 
are far superior and she has a very specific idea of what “divine origin” means. It is not 
revelation from a “God,” it is a “language and system of science imparted to the early 
mankind by a more advanced mankind” [Italics in the original] (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 
309). We can see her struggling with these concepts when she not only suggests that exoteric 
doctrines are allegorical, but that esoteric teachings (Theosophy) are to “some extent” also 
                                                          
58Blavatsky sets up an opposition between absolute reality and the manifested world of illusion. To perceiving 
beings in the worlds of manifestation unreal objects (unreal in relation to absolute reality) will appear as real. 
On each plane, objects on that plane appear as real to the perceptive consciousness on the same plane. In this 
sense, there is a correct description of events and objects that occur and appear on each plane (Blavatsky 
1988b, vol. I, 328-9). 
59Blavatsky makes constant references to “dogmas,” human, esoteric, and others. A defining statement is 
contained in a reply to a point made by Solovyov, an early critic of Theosophy. She writes “Mr. Solovyov should 
also know that ‘Theosophy’ is not ‘a religion without definite dogmas,’ as he expresses it, but is a universal 
system of philosophy, absolutely without any man-made dogmas” (1980, 341). [Italics in the original]. 
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allegorical or semi-metaphysical (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. II, 81). It is only the spirit that can 
“see” the real spiritual world. She is aware, then, of the limits of language though marks 
esoteric statements as a special case. Boris de Zirkoff, echoing this writes, “It is well to 
remember this, and to keep constantly in mind that Theosophy is Truth, though expressed in 
human language, however inadequate it may be” (1983, 37). At least one academic reflects a 
similar reading of Blavatsky. James A. Santucci notes that she speaks “ex cathedra” and that 
the ancient wisdom, according to her, comprises “Truth as it really is, not what it should be” 
(Santucci 2007, 1). 
The nascent human is initially an unconscious spiritual being, in instant and direct harmony 
with the inner planes. This unconscious spiritual state equates to the two higher Theosophical 
human principles, atman and buddhi, and with the first two root-races. At a certain point in 
its evolutionary journey humanity’s instinctive and intuitive link to the inner planes and the 
inner self was lost. Before this loss, this descent of spirit into matter, there would have been 
no need for the communication and preservation of truth. The intuitive link to the divine 
would have been present until the awakening of the kama-manas, or the lower mind. This is 
the later third root-race and its bridges into the fourth root-race. Blavatsky suggests that the 
first two root-races, the early part of the third root-race, and parts of the link from the third to 
the fourth root-race knew no “religion, if religion is understood as dogma, belief by faith, or 
any system of ‘outward worship’” (1988b, vol. II, 272). She notes, that if by “religion” is 
meant “the binding together of the masses in one form of reverence paid to those we feel 
higher than ourselves, of piety – as a feeling expressed by a child toward a loved parent – 
then even the earliest Lemurians had a religion” (1988b, vol. II, 272). Blavatsky has in more 
than one place presented the idea of religion as a “bond” (1984, 99; 1988, 161-63). Each 
passage should be read carefully in context. What strikes me is that any idea of a “bond” in 
her writings bears little resemblance to contemporary sociological theories of religion. The 
bond she presents is one that unites the inanimate world, humanity, and the invisible realms 
into one whole. That is, it includes the ontological reality of these invisible worlds, to which 
one is bound. It is rooted, then, in the reality of spiritualist phenomena and its associated 
concepts. I suggest, however, that this is not Blavatsky’s primary understanding of religion, 
which instead revolves around a body of Truths about Nature. For her, all the knowledge 
about the world that Theosophy attempted to restore to the nineteenth century was innate in 
the early stages of humanity’s evolutionary development. Our story, then, begins with this 
loss, the descent into matter, in short, with the Theosophical third root-race. 
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The events of the third root-race are central to the history of humanity. It is no coincidence 
that the third root-race is associated with the awakening of mind and consciousness in 
humanity, the very problem around which many nineteenth-century debates were revolving. 
While other important events occurred in this root-race, for example, the differentiation of 
humanity into male and female from an earlier sexless and then androgynous state and the 
increasing materialisation of the human form, I will highlight the issues surrounding the 
development of the mind. In brief, Blavatsky presents a story in which, according to karmic 
law, beings (mānasaputras) from a higher plane descended and were involved in the 
“quickening” of humanity’s latent mental principle.60 These beings, on their own 
evolutionary journey, were of various classes and “incarnated” into the human races in 
staggered stages. The differing degrees of awakening are an explanation for the supposed 
varying intellectual development found in humanity around the world.61 Blavatsky saw 
evidence of this historical “descent” of divine beings portrayed in the myths of “fallen 
angels,” of Prometheus, in the Hermetic tracts, and elsewhere. To become “rational” or 
“conscious” is a necessary descent from the early unconscious, spiritual state of the early 
races. The “fall” of humanity in, for example, the Biblical tradition is part of the evolutionary 
cycle of beings. A fallen, and now conscious, humanity is given free will to continue 
evolving with the end of transcending the “human” mental stage and becoming consciously 
spiritual. Humanity, then, ends where it began, with the difference that the final state of the 
fully evolved human is conscious spirituality. While this may seem obscure, the point, for my 
purposes, is that the loss of an intuitive direct contact with nature, the closing of the “third 
eye,” heralded the need for training and initiation for real knowledge to be gained. The 
mystery schools and their shadow, the “religions” of the world, have their origin in this loss 
of a primordial innate spirituality (Purucker 1974, 4, 473). 
The divine beings of myth and tradition, instructors of humanity are, for H. P. Blavatsky, no 
myths. They are a part of the evolutionary history of the human race, and she will trace them 
through the scriptures of the world. The initial purity of the wisdom brought down gradually 
degenerated into sorcery and exotericism as humanity continued its general cycle of descent 
into matter in the fourth root-race. A certain “elect” group, however, became a fountain of 
                                                          
60 G. A. Barborka defines mānasaputras as the “Sons of Mind,” or “Sons of Mahat” (1992, 295). Mahat is the 
fifth Theosophical plane counting upwards, the mental plane, with mind (manas) being the fifth human 
principle counting upwards. See G. de Purucker’s Man in Evolution (1977) and Fountain-source of Occultism 
(1974, 481-3) for brief discussions of this event. 
61 For a discussion of H. P. Blavatsky and racism see, Santucci “The Notion of Race in Theosophy” (2008), and 
Lubelsky “Mythological and real Race issues in Theosophy” (2013). 
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purity from which Truth was drawn in various ages and by various races (Blavatsky 1988b, 
vol. II, 281). Two strands of “religion” are traced through the end of the third root-race 
(Lemurians) to the fourth root-race (Atlanteans), that of the esoteric or wisdom religion and 
that of the exoteric religions. Exoteric religions are characterised by phallicism, sexual 
symbology, sorcery, anthropomorphism, materialism, ritualistic pomp, idolatry, dogmatism, 
and false statements about the world. 
While more could be said about Lemurians and Atlanteans in Theosophical speculation I 
want to move the discussion to H. P. Blavatsky’s statements on the recognized historical 
religions. From their “Lemuro-Atlantean” origins the oldest religions are the Indian (Vedic), 
including Buddhism, Mazdean, Egyptian, and Chaldean (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 10, 376, 
668-9; II, 483). Following these would be the Semitic religions, for example, Judaism and its 
offshoot, Christianity (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 311, 318). The further one moves from the 
Eastern origin the less esoteric lore is contained in a religion. Eastern occultism, for example, 
contains all seven interpretive keys, while Judaism contains at best two. The general 
historical movement is from the East and Central Asia to the West. This is a diffusionistic 
theory of religious development. At one level, new religions draw on the material of older 
existing religions. The statements are re-worked and re-presented in the language and cultural 
idioms of the new peoples. At the same time, founders of religion are, according to 
Blavatsky, “transmitters” of the ancient wisdom of the past. New initiates present larger or 
lesser portions of the complete wisdom tradition to their own communities (1988b, vol. I, 
xxxvi). The spread of religion, then, moves at two levels: the esoteric and exoteric. What 
distinguishes them is simply that one is conveying the truth, while the other is not. They are 
both historical movements in time and space. This dual movement is, in part, Blavatsky’s 
attempt to explain the existence of the underlying patterns she has identified in the religions 
of the world. 
The way in which the truths were carried across geography and time is via the mystery 
schools and initiation. The “immutable truths” of esotericism are revealed only during 
initiation to the worthy, due to their power and to prevent abuse. Initiation is a quickening of 
evolution and heralds an awakening. Those older souls and those who strive to progress 
spiritually will move ahead of the general body of humankind. The “mass” of humanity is 
destined to attain the same level of spiritual awareness as an initiate, though they will do so at 
a much later date in time. The natural course of evolution is towards perfection of each type 
or species. In this sense Blavatsky’s theories embrace a “psychological” origin. Each human 
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being contains within them the totality of knowledge accessible to that type of being. Some 
will become aware of it early through initiation, while others will naturally awaken to it in the 
slow course of evolution. Exoteric truths are alterable, amendable, and the result of 
corruption, degeneration, and deliberate encoding. It is of interest that Blavatsky suggests that 
outside of initiation the esoteric truths cannot be known. There are barriers to do with one’s 
intellectual and cultural environment, which prevents thought to reach the highest truths 
(1988b, vol. I, 326). She will, however, periodically refer to “half-initiated” adepts, for 
example, P. B. Randolph and A. S. Mackay who, without the benefit of initiation, grasped 
certain truths through their own effort. Often, however, even these non-initiates were secretly 
inspired by the mahatmas for various reasons of their own. Blavatsky does, however, concede 
the physical world to science in many respects, and links her domain of interest with that of 
the “psychic,” the “spiritual,” and the “psychological” (1988b, vol. I, 229). For Blavatsky, the 
“adepts” of the past have solved the mysteries with which her contemporary science grappled 
(for example, death), and these truths are released when humanity has the capacity to 
understand them (1988b, vol. II, 451). The carrier medium of these esoteric truths is the 
“mystery language,” Senzar. John Algeo has comprehensively reviewed Senzar in his work, 
Senzar: The Mystery of the Mystery Language (1988). This mystery language is symbolical, 
pictorial, geometrical, and numerical. It was once a universal tongue which was understood 
by the adepts of all nations. The symbols of this language are multi-faceted having seven 
modes of expression and H. P. Blavatsky notes that the various theologies were attempts to 
interpret or present this language. The Secret Doctrine is an attempt to present an 
interpretation of this symbolical language to the public. 
H. P. Blavatsky’s study of religions, her “institution of comparisons,” led her to see an 
“identity of thought and meaning” and a “striking similitude of conception,” suggesting a 
“concurrent design” (1988b, vol. I, 318, 341; vol. II, 516). These conceptions lead into her 
enterprise in comparative religion. She presents the patterns - the underlying template and 
grid - which her research uncovered. While she may well attribute her work to initiation and 
Eastern adepts, we cannot embrace this explanation in the current academic climate. I suggest 
that in the academic environment in which we exist we must present her work as the fruit of 
her research, with plagiarism being the other option, an option I challenge. The identical 
pattern she recognized in the religions she examined is the universal wisdom tradition, or 
Theosophy, as she presented it. It is to the specifics of her comparative religion enterprise in 
The Secret Doctrine that I now turn. 
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6) COMPARING RELIGIONS 
It is not within the scope of this study to investigate H. P. Blavatsky’s engagement with any 
particular religion. I am interested, here, in her general interpretive orientation towards 
religious texts. 
 
6.1) Structural Patterning 
I have proposed that the underlying harmonising force in H. P. Blavatsky’s interpretive 
strategy is derived from structural pattern identification. It is my argument that she presented 
a template or grid against which the religions of the world were measured. This grid is the 
product of an epistemic code common to the time and is supported by a number of 
interpretive movements, including a functional patterning, symbolism, esoteric/exoteric 
distinction, and so on. In this section I focus on a number of diagrams and tables found in The 
Secret Doctrine which represent the parameters of the Theosophical template. Diagrams are 
one form in which the Theosophical scheme can be represented. This template can also be 
represented in prose form, and the totality of the written statements of Blavatsky on the 
relevant topics would form the paradigm, the limit, the content, and the details of the ideal 
and primordial religion.  
In prose form the basic parameters might specifically include the Three Fundamental 
Propositions and the points presented in the “Summing Up” section of The Secret Doctrine 
(Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 14, 16-7, 269-80). Almost any attempt to present the foundations, 
generalise the structure, or distil the essence of Blavatsky’s ideas becomes, due to the nature 
of her work, a sketch of the original and complete religion and, therefore, an exercise in 
Theosophical comparative religion.62 Each basic dimension of the framework proposed is 
then sought in the doctrines of the world religions. In this way, her writings challenge, or 
transgress, the boundary between doctrinal presentation and the study of religion. We note, 
also, that these statements are claims about the world. This reintroduces her work into the 
sphere of the sciences, when the latter are conceived of as a body of statements about the 
world. 
  
                                                          
62 There are many such attempts, two examples of which are Barborka’s various “Laws”, and Hoskins’ 




The first diagram is the fundamental diagram of H. P. Blavatsky’s Theosophy, with various 
later Theosophists presenting versions or elaborations of this basic picture.  
 
        (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 200) 
I suggest that this diagram is the settled form of the “Two Page Diagram” from Isis Unveiled 
that I presented in chapter two. Both works, The Secret Doctrine and Isis Unveiled, present 
their diagrams in an Eastern and Western version, and plotted on these diagrams can be found 
the entire Theosophical statement in relation to the cosmos, creation, and the evolution of 
humanity and other kingdoms of nature in the solar system and on earth. Though the present 
diagram can represent the earth, the solar system, and in a generalised sense the universe in 
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the abstract, The Secret Doctrine deals primarily with the solar system and the earth planetary 
chain (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 13, 20-21, 60; vol. II, 700).63 In broad terms we see the seven 
planes with an emanation, unfolding, evolving, or radiating from the spiritual to the material. 
While only the last division of the physical plane is objective to us, in Theosophical thought 
the first three planes are regarded as unmanifested and the bottom four are regarded as 
manifested. The first three planes can also be represented by the concept of the Three Logoi, 
the last of which, the creative logos, produces the seven rays or globes. If the diagram is 
indicative of the solar system the seven globes would represent the planets. If the diagram is 
indicative of the earth planetary chain (a seven-fold or seven-principled planet) then the 
globes represent the various principles of the earth. When referencing human evolution the 
descending arc of evolution would be represented by the globes A to D. Globe D is the 
bottom of the cycle, the most material period and state, and globes E to G would represent the 
ascending arc of involution. While not shown on the diagram it is understood that each plane 
is seven-fold, as is each globe. The general principle of human evolution would be that of a 
movement from unconscious god-spark to self-conscious god-spark, a descent into 
materiality followed by an ascent into perfection. The importance of this diagram is that the 
doctrines of religions can be plotted onto it. Creative deities, for example, would correspond 
to the third plane and third Logos. The Secret Doctrine is a detailed commentary, in the 
Theosophical vocabulary, on the dimensions of this diagram and how the world religions fit 
onto it. The Secret Doctrine is, among other things, a broad exercise in comparative religion 
and in interpreting religion.  
Geoffrey A. Barborka presents a list of equivalent terms which include those from the 
Theosophical vocabulary and various religions of the world. As an instance, I reproduce 
those dealing with “Ākāśa (Sanskrit – Trans-Himalayan)”, 
Pre-Cosmic Substance, Primordial Cosmic Substance, Aditi (Vedic), Mūlaprakriti 
(Vedantin), Pre-Cosmic Root-Matter, Primordial Root-Matter, Pradhāna 
(Brahmanical), Svabhavat (Northern Buddhistic), Father-Mother (Stanzas), Alaya 
(Northern Buddhistic), Zeruana (Mazdean), Bythos (Gnostic), Chaos or Chaino 
(Greek), “Waters” (Bible-Genesis), Deities: Neith or Nut (Egyptian), Anaita 
(Assyria), Nerfe (Etruscan). (1992, 482) 
                                                          
63 H. P. Blavatsky notes that the “The history of cosmic evolution, as traced in the Stanzas, is, so to say, the 
abstract algebraical formula of that Evolution” (1988b, vol. I, 20). 
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On the diagram these would be represented by the white page in the background. It is the 
matrix from which the First Logos (the first plane), the point in the circle, is said to radiate or 
emanate. There are, of course, many synonyms for this First Logos, including Brahman, 
Kether, etc. In every religion Theosophy will attempt to locate a hidden deity behind the 
creative powers of the Third Logos and where no such concept can be found that religion will 
be judged to be deficient or limited. It is not always the case that every religion has every 
aspect of the template hidden in it. Some religions have more of the original body of truths 
than others. Some religions are simply deficient of the “higher” and more esoteric doctrines, 
and Theosophy then augments those traditions. In general these are the Western religions as 
opposed to the Eastern religions, which are historically older and nearer the primordial 
source, according to Blavatsky. 
There is flexibility in this diagram, which enhances its interpretive power, for example, 
various meaning-laden numbers can be read into it. G. de Purucker, for instance, plotted 
twelve globes across the seven planes by adding 5 globes spread across the three higher 
planes. This is presented as an extension of the esoteric wisdom. Theosophists searched 
religious texts for key numbers, 1, 3, 7, 10, 12, and many others, through which Theosophical 
















        (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. 1,172) 
This diagram portrays two planetary chains, the Earth and the Moon. A planetary chain is a 
seven-principled planet, each globe corresponding to a human principle. The bottom globe 
(D) of each chain is the physical earth and physical moon. The remaining globes are the inner 
principles of the planet. We can note the globes spread over the four lower planes of the first 
diagram. The purpose of this diagram is to show the “life-waves” transferring from the Moon 




       (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. II, 759) 
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I insert this diagram as an illustration of how H. P. Blavatsky maps religious doctrines onto 
the Theosophical template. In this instance she is mapping the “Mazdean” terms onto the 
basic theosophical grouping of the globes and planes. We have already noted the link H. P. 
Blavatsky has drawn between the Kabbalistic Sephiroth of the Tree of Life and the 
Theosophical planes and globes. She will locate her globe teachings in many traditions, 
including, as a favoured example, the Purānas. She equates, for instance, Jambu-dwipa with 
the lowest globe (1988b, vol. II, 320). The Theosophical planes are read into world traditions 
in much the same way the seven lokas of the Purānas, bhur, bhuva, svar, mahar, janar, 
tapar, and satya lokas are read from material to spiritual on the Theosophical template. This 
allows Theosophists to interpret, as an instance, the Gayatri in a Theosophical sense, while 
using the exact terminology of its native tradition. H. P. Blavatsky found a reason to look at 
ancient (and contemporary) religious traditions and myths for historical data and 
information.64 The foundation of this was the reality of the séance phenomena. Once she 
began looking to the past she drew on the new source material to elaborate her scheme. There 
is, then, a reciprocal movement between the past and present, all under the sway of H. P. 











                                                          
64 The Theosophical engagement with religion in the late nineteenth century presents, therefore, a counter-
example to Hans Penner’s notion that one does not read myths for true (whatever this may mean, and this, 
surely, is an important question) information. One may well read a myth for true information if one’s inter-





       (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. II, 300) 
Diagram four reflects the full Theosophical vocabulary of Rounds and Root-races. According 
to Blavatsky we are in the Fourth Round and Fifth Root-race. One round is a single cycle of 
the seven globes. Being in the Fourth Round, humanity is unfolding its fourth, or kama 
(desire), principle. We are, however, in the fifth stage of our evolution in this round, the fifth 
Root-race, which means we are unfolding the fifth, manas (mind), principle. Humanity, in 
general, is unfolding the mental aspect (fifth sub-principle) of its desire principle (fourth 
principle). Linked to the Root-races are the continental geographic distributions. The first 
race is linked to the “Sacred Land,” the second with the “Hyperborean,” the third with 
“Lemuria,” the fourth with “Atlantis,” the fifth, our own race, with Europe and the Americas 










       (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 157) 
Table one shows the how the seven-fold principles of the individual can be presented in both 
a six- and four-fold classificatory system. The seven principles could also be presented in a 
two-fold (spirit/body), three-fold (spirit, soul, body), and five-fold classification. Blavatsky 
suggested that for meditational purposes one may use a three-fold or four-fold classification, 
but for “practical occult teaching” the seven-fold is required (1988b, vol. II, 593). The point 
to be stressed here is that the terminology of different religions can be converted into the 




       (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. II, 632) 
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Table two presents the Theosophical and the Egyptian series of principles. For Blavatsky, 
when Egyptians speak of the Kha we need simply replace that with the Theosophical Rupa or 
body. With this “translation” a complete Theosophical system is inserted into the Egyptian 




       (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. II, 596) 











Diagram 6:  
 
       (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. II, 593) 
Diagram six correlates the four lower human principles to elements in nature. 
These diagrams and tables represent the parameters and skeleton of Blavatsky’s Theosophical 
template. The basic dimensions of creation, the individual, and of human history are 
displayed through these representations. They are woven into a tight, interrelated system 
(with an attendant vocabulary) in which the patterns are linked in such a way that forces 
certain structures. This is the foundation of her comparative religion enterprise. Blavatsky has 
spent thousands of pages of writing, not to mention the vast array of later commentators on 
her ideas, fleshing out and explaining her concepts. Her works are, among other things, a 
reading of the religions of the world in the light of this template. I have attempted a bare-
bones presentation of the Theosophical system by focusing on the diagrams. Diagrams are a 
fundamental component of her presentation strategy. In her Inner Group teachings and 
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Esoteric Section writings the diagrams and tables of correspondences become increasingly 
elaborate. By focusing on the diagrammatic representation of the Theosophical wisdom 
tradition I have tried to avoid being accused of doing Theosophical “theology” in the place of 
a serious study of Theosophy. It should be clear, however, that it is my position that  
Blavatsky’s works challenge any such settled distinction. 
While the structural patterning is the basis of Blavatsky’s interpretive enterprise, it is 
supported by many attendant techniques. An important supporting technique is the creating of 
equivalencies based on function. Creative deities are representative of one such functional 
correspondence. A second, of many possible examples, is the correspondence of the 
Theosophical Fohat with the Egyptian Atum (Toum in H. P. Blavatsky’s writings) which I 
have discussed in an earlier writing (Bester 2012).  
 
6.2) Texts are Interpretable 
The interpretive manoeuvres of The Secret Doctrine are in many ways a repetition of those in 
Isis Unveiled. Rooted in the basic distinction between exoteric and esoteric H. P. Blavatsky 
proposes that religious texts require interpretation to be properly understood. She notes,  
There is no purely mythical element in any of the ancient religious texts; but the 
mode of thought in which they were originally written has to be found out and 
closely  adhered to during the process of interpretation. For, it is either symbolical 
(archaic mode of thought), emblematical (a later though very ancient mode of 
thought), parabolical (allegory), hieroglyphical, or again logogrammaical – the most 
difficult method of all, as every letter, as in the Chinese language, represents a whole 
word. (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. II, 335) 
In Blavatsky’s conception, religious texts are deliberately allegorical and symbolical, not 
overtly revealing their intended message. Religious texts should not be read literally (though 
literal esoteric truth statements may be found), and under almost every myth and legend is a 
historical fact or a truth about the nature of the world or humanity. A primary technique 
claimed by her is that of analogy; she writes, 
The law of Analogy is the first key to the world-problem, and these links have to be 





Analogy is the guiding law in Nature, the only true Ariadne’s thread that can lead us, 
through the inextricable paths of her domain, toward her primal and final mysteries. 
(Blavatsky 1988b, vol. II, 153) 
A consequence of her structuring insights is a conscious analogical patterning underlying her 
microcosmic and macrocosmic speculations. Blavatsky used the principle of analogy in a 
unique way to link the stages of growth and development in a wide variety of contexts, 
including the development of the foetus, the constitution of the individual, and the evolution 
of a planetary chain, solar system, and the cosmos as a whole. Analogy is a strategy with use 
well beyond the esoteric domain. Purrington notes the use of analogy in nineteenth-century 
physics by scientists such as James Clerk Maxwell, Michael Faraday, and others (1997, 27-
29). The use of analogy and pattern recognition in the field of comparative religion is 
referenced by Strenski in relation to Max Müller and James Frazer, and by David Chidester in 
relation to E. B. Tylor (Strenski 2006, 137; Chidester 1996, 1; 2014, 93). 
Texts are also characterised by having “blinds.” Blinds, we gather, intentionally conceal 
mystery teachings and divert attention from prying and undeserving eyes. In addition to the 
inevitable decline in religious understanding associated with the passing of time, the founding 
sages of religion have also purposely concealed their true teachings from the masses. It is of 
little wonder, then, that Blavatsky would turn to Gnostic, Kabbalistic, and Mahayana 
traditions. That there are “secret” commentaries presenting the “real” message of the 
founders is basic to these traditions. We might conclude that H. P. Blavatsky had quite 
correctly noted this tension within religious history itself. Her specific contribution is the 
content, the body of truths she calls Theosophy, reflected in the pattern that she unveils.  
 
6.3) Seven Keys 
If the real meaning of religious texts is “locked” within the texts, then clearly a “key” is 
required. This is a metaphor H. P. Blavatsky frequently exploits. Regrettably, for all the 
prominence of this metaphor, she nowhere concisely outlines the nature of these keys. What 
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follows is an attempt to categorise the hints and scattered statements she has left in The Secret 
Doctrine concerning both these keys and other related interpretive tools.65 
As a basic background statement, Blavatsky asserts that there are seven keys to interpreting 
texts. Of these keys it is only “Eastern Occultism” which still retains knowledge of all seven. 
According to her, even the Vedas are “not complete” in this respect (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 
318). No exoteric tradition, not even an Eastern one, has the completeness of the occult 
tradition. Different traditions may retain knowledge of a few of the keys and specific mention 
is made of Judaism which has two of the seven keys (1988b, vol. I, 318). Thus far, we are 
anticipating seven keys to be presented. Before continuing this line of thought I turn to 
alternate, though seemingly related, interpretive manoeuvres and terminology.  
The first is Blavatsky’s notion that religious deities were simultaneous “septiform 
personations” of: “the noumena of intelligent Powers of nature;” of “Cosmic Forces;” of 
“celestial bodies;” of “gods or Dhyan Chohans;” of “psychic and spiritual powers;” of 
“divine kings on earth (or the incarnations of the gods);” and of “terrestrial heroes or men” 
(1988b, vol. II, 765). A deity, then, can be read in seven ways or contexts. This is presented 
as a “symbolical and allegorical system.” Secondly, H. P. Blavatsky writes of each symbol 
having seven meanings. Each of these meanings is appropriate to its own plane of thought. 
She lists, however, only four of these planes of thought: the metaphysical, the astronomical, 
the psychic, and the physiological (1988b, vol. II, 538). Thirdly, while discussing a specific 
symbol, the “Svastica,” she suggests that its symbolism pertains to both the cosmological and 
anthropological spheres. She writes that it is, “at one and the same time an Alchemical, 
Cosmological, Anthropological, and Magical sign, with seven keys to its inner meaning” 
(Blavatsky 1988b, vol. II, 99). Fourthly, she makes reference to various “modes of thought” 
on seven “planes of Ideality.” She reveals only three of these planes of thought, the 
“Realistic,” the “Idealistic,” and the “purely Divine or Spiritual.” The other planes of thought 
cannot be expressed in “ordinary phraseology” (1988b, vol. II, 335). The “modes of thought” 
are presented as “symbolical (archaic mode of thought), emblematical (a later though very 
ancient mode of thought), parabolical (allegory), hieroglyphical, or again logogrammical” 
(1988b, vol. II, 335). 
                                                          
65 I have found few previous studies on the issue of the seven keys. James Santucci and Jerry Hejka-Ekins, in an 
explanatory footnote to a Blavatsky letter, summarily reference the seven keys as being, the 
physiological/anthropological (human), the astronomical, the symbolical, the theogonic, the metrological, the 
metaphysical, and the mystical (Blavatsky 2016, 57-58). An ‘Aryel Sanat’, in two internet articles, has located 
references to nineteen “keys” in H. P. Blavatsky’s works (2013; 2016). 
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Elsewhere, referencing the “truth” of a myth, she appears to mention two additional “planes 
of thought.” She writes that “we can give it only from its philosophical and intellectual 
planes, unlocked with three keys respectively” (1988b, vol. II, 517). The last four keys could 
not be revealed according to Blavatsky. Fifthly, she refers to various “modes of 
interpretation,” of which the Occult adepts have seven, while “the Jews” have only four. The 
four that Judaism retains are, the “real-mystical,” the “allegorical,” the “moral,” and the 
“literal or Pashut” (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 374). Finally, she refers to the “spirit of 
interpretation” of the Hindus and Egyptians, and the Hebrews. The spirit of interpretation of 
the Hindus and Egyptians is metaphysical and psychological, while that of the Hebrews is 
realistic and physiological (Blavatsky vol. II, 469). These six manoeuvres appear to be linked 
to the idea of interpretive keys and certainly they are linked to a process of interpretation. As 
they invoke a different vocabulary to that of just “keys” I note them separately. 
Below I generate a table drawing together H. P. Blavatsky’s more explicit references to the 
“seven keys” in The Secret Doctrine. A table inevitably de-contextualises the elements it 
presents, and the reader should note that not every element presented is expressly called a 
“key” in every instance. However, the term “key” is, in these cases, used in the proximity of 
the statement and through inference I have understood them to be keys.66 















I/363 I/363 I/363 I/311 I/311 I/311 II/23 I/363 I/363 
 II/291  I/318 I/363 I/318 II/539   
   II/471 II/23 II/497    
    II/497     
    II/539     
 
Blavatsky does not seem consistent in her use of the term “key.” It is, of course, possible that 
the logic of her use eludes me, and that other collations could be proposed or, that there is no 
                                                          




underlying logic to be found. For example, referring to the “modes of interpretation” 
available to the “Jews” she mentions “real-mystical,”“allegorical,”“moral,” and “literal” and 
appears to call them “keys” (1988b, vol. I, 374). Elsewhere, allegory is referred to as a “mode 
of thought” (1988b, vol. II, 335). In another place she suggests that “allegory” and “symbol” 
are read or opened by the human or “terrestrial anthroposophy” key. It should also be noted 
that “analogy,” while mostly referred to as a “law,” is also referred to as a key in some 
instances (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 150, 604). 
Obviously, the table lists nine keys, not the seven as anticipated. My proposal to resolve this 
discrepancy would be to regard column 1 and 2 as one key (Anthropological), and column 4 
and 6 as one key (Geometrical, or Numerical), thus totalling seven keys (Blavatsky 1960, 
180). Included in the Geometrical key would be her references to a “metrological key” 
(Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 308; vol. II, 595). An interesting reference, in my opinion, is 
Blavatsky’s mention of “seven sub-systems and the key to the entire system” (1988b, vol. I, 
311). My best present suggestion in resolving this is that the mysteries to be explained are 
both cosmic and human – the latter including that of the history of humanity. Each of these is 
resolved into seven divisions, that is seven cosmic planes, and seven human principles, 
implicit in the latter are the seven rounds and root-races. Each of these seven divisions is in 
turn divided into seven sub-divisions, making 49 mysteries to resolve, requiring 49 keys 
(Blavatsky 1982, 54). To read it in another way, there are seven keys, each key having seven 
subdivisions (sub-keys) depending on the object being unlocked. This would explain changes 
in terminology and application while a single key is being applied. For example, if one key 
deals with “physiology” this is with the human being as the object. It makes no literal sense 
to refer to the “physiology” of a solar system or planet, yet a key must be used to unlock the 
physical dimension of these entities. This might explain a sentence like, “science has only 
one key – the key of matter – to open the mysteries of the nature” (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 
155). “Matter” might refer to the “physiology” of the human body and to its correspondences 
on earth - earthquakes, volcanoes, and leylines, etc. A “key” appears to mean something like 
an interpretive context. 
To conclude this section, I ask myself, what is happening here? In broad strokes, ignoring 
specifics, H. P. Blavatsky is arguing that words, names, myths, and symbols can be read in 
more than one explanatory context and in more than one sense. For example, a particular 
deity in a myth may be read as referring to the blood in the human being and to the flow of 
energies in the earth and solar system. Referencing the “deluge” myth, as an example, she 
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suggests that a myth may have sidereal, geological, allegorical, and moral application (1988b, 
vol. II, 335). We can ask ourselves a number of questions and draw a number of conclusions 
at this point. We might ask: Can a religious text be read in this manner? I think the answer to 
this is, yes. Blavatsky has provided, for all its potential shortcomings, a way of understanding 
myth and religion, and Richard Rorty has argued that plausibility reflects a community 
decision as to what is allowable. We might ask: Can one find existing traditions in which this 
type of interpretive methodology has application? This is not to ask if this is a universal, 
cross-cultural, trans-historical method of interpretation, as Blavatsky claims. We are asking 
whether something resembling this method can be found in any existing religious tradition. I 
propose the answer is, yes. As a possible instance I would offer Jamgön Mipham’s (1846-
1912) commentary on the Seven-line Prayer to Guru Padmasambhava. This short prayer is 
read on several different interpretive levels which, in Theosophical vocabulary, might 
correspond to the anthropological, psychic, spiritual, literal, and historical keys. Finally, we 
might ask: Should one interpret religious texts in this manner? This is a little more difficult to 
answer and revolves around how texts are interpreted, and why texts are interpreted at all. 
How a text is interpreted has to do with the interpretive possibilities that lie within a culture. 
A whole culture turns towards interpretation but, as cultures are not homogeneous, there are a 
multitude of possible and viable interpretive perspectives. That some enterprises become 
forgotten or marginalised does not change this. The motivation for interpretation is not to be 
separated from the “use” of interpretation. Texts are interpreted in support of the larger 
narratives we are weaving about ourselves and for ourselves. They are harnessed in support 
of, and deployed to confirm, broader moves and trends in society. 
 
6.4) Additional Interpretive Strategies 
I present, here, some practical examples of how H. P. Blavatsky’s interpretive techniques 
lead to the disassociation, appropriation, and construction of meaning. While I attempt to 
separate these techniques out for clarity they are not necessarily as distinct in practice. 
H. P. Blavatsky is conscious of the fact that she is adopting, transferring, and transforming 
the meaning of specific terms already in the public domain. She notes, “There are Sanskrit 
words used - “Jiva,” for one – by trans-Himalayan adepts, whose meaning differs greatly in 
verbal applications, from the meaning it has among Brahmans in India” (1975, 347). It is not 
a question of Blavatsky being simply ignorant of inherited meanings. Her holistic reworking 
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and re-presentation of her underlying wisdom tradition brings about these shifts in meaning. 
She is also aware that her creative presentation and indiscriminate use of disparate terms—
Parabrahm and God, for example—in her early writings has led to some of the criticisms 
aimed at her (1975, 51). Some of her later works are attempts to systematise and clarify her 
early presentations, which is a normal process of development in theory building. 
Blavatsky is engaged in a conscious process of selection and rejection. Guided by the 
underlying pattern or typology she has found in religious texts, she selects and reweaves bits 
of information into her new synthesis. She notes, “In the Egyptian Papyri the whole 
Cosmogony of the Secret Doctrine is found scattered about in isolated sentences, even in the 
‘Book of Dead’” (1988b, vol. I, 674). This is an inevitable result of her method which 
includes a selection of relevant facts picked according to a pre-existing model. We might 
recognize that this does not mean that her theory leaves an unexplained “remainder.” The 
parts she rejects are not unexplained; they are instead deliberately assessed as being of no 
importance. 
As Theosophy has the complete, basic, and original pattern of truth, this allows her to fill the 
gaps she finds in existing traditions. Traditions which either lost the keys to the full 
understanding through corruption, or which in fact never contained the complete pattern, can 
now be spiritualised through Theosophical scrutiny. Deficient traditions are now amplified, 
augmented, and expanded to reflect the truth of the original pattern. An example of this is her 
addition of two skandhas to make an esoteric seven in total. 
A further interpretive strategy is a re-reading in a modern vocabulary of various religious or 
mythic statements. Ancient myths of creation can be re-stated in contemporary philosophical 
or scientific language. For instance, while Egyptian texts might refer to Atum “copulating 
with himself” to generate the gods, Blavatsky writes of the process of creation in the 
following manner,  
Manvantaric impulse commences with the re-awakening of Cosmic Ideation (the 
“Universal Mind”) concurrently with, and parallel to the primary emergence of 
Cosmic Substance – the latter being the manvantaric vehicle of the former – from its 
undifferentiated pralayic state. Then, absolute wisdom mirrors itself in its Ideation; 
which, by a transcendental process, superior to and incomprehensible by human 
Consciousness, results in Cosmic Energy (Fohat). Thrilling through the bosom of 
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inert Substance, Fohat impels it to activity, and guides its primary differentiations on 
all the Seven planes of Cosmic Consciousness. (1988b, vol. I, 328) 
Blavatsky has, however, also made what appears to be simple and irresolvable misreading of 
texts. These are readings which I do not believe can be explained by a semantic holism. An 
example of this is her apparent misreading of Herodotus on Menes in book II of his The 
Histories. Among other misunderstandings of the text, H. P. Blavatsky read Herodotus as 
listing the kings who preceded Menes, while Herodotus lists the kings who succeeded Menes 
(Blavatsky 1988b, vol. II, 368-69; Herodotus 1996, 177-78). This is most likely a simple 
error in light of the fact that it is easy to reference and check. This misstatement has, 




I have stressed the coherence and internal consistency of the Theosophical presentation of H. 
P. Blavatsky. This is not a simple coherence argument for the rationality of her work. Her 
thoughts are rooted in the debates and issues of the nineteenth century. This is to argue, with 
Davidson, that coherence yields correspondence. I have highlighted the contested events of 
the séance room and spiritualism and the consequences that flow from them. Her work is also 
causally connected to the texts and traditions under interpretation. 
I present Blavatsky’s work as a creative and idiosyncratic, in a Rortyan sense, enterprise in 
interpretation. For Rorty, all novel theories could be regarded as idiosyncratic and, therefore, 
in this sense, Max Müller, Tylor, and other theorists could be seen as idiosyncratic. Certainly, 
in her own mind, she is reflecting the essence of religious texts, their real and intended, 
though hidden, meaning. From my perspective, however, she is involved in processes of 
extraction, creation, correction, and measuring. This measuring is carried out against the 
patterns she has noticed across religious texts. Blavatsky is not confined to repeating 
contemporary studies or to reflecting what is, perhaps, apparently plainly recorded in any 
specific text. Texts are read against her broader holistic understanding and as such she can 
justify her re-reading and re-ordering of statements. 
These processes have led to negative assessments of H. P. Blavatsky’s works and, as a 
practical illustration, we might briefly turn to Christopher A. Plaisance’s critical review of 
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her use of the terms “soul” and “spirit” in Isis Unveiled.67 In brief, Plaisance argues that 
Blavatsky has inverted the meanings historically associated with the Hermetic terms of “soul” 
and “spirit.” She has imposed a Pauline understanding of these terms onto a literature to 
which it does not belong. Plaisance’s assessment of Blavatsky is that she is guilty of 
plagiarism and “inventing,” is ignorant of the source material, is “dishonest” and “lazy,” 
displays “terminological inconsistency,” engages in “disingenuous appropriation,” and cannot 
be involved in “creative misreading” as only people who understand the source material can 
be said to do that (2013, 250-72).68 This is a good story, though I suggest not the only one 
that might be told. Plaisance has read what H. P. Blavatsky has said but has missed what she 
is doing and, therefore, missed what she is really saying. 
Plaisance has not appreciated the wholesale re-description of the field that H. P. Blavatsky is 
engaging in. She is developing, one could say “inventing,” a vocabulary which will allow her 
to cope with the material at hand. Blavatsky is not concerned with interpreting any one text or 
any single tradition. She is involved in an interpretive enterprise covering every religious 
text, myth, and tradition. Plaisance misses this when he reads “Hermetic” in Isis Unveiled as 
referencing mainstream understandings, for example, Alexandrian Hermeticism. The term 
Hermetic has, however, a unique place in Blavatsky’s larger narrative and Plaisance himself 
quotes Isis Unveiled to the effect that “Hermetic philosophy” is conceptually linked to the 
“ancient universal Wisdom-religion” (2013, 251). We are, then, no longer referencing 
Alexandrian traditions in any usual sense. The meaning shifts that Plaisance abhors, I 
suggest, are largely explainable by the corrective and holistic vision that Blavatsky is 
developing. Linked to this is Blavatsky’s clear intention to uncover the “esoteric” and real 
meaning of ancient texts. Her semantic holism allows for the invention of terms, a 
vocabulary, and for a corrective reading of individual instances. She is also clearly conscious 
of what she is doing. She references the spirit/soul as problematic in ancient usage, its link to 
Paul, and the need to “invent” terms to describe her ideas (Blavatsky 1977, 292, 331-6; n.d., 
14-5). 
                                                          
67 In response to Plaisance’s more recent article “Occult Spheres, Planes, and Dimensions: Geometric 
Terminology and Analogy in Modern Esoteric Discourse,” (2016) in addition to the points I raise here, I would 
include the following comments: he makes undefined use of the term “esoteric;” he does not acknowledge his 
own personal selections and the influence this has for his broader points; his work is insufficiently 
synchronically contextualised when referencing the late nineteenth century; and he has not embraced the 
consequences of Rorty’s broad critique of all epistemological claims.  
68 I feel Plaisance is on thin ice when he trades on the binaries of reading/misreading and understanding/ 
misunderstanding. Plaisance will claim to have correctly “read” and “understood” the texts at hand but, we 
ask, can this claim be justified in a non-circular way (Culler 1994, 175-9)? 
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Is she a poor scholar of historical Hermetic traditions? It is difficult to answer this because 
she does not present herself as an exclusive scholar of Hermeticism. A Theosophically 
oriented scholar of Hermeticism and Gnosticism was G. R. S. Mead, who, conveniently, has 
written on these same issues. He seemingly had no real problem discussing, for example, the 
term augoeidēs as found in Hermetic and Platonic works (1967, 56-81). Could Plaisance 
apply the same list of pejoratives he aimed at Blavatsky to Mead? I do not believe so. The 
point I feel to be stressed here is that H. P. Blavatsky is involved in a “revolutionary” re-
description of a broad field of knowledge. Her works must be understood within this larger 
context and movement. Through this, I believe, a better understanding of what she was doing 
and saying will be gained. Plaisance, to his credit, managed to refrain from calling Blavatsky 
irrational. This normative evaluation is, however, the inevitable outcome of arguments like 
his, which do not adequately describe all the issues and forces at play. I work to present 
Blavatsky as a rational, reasoned, and engaged scholar who attempted a large scale re-reading 
of the late nineteenth century. That her presentation failed to attain prominence is true, but 
rejection was the ultimate fate of much nineteenth-century theory. As Rorty outlined, 
arguments are not won or lost with an obvious victor declared. Instead, a society or 
community gradually abandons an old, familiar, less useful vocabulary and adopts a new, 
more useful one. With the new vocabulary and habits come fresh problems and debates, 
while the old debates associated with the past are forgotten and erased. 
Before I move to my final chapter, wherein I will locate H. P. Blavatsky’s statements on 
mainstream interpretive endeavours of religion in the late nineteenth century, I make a quick 
point. We might ask ourselves, has Blavatsky produced a reliable interpretation of religion as 
a category and of individual religions? Are her interpretive statements true to the texts she is 
exploring? For example, when she equates Atum with the Theosophical Fohat, is she being 
true to the Egyptian conception? This is one mode of questioning. A different mode, the 
approach I am endorsing here, considers whether Blavatsky was justified in her perspective. 
To support this position I refer to Rorty’s distinction between causing beliefs and justifying 
beliefs (Davidson 1989, 311; Rorty 1991, 83-4, 97; Tartaglia 2007, 212-6, 219-20). The 
religions and religious texts of the world may cause belief, that is, may cause one to have an 
interpretive stance, but they do not justify it. This is to argue that texts do not intentionally 
present themselves to the reader in such a way that they cannot but be correctly understood – 
as Rorty phrases it, they do not insist “on being described in a certain way, its own way 
(1991, 83). As one surveys the domain of religion/s one adopts an interpretive stance, one of 
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many descriptive possibilities. Thus, we have various interpretive positions, including, as 
nineteenth-century instances, Max Müller’s and E. B. Tylor’s models. What makes an 
interpretive school relevant is not that it “got” Ancient Egypt, or the Egyptian religion 
“right.” It is impossible that we will ever really recapture what exactly Ancient Egyptians or 
early Indian religions specifically thought about the world in every instance. It is important to 
remember that justification of one’s beliefs comes not from any representational link to the 
world or religious texts directly. Justification is a function of relations to other beliefs and 
interpretations that we already hold. The late nineteenth century was a broad field of inquiry 
including multiple and competing stances on individual issues. Justification is a result of the 
larger webs of meaning we locate ourselves in, and H. P. Blavatsky’s understanding of 
religion is warranted once her larger interpretive world is located. 
I have worked to show that H. P. Blavatsky engaged with religion and produced an 
interpretive stance which is justified, rational, and historically comprehensible. In my final 
chapter I examine her statements concerning other movements in interpreting religion. This 
will involve recapturing her position in relation to the emerging “science of religion” and the 
field of comparative theology. Linked to this endeavour, I will draw out her statements in 
relation to a selection of actors in the field of comparative religious studies, including, F. Max 
Müller, E. B. Tylor, and Herbert Spencer. This contextualising will allow for a more 
















In this chapter I move away from a strict chronological assessment of H. P. Blavatsky’s 
statements and focus instead on her general comparative enterprise and the ways in which it 
intersects with selected themes and actors in the broader field. I propose to move 
centrifugally from her works by examining specific textual engagements with a 
representative selection of students of religion. Where she references an important figure 
under review, for example, F. Max Müller or E. B. Tylor, I will discuss her perspective on the 
referenced aspect of their work and bring to light some of the underlying assumptions and 
tensions. Given space constraints it is not possible to conduct a whole-scale comparison of 
her work against all individual competitors (or colleagues), though I may touch on basic 
underlying assumptions. I hope my focus on specific intersectional instances will highlight 
the use she made of the sources available in the nascent field of comparative religion. The 
late nineteenth century can be seen as a matrix, a womb, which gave birth to a variety of 
theories of religion. All theorists of religion, then, had the same parent, the fullness of the 
nineteenth century and its resources, and what binds them together is more potent than what 
appears to separate them. I am arguing that valorising one project over another says as much 
about our own choices and assumptions as it does about the quality of H. P. Blavatsky’s 
works. I am focused on her enterprise as a holistic, self-sustaining, and justifiable interpretive 
theory of religion and religions in the late nineteenth century. 
 
2) BROAD BACKGROUND TO COMPARATIVE RELIGION IN THE LATE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 
The general background of events and currents which contributed to the establishment of a 
professional era in comparative religion is broadly acknowledged. I only point to them, as 
they are of no direct importance to my argument. H. P. Blavatsky fell within the ambit of the 
late nineteenth century and she would have inevitably been influenced and open – or closed –
to its various movements, moments, tendencies, resources, and inherited histories, as would 
all of the nineteenth-century characters implicated. It is apparent, however, that the various 
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participants had differing foundational assumptions and manipulated the available resources 
in distinctive ways. This is revealed by the disputes and disagreements between, as specific 
instances, Andrew Lang and F. Max Müller, between F. Max Müller and William D. 
Whitney, and between Herbert Spencer and Frederic Harrison.69 
One background condition to the development of a global comparative religion was the 
increase in available materials. As often noted, the nineteenth century saw an increase in the 
availability of new religious texts, especially Asian writings, new archaeological material, 
and, due to the imperialistic impulse, more ethnological data on diverse groups of people 
(Vries 1977; Sharpe 1986). However, while there was a proliferation of resources in the 
nineteenth century, we can note the same claims made for the eighteenth century (Manuel 
1967, 6-7). We could make a similar claim for the twentieth century. Did we really have a 
clear understanding of, for example, Tibetan Buddhism, until the 1950s exodus from Tibet? 
Did we have a comprehensive grasp of all Tibetan Buddhist perspectives on nirvana, a 
nineteenth-century topic of interest, until the 1980s with the discovery of the Jonang texts? 
One might mention the Dead Sea Scrolls, Nag Hammadi Texts, and other discoveries. It may, 
instead, make sense to speak of a broadening and intensification of existing trends, rather 
than of something new happening. While new material may initiate new theories and insights 
into cultures and religions, this is to be seen as an historical process continually unfolding 
over time. New materials may also confirm existing theories instead of breaking with the 
past, there is no rule here. Herbert Spencer is an example of this. Sharpe’s rough assessment 
of Herbert Spencer’s theory of religion is that it displayed the qualities of Euhemerism, and 
his real importance to the field is not his specific theory but rather his emphasis on the 
importance of evolution to the field (1986, 32-34). Euhemerism is not a novel theory of 
religion by any stretch of the imagination. Referencing the implications of new resources we 
might review Egypt as an instance, relevant due to the so-called “Egyptian” atmosphere of 
Blavatsky’s earlier writings. 
Prior to Champollion’s deciphering of hieroglyphics in the 1820s there were rich theories and 
interpretations of Egyptian religion. However, many of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century views were seemingly undone by the possibility of actually reading Egyptian texts. 
                                                          
69 The disputes between Andrew Lang and F. Max Müller are well-known. An overview of the dispute between 
F. Max Müller and Whitney can be reviewed in Whitney’s Max Müller and the Science of Language: a Criticism 
(1892). That between Spencer and Harrison is gathered in Youmans The Nature and Reality of Religion: a 
Controversy between Frederic Harrison and Herbert Spencer (1885). H. P. Blavatsky was aware of some of these 
disputes, and others of the nineteenth century, now mostly forgotten (1988a, vol. II, 47, 472). 
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This was not, though, the end of the development of Egyptology. Ancient Egypt was not 
suddenly “understood” in the 1830s, and it is not simply “understood” now. Current 
Egyptological views on the constitution of the individual – the ba, ka, khat, etc. – appear to 
be rooted in a theory of animism which has been challenged in the field of comparative 
religion (Zabkar 1968; Bolshakov 1997; Chidester 2005). New materials may initiate new 
debates, new questions, revisions of the past, and new competing theories, though they may 
also simply reinforce existing positions. Two particular developments in Egyptology are of 
relevance to Blavatsky’s position, both of which revolve around timing.  
The first is the superseding in importance of the Egyptian Book of the Dead by the Pyramid 
Texts. These latter writings were only discovered and made available in French in the 1880s 
(Hornung 1999, xvii, 2). Blavatsky’s textual interest is primarily concerned with the once 
named “Bible of the Egyptians,” the Book of the Dead. How else could it be when the 
Pyramid and Coffin Texts attained prominence after her major writings and death? This is 
important because the Book of the Dead shows a sophistication and development of thought 
not usually associated with the beginning of a tradition. Prior to the discovery of the Pyramid 
and Coffin Texts it was regarded as the oldest Egyptian text, which meant that the oldest text 
was the most theologically developed. This anomaly challenged evolutionary narratives of 
the time. We know now that that the Book of the Dead is a much later compilation, with 
sections drawn from the earlier writings, reversing the narrative and chronology which held 
sway over Blavatsky. 
The second example relates to the “discovering” of Pre-Dynastic Egypt. The Egyptologist 
Walter Emery noted, “Before 1895, our knowledge of Egypt’s history did not extend back 
beyond the reign of the Pharaoh Senefru, first king of the Fourth Dynasty” (1961, 21). David 
Gange has contextualised and broadened our understanding of the situation. He begins by 
noting that Egyptology professionalised in the last 30 years of the nineteenth century; we 
have seen the same claim made for any number of fields during this period, including that of 
comparative religion. This involved, among other things, the development of new 
methodologies and techniques. William Matthew Flinders Petrie was one of the founders of 
professional Egyptology and Archaeology and is responsible for developing a typological 
sequence dating system. Flinders Petrie, as Gange has pointed out, went to Egypt with the 
express purpose of fitting Egyptological finds into a biblical chronology. Ancient Egypt was 
seen as possibly providing the evidence to support various biblical claims against the 
challenge of evolution and sciences such as geology. Gange continues,  
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These sciences [evolutionary and geological] claimed that man’s intellectual capacity 
had undergone a constant development from primitive origins, and in the late 
nineteenth century, when the earth was thought to be many times younger than we 
now know it to be, the timescale for this process was drastically foreshortened. The 
argument employed by the vast majority of those who took an interest in ancient 
Egypt during this period was that this civilization – the oldest to have left some 
substantial documentation behind – could settle the issue of origins. To some, 
Egyptian civilization was seen to betray remnants of man’s bestial state, revealing 
him coming down from the trees to begin the course of civilization. To others, 
including the biblical Egyptologists, Egypt revealed man reeling in the wake of the 
biblical fall, within memory of a glorious, more enlightened stage of civilization. The 
fact that predynastic artefacts only began to be appreciated for what they were in the 
late 1890s was of great significance here: before this it was widely noted that 
Egyptian civilization seemed to have come into existence as a fully formed complex 
culture, a major blow, it was felt, to evolution. 
Part of the claim made by supporters of evolution and biblical criticism was that in 
the age of the Old Testament, when humanity was in a stage of evolution 
significantly less advanced than that of Victorian Britain, written language must have 
been relatively undeveloped, that the Pentateuch must therefore be an unreliable – 
even barbaric – document based on centuries of distorting oral tradition before its 
eventual materialization in written form. Egyptologists therefore went to Egypt not 
just to find records of biblical events, but in search of the highly developed written 
culture that they were certain must exist, and that would offer a serious setback to the 
claims of evolutionists and biblical critics. Some Egyptologists even went so far as to 
resurrect the enlightenment idea – well-known from Newton’s writings – that all of 
the world’s civilizations sprang from a single source in a glorious super-civilization 
that had known divine knowledge but in its decadence had been destroyed by the 
Noachic deluge. The British Museum Egyptologist Peter le Page Renouf for instance, 
supported this idea in his Hibbert Lectures of 1878, writing: 
It is incontestable true that the sublimer portions of the Egyptian religion 
are not the comparatively late result of a process of development or 
elimination from the grosser. The sublime portions are demonstrably 
ancient; and the last stage of the Egyptian  religion, that known to the 
Greek and Latin  writers, heathen or Christian, was by far the grossest 
and the most corrupt.(in Gange 2006, 1089-90) 
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I have quoted this passage at some length as it reveals a number of points relevant to my 
larger thesis. We see that Predynastic Egypt was revealed through a series of archaeological 
finds and new techniques in the mid to late 1890s. This is after the publication of H. P. 
Blavatsky’s The Secret Doctrine (1888) or even her passing away in 1891. The paucity of 
data would have allowed for greater speculation by all participants. Additionally, the field of 
Egyptology was in the process of disciplining during the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. During this period of contestation the existing evidence could support any number of 
positions, including some which were reflected in Theosophical positions. The point, from 
my perspective, is that the evidence was capable of being narrativised in various ways. 
Blavatsky could, therefore, draw on reliable third party resources in support of her position. 
The late nineteenth century, in its totality, was a pool of resources from which actors could 
draw on in support of their theories. Some emphasised certain positions, while others 
emphasised and privileged other stances. Such is the modus operandi of rational and 
considered theorising. 
These are examples presented to make a point. A great deal more study is required of 
Blavatsky’s works and the manner in which they intersect with every discipline of the 
nineteenth century. The lack of such studies can mislead even superb scholars such as 
Joscelyn Godwin, referencing Andrew Dickson White’s The Warfare of Science with 
Theology in Christendom (1896), into making statements like,  
White’s work does half the job of Isis Unveiled: the exoteric half of demolishing 
religious superstition, obscurantism, and persecution in the clear light of science. 
What its rationalist author could not possibly imagine was the esoteric half of 
Blavatsky’s work, which in turn demolishes the pretensions of science by adducing a 
mass of evidence against the premises of materialism. (1994, 305) 
Firstly, “science” is not one “thing;” it is a diverse body of fields comprising many competing 
strands, some of which H. P. Blavatsky endorsed. Secondly, why is it Blavatsky’s “esoteric” 
criticism that attacks materialism? Many sciences were internally divided amongst 
themselves on the precise value of materialism and Blavatsky drew on these internal disputes 
to create, reinforce, and develop her position. 
In the late nineteenth century we might additionally point to interrelated events and trends in 
both the centre of European society and at the periphery of European power, which 
influenced the development of comparative religion as an enterprise. At the periphery, 
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colonial and imperial endeavours led to increasing cultural contact with non-European 
traditions and an attendant proliferation of material. David Chidester, focusing on Southern 
Africa as a case study, has provided a model of how the science of comparative religion at the 
imperial centre was founded, at least in part, on materials drawn from the colonial periphery 
that were worked into an evolutionary narrative involving savages, primitives, and a civilized 
Europe. Focusing on the production, authentication, and circulation of material via a complex 
triple network of imperial theorists, colonial interrogators, and indigenous informants, 
Chidester has worked to show how the history of the comparative project is to be 
complicated. The supposed “raw materials” invoked by the founders of comparative religion 
in Europe have been shown to be mediated by earlier actors. Having erased the complex 
origins of their material these founding theorists reworked the material with methodologies 
and theories popular in Europe (Chidester 1996; 2014). Whatever repercussions this had for 
the major theorists, Blavatsky would be implicated too.  
Internal to European culture, though not separate from peripheral events, were various 
philosophies, trends, and developments contributing to the forms taken by comparative 
religion. The Enlightenment rationalism of the eighteenth century, specifically the Deist 
legacy, has been singled out as an important foundation of nineteenth-century comparative 
religion (Byrne 1991). The counter-Enlightenment and Romantic and Idealistic impulses 
provided a reaction to the eighteenth-century focus on rationalism. The Romantic impulse 
emphasised the historical unfolding of religion and promoted the affective over the cognitive 
foundation of religion (Vries 1977, 39-58; Byrne 1991, 181). Reviewing the general 
characteristics of the Enlightenment and Romantic movements I do not think Blavatsky fits 
neatly into either movement and appears to draw from both trends (Tarnas 1999, 366-78).70 If 
she can refer to Arnold’s Light of Asia as being “replete with philosophical thought and 
religious feeling – just the book, in short, we needed in our period of Science of Religion – 
and the general toppling of ancient gods,” I would suggest that Theosophical thought 
preferences the philosophical over the emotional aspect of religion (Blavatsky n.d., 131). Ivan 
Strenski has emphasised the influence of Biblical Criticism for the development of 
comparative religion. Techniques and methodologies initially evolved to critically assess the 
Bible, including philology, hermeneutics, historical contextualising, and text-criticism, were 
applied to other religions as their texts and historical environment became open to scrutiny in 
                                                          
70H. P. Blavatsky would not be the first student of religion to be seen to defy classification into one or other of 
these trends. See Blok on G. F. Creuzer (Blok 1994, 28). 
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Europe (Preuss 1987; Strenski 2006). Scientific developments inevitably had repercussions 
on any European assessment of the world, including comparative religion. The central 
importance of an evolutionary narrative was, as an instance, the grounding principle of much 
comparative theory. De Vries highlights the influence of Comtean Positivism with, among 
other aspects, its interest in uncovering “laws” which governed nature (Vries 1977, 62-3).71 If 
de Vries can refer to the “establishment of laws” as a goal of Positivist investigation I would 
suggest that H. P. Blavatsky, with her own uncovering of “Occult Laws,” displayed a similar 
interest in her work. 
If the above is the familiar background to the development of the study of religion, Jason 
Ānanda Josephson (also Jason Ānanda Josephson-Storm) has proposed a new history, 
initially in a journal article, “God’s Shadow: Occluded Possibilities in the Genealogy of 
““Religion”” (2013) and more recently in his book The Myth of Disenchantment (2017). The 
book is an elaboration of his article and his broad project is more clearly presented in it. 
Josephson-Storm concern is to challenge what he calls the “Myth of Disenchantment” which 
is linked to the “Myth of Modernity” and, consequently, to the “Myth of a Postmodern” turn. 
If disenchantment never fully occurred, then the assumptions of Modernity are a “Myth” and, 
according to him, the disenchantment narrative itself is simply another myth. I am 
sympathetic to this work, but will focus my comments on Josephson-Storm’s assessment of 
Blavatsky. Josephson-Storm, recognising the importance of spiritualism in the nineteenth 
century, argues that the “disciplinary formation of religious studies has been misread.” The 
“cultural setting” for religious studies was not “antireligious skepticism,”“mainstream 
Protestantism,”“secular disenchantment” or “liberal theology.” Instead, spiritualists, 
occultists, and scholars of religion were “fellow travellers,” and “inhabitants of the same 
conceptual universe” (2013, 337; 2017, 122). The discipline, Josephson argues, emerged 
from a Counter-Enlightenment trajectory in communication with Western esoteric impulses. 
The French Enlightenment produced a binary system of classification which included the 
study of “spirits” (a “science of spirits”) as the negative half and the study of natural and 
revealed theology (comparative theology) as the positive half (2013, 312). The 
Enlightenment project is then “haunted” by the very things it classifies and attempts to 
devalue. For Josephson, it is no coincidence that the study of religion arose in the same 
context as spiritualism and Theosophy, and the enterprise defined itself against these 
                                                          
71For a brief overview of Comte’s influence on comparative religion see William Grassie, The New Sciences of 
Religion (2010, 31-47). For H. P. Blavatsky’s dismissal of Auguste Comte and Positivism, rooted in her positive 
evaluation of spiritualistic phenomena, see Isis Unveiled (1988a, vol. I, 75-84). 
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emergent movements. He then discusses three actors, F. Max Müller, Eliphas Levi, E. B. 
Tylor, and H. P. Blavatsky focusing on their shared background commitments. 
The broad nineteenth-century background that Josephson-Storm presents is that of an 
opposition between science and religion which, linked to concerns over the place of God and 
humanity in the world, led to both to the rise of various occult movements and to the 
emergence of disciplined study of religion. The opposition between science and religion led 
to two supplementary categories which exist, in part, as critiques of secularizing and 
modernizing forces. The categories are a positive conception of “magic” and a negative 
construction of “superstition”. Referring to Theosophy and spiritualism Josephson writes, 
“These movements embodied dissatisfaction with the perceived consequences of the 
Enlightenment while benefiting from many of its basic assumptions. They attempted to 
occupy the position of “science” and to assert the universality of their particular interpretive 
systems, at the same moment that they strove to subvert the symbols of the established order” 
(2013, 314).  
A number of issues emerge from Josephson-Storm’s narrative as it relates to Theosophy. The 
first is Josephson’s hasty linking of spiritualism, Theosophy, the Golden Dawn, and 
Spiritism. While there could always be ever broader categories or themes under which 
disparate groups could be linked, a closer look would show defining individualities and 
differences that are glossed over. Secondly, he subtly carries forward distinctions between the 
Theosophical project and the nascent field of comparative religion, the retaining of which I 
question. For example, he remarks that academics spent their time in European libraries 
critically translating texts while Theosophist went east in search of “revelation.” Theosophists 
were, however, also engaged in the translation of texts, specifically Asian texts, and made use 
of the new translations of religious literature. To call Theosophy “quasi-academic”, as he 
does, is to iterate loaded distinctions of the past and present which, in fact, require direct 
challenging. The interesting distinction between Theosophists and academics was in term of 
interpretive orientation relating to metaphysical commitments concerning contemporary 
events, not in methodology.  
Furthermore, we need to consider the question of chronology and direction of influence. 
Theosophy, surely, drew some of its initial impulse from the internal scientific debates and 
contestations. Subverting the “symbols of the established order,” assuming there was such an 
order, surely began within the scientific community, before Blavatsky adopted them in 
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support of her enterprise. Josephson further remarks that the movements mentioned provided 
a “necrovitalist critique” of the Enlightenment. But, I wonder, do we really want to say that is 
what A. R. Wallace was doing? Why wasn’t he just being an honest scientist following the 
evidence where it led him? In the same light, why isn’t H. P. Blavatsky simply a student of 
comparative religion? Why is the Theosophical effort characterised as a “doppelganger” or as 
being “esoteric”? This vocabulary is better dropped. Theosophy, I confine myself to this 
movement, is not separate from the various knowledge fields of the nineteenth century, which 
themselves were not homogenous entities. The potential for communicating with 
disembodied intelligences lay within the parameters of science and was not confined to the 
spiritualist or esoteric milieu. Josephson-Storm’s tone is in part anachronistic and 
insufficiently historical. The evocative neologisms, furthermore, function to distance and 
separate certain thoughts and ideas from those seemingly closer and more acceptable to him. 
The rehabilitation I am aiming for requires a direct revisionist critique of positions of the 
past. In part, differences between Josephson-Storm and my efforts are a function of our 
choices over story space and entry point. Josephson-Storm is challenging a diachronic 
narrative of disenchantment. I have entered the debates through a synchronic based re-
description of the scientific assessment of the séance and related phenomena, and the 
implications which flow from this re-conceptualisation.  
In the vision of the field of the study of religion that I am trying to outline, Blavatsky, Max 
Müller, Tylor, and any other contemporary actor should be seen as occupying equal though 
different places in the history of the field. They all drew on the available resources in unique 
ways and presented theories of religion. Any hierarchical valuing of the different endeavours 
is not supported by any interesting criteria and represents another uncritical casting of the 
present, the inheritor of past distinctions, into the past. It is also an error to reject any 
potential influence in the production of a theory. Once one goes into individual biography the 
problems of broad contextualising become even more apparent. I look now, however, to 







3) PROFESSIONALISING THE FIELD 
We are examining the field of comparative religion and H. P. Blavatsky’s potential place in 
it. If, in or around the 1870s, comparative religion became a science, professionalised, or 
disciplined itself we need to examine the import and consequences of this boundary-marking. 
As Blavatsky’s works were contemporaneous with the founding of the field, and despite the 
fact that she had a clear interest in understanding religion, her exclusion from its histories is 
of some interest. I will highlight a number of the boundaries and distinctions drawn and 
review them in the light of her enterprise and my own broader methodological and 
philosophical grounding. It is, of course, my position that the existence of Blavatsky’s 
comparative enterprise destabilises the assumptions on which the field has been constructed, 
and that the use of the “professionalising” metaphor is at an end. 
I have earlier reflected the idea that “professionalizing,”“disciplining,” or “institutionalising” 
a field is primarily the establishing of academic chairs, re-directing of resources to specific 
endeavours, the self-perpetuating of favoured assumptions, methodologies and theories, and 
the fulltime employment of scholars. What “professionalizing” does not entail is a specific 
body of knowledge or practice true across time. What professionals do and the manner in 
which they conduct their research will differ synchronically and diachronically. As an 
example, we might review Sharpe with his perspective on the founding of the field of 
comparative religion. Pinning the beginning to the 1860s and 1870s he proposes there should 
be a motive, available material, an acceptable methodology, and the detachment of the 
researchers (1986, 1-2). He further goes on to describe the “study of religion” as scientific 
(inductive), critical (based on evidence), historical, and comparative (the basis of knowledge) 
(1986, 31). An additional indicator of professionalism was the establishment of university 
chairs in various countries around this period. If these were the necessary foundations of a 
professional comparative enterprise, then one may wonder if the field still exists. I refer to the 
isolating of inductive thinking. It is also fairly apparent to me that the early professionals 
within the field did not live up to all these ideals themselves in all instances. Note Louis 
Henry Jordan’s comments as they relate to “detachment.” Writing of the new field he 
comments, “Its function consists in placing the numerous Religions of the world side by side, 
in order that, deliberately comparing and contrasting them, it may frame a reliable estimate of 
their respective claims and values” (1905, xi). Discussing whether Christianity may be more 
“worthy” than any other religion he continues, quite incredibly by modern standards, to say, 
“If, however, an opposite verdict should be necessitated by a summation of all the available 
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evidence, Comparative Religion will never hesitate to discharge its full duty in the 
circumstances. The demands of truth are paramount, and they must at all costs be respected” 
(1905, xii). Corrective and correcting, that was my earlier assessment of H. P. Blavatsky’s 
enterprise. For Jordan, evidently, scientific comparative religion was in a place to judge the 
worthiness of individual religions. In many respects Blavatsky’s writings sit comfortably 
within such operative parameters and once Jordan begins to outline his normative vision of 
the “Science of Comparative Religion,” his definition of  “Science” in this context, and his 
definition of “Comparative Religion,” I think traditional historians of the field may well 
throw their hands up in despair (1905, 13-5, 63). I can think of no interesting or compelling 
reasons, historical, intellectual, or methodological to exclude H. P. Blavatsky’s enterprise in 
comparative religion from the history of the field.72 
I wish to make my point clear. A benign definition of “professionalising,” that is, any 
definition shorn of all knowledge content, is simply uninteresting. If the simple establishment 
of a university chair in a particular subject is sufficient to call that field “professional,” then 
this is of no real importance. What is of interest are the actual theories produced. I have no 
doubt that individuals employed fulltime to produce theories of religion may be more 
successful than part-time scholars, but this status simply increases the odds of success, it is 
not defining of where relevance lies. We could also note that professionalising may lead to 
normative and exclusionary commitments or, as Byrne notes, that ontological foundations 
underlie any theory of religion (Byrne 1991, 204, 243). This is an obvious insight into much 
academic research. My specific point is that in the late nineteenth century who was in and 
who was out was as much based on a party line being followed as it was on any justifiable 
argument. An example of this might be Sir John Lubbock, who is mentioned in various 
histories of the field of comparative religion but, who was not university educated let alone 
professionally employed by one (Sharpe 1986, 52). Lubbock toed the evolutionary and 
naturalistic line which was favoured by a growing section of the educated population, and he 
is included in the history of the field. Blavatsky, who did not tow the mainstream line, is out. 
This is not even to mention other extra-scientific factors that result in exclusions. Such as the 
subtle paternalism which appears in Max Müller’s assessment of Blavatsky, leading him to 
                                                          
72We may feel that the current field of comparative religion has moved on from many of these early concerns. 
However, it seems many of these issues reappear in a new guise. Boundary disputes, the negotiating of who 
was, is, or should be regarded as a participant in the field, continue. See Ivan Strenski on David Chidester, as an 
example (Chidester 1996, xxi; Strenski 2004). A further example might be the reappearance of Comparative 
Theology within the study of religion discipline. (See Locklin and Nicholson, 2010). 
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imply she was temperamentally unfit to study religion dispassionately (Müller 1901, 101). 
We could also note Max Müller’s appeal that only individuals competent in Sanskrit and Pâli 
should be allowed to comment on Asian (Buddhist) scriptures (Müller 1901, 107). This is his 
complaint against both H. P. Blavatsky and Andrew Lang. Yet, Andrew Lang is in the 
histories of the field.73 These exclusionary actions are not confined to the nineteenth-century 
actors, we perpetuate them. 
We might reflect on a number of binaries: science/pseudo-science; professional/amateur; 
secular/theological; naturalism/supernaturalism; etic/emic. Many of these are already 
questioned. For example, Masuzawa challenges the value of the both the 
professional/amateur (lay) and the comparative religion/comparative theology divisions in the 
history of the field (Masuzawa 2005, 74, 104). The others have been challenged by both 
narrative theory and semantic holism (Flood 1999; Gardiner and Engler 2012; 239-55). My 
broad stance is that these binaries are intrinsically uninteresting. My specific argument is that 
they were not sufficiently entrenched in the late nineteenth century to be of interpretive use 
and that they cannot, therefore, be invoked as exclusionary mechanisms to be applied to 
Blavatsky. Which actors are to be included or excluded from the history of comparative 
religion? This is not a sterile question of the past. I refer again to Ivan Strenski’s criticisms of 
David Chidester’s inclusion of various actors in the “science” of comparative religion (2004). 
Strenski is surely right that a science must have its scientists. And Chidester is surely right to 
include the intermediary and indigenous participants that he does, thereby problematising and 
re-defining the accepted boundaries of the “science.” The shortcoming of Strenski is to link 
comparative religion exclusively to academic chairs. This just cannot stand historically, and 
should not stand intellectually. 
 
4) H. P. BLAVATSKY ON COMPARING 
If we accept that the discipline of comparative religion began professionalising in the 1870s, 
we might ask, where does H. P. Blavatsky situate her work in relation to this newly self-
conscious movement? A number of things stand out to me. We can see that Blavatsky 
embraces a “comparative” method and that she is impressed by the prestige of “science.” 
                                                          
73H. P. Blavatsky was proficient in at least French, Russian, and English, sufficient for our contemporary 
academic requirements. Furthermore, full proficiency in the languages of every world scripture eluded Max 
Müller, as I have no doubt it eludes most scholars of comparative religion today. It is obvious also that Max 
Müller’s proficiency in language did not insulate him from a methodological bias or associated shortcomings. 
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None of this is unexpected if we recall Daston and Galison’s epistemic codes at play in the 
nineteenth century. In terms of the disciplinary field, Blavatsky makes specific reference to 
the “science of religion,”“comparative religion,”“comparative theology,”“comparative 
philology,” and “comparative mythology.”74 She identifies many of these fields as 
“sciences,” though she has an ambivalent assessment of them. Her further references to the 
comparative endeavours of the nineteenth century highlight the widespread use of the 
comparative technique during that period. Thus, Blavatsky can refer to a “comparative 
method,”“comparative anatomy,”“comparative symbology,”“comparative 
grammar,”“comparative vocabularies,”“comparative psychology,”“comparative occult 
symbology,”“comparative theogony,”“comparative pathology,” and can further refer to 
various works of the time which included “comparative religion” or “science of religion” in 
the title.  
To appreciate Blavatsky’s position we need to take a step back and recall her own narrative. 
Essentially, she presents herself as an inheritor of a wisdom tradition that has secretly carried 
the truths concerning nature and humanity in the religions, myths, and traditions of the world. 
This esoteric tradition, into which she has been initiated, is now to be uncovered in the 
various religions of the world through her activities. The comparison and justification she 
engages in through her writings is in support of this pre-existing body of “occult” truths, and 
these literary activities are secondary to the living transmission of which she is a link. This is 
her story, though, as I have argued, it cannot be mine or any other scholar’s in the current 
academic climate. This is not to say that her story is necessarily untrue, rather it is to accept 
that her perspective is not currently justified and is less useful than recent theories of religion. 
We must either accept her story as true, or we must give an alternate explanation for the 
origin of her theory of religion. Currently, we cannot accept her story as true, therefore, as an 
alternate stance I have proposed that her work is the result of her research and study of 
religious material and of her engagement with the intellectual world of the late nineteenth 
                                                          
74If by comparative theology one means the comparing of religions from a Christian foundation then H. P. 
Blavatsky had no overt link to this and is usually presented as “anti-Christian.” If, instead, one sees 
comparative theology as the comparing and juxtaposing of the theological and doctrinal systems of various 
traditions, then this is fair description of what Blavatsky is doing. See Hugh Nicholson The New Comparative 
Theology and the Problem of Theological Hegemonism for a brief note on the difference between comparative 
theology and comparative religion in the late nineteenth century (2010, 49). No doubt one may find underlying 
Biblical themes in Blavatsky’s orientation if one searches for them, but if the case this would really be par for 
the course in a certain sense (Boag 2011). For example, criticising “false analogies” in the field, F. Max Müller 
proposed the following categories  to be used as foci for comparison, “the belief in a divine power, the 
acknowledgement of sin, the habit of prayer, the desire to offer sacrifice, and the hope of a future life” (Max 
Müller 1895a, 100-1). 
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century as a whole. She is, therefore, no different from any other actor in the field in the late 
nineteenth century, and my shift is from what she is saying to what she is doing. It is simply 
the fact that we cannot allow her to be different, as to do so would undermine the intellectual 
assumptions of our own age. For Blavatsky, one first knows the truth, then, one locates this 
truth in the material and resources of the world. Scholarly research theoretically moves in the 
opposite direction though it has become clear that “objective” research is illusionary, scholars 
and methodologies have implicit ontological assumptions, and the by rote application of a 
theoretical model will result in pre-determined outcomes.  
I turn now to her actual statements. Referring to comparative religion she believes that this 
enterprise will, with philology, eventually concede the common root of all religions. 
Preventing this is the lack of knowledge of the “symbolical universal language” with its 
various keys (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 317-8). Confirming my argument that for H. P. 
Blavatsky science is a body of truths about the world and humanity, and not a specific 
method, she notes, “the study of comparative religion” cannot “become a ‘Science’ until the 
symbols of every Religion yield their final secrets” (Blavatsky 1985, 444). Comparative 
Theology and philology have had “meagre” results due to the lack of the esoteric keys and to 
the fact that scholars have struggled to decode the “allegorical speech” of the past (Blavatsky 
1988a, vol. I, 269). She believes that various ancient texts present the same secret doctrine 
under an allegorical guise. On the one hand, the “exact sciences” of philology and 
comparative mythology prove Theosophical points and, on the other, they are regarded as 
limited tools (Blavatsky 1988a, vol. I, 580; Blavatsky 1975, 66). Referencing the comparative 
method in general, Blavatsky notes, “To thoroughly comprehend the idea underlying every 
ancient cosmology necessitates the study, in a comparative analysis, of all the great religions 
of antiquity; as it is only by this method that the root idea will be made plain” (1988b, vol. I, 
424). In the Key to Theosophy, when asked how Theosophy will reconcile religions and sects, 
she answers “[by] their comparative study and analysis” (Blavatsky 1987b, 3-4). Illustrating 
her dual movement mentioned above, when asked how Theosophy could reveal the truths in 
religion, myths, and traditions, she indicated that the first step is by presenting the occult 
truths of the mystery schools, and the second would be by use of the “comparative method” 
(Blavatsky 1960, 404). 
H. P. Blavatsky endorses the various unfolding scientific fields when they support her stance, 
for example, when they undermine the uniqueness of Christianity, highlight the rationality of 
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past religions, appear to be moving in her direction, or they actually propose a position which 
she too holds. She will find them wanting when they fall short of her position.  
Blavatsky references a bewildering array of resources. To which of these sources she owes 
the greatest debt, or any debt, is difficult to establish and this is quite possibly the wrong 
question to ask. Sheer quantity of reference is no sure sign of influence. Sources which 
discuss or list the potential references of H. P. Blavatsky include: 
Gomes’ Theosophy in the Nineteenth Century (1994),   
 Gomes’ A Catalogue of Books Belonging to H. P. Blavatsky (1995), 
 Coleman’s The Sources of Madame Blavatsky’s Writing (1895),   
 Each volume of the H. P. Blavatsky Collected Writings contains a “General  
  Bibliography with Selected Biographical Notes” on various reference sources,
 The Pasadena edition of Isis Unveiled (1988a) contains a “Bibliographical Index with 
  an Author and Title Key,”       
 The Theosophical Publishing House edition of Isis Unveiled (1972) contains a more 
  detailed version of the Pasadena edition Bibliography,   
 The Theosophical Publishing House edition of The Secret Doctrine has a third volume
  entitled “General Index and Bibliography” (1987a),     
 The Pasadena Theosophical Society’s recent online publication of the references to 
  The Secret Doctrine. (Theosophical Society Pasadena).75    
What is one to make of her references? Whether she actually sourced them directly, or 
whether she knew a number of them via a few select secondary sources, is not directly 
relevant to me. That is a relatively uninteresting historical question of method, and I am 
privileging the product over the production, the surface statement over the emergent 
conditions. The basic questions remain the same. How did they influence her? What 
contribution, if any, did they make in the unfolding and development of her comparative 
enterprise? Are we looking for her “system” before she herself wrote? Did she selectively 
quote to support an argument? What is to be gained by tracing every one of the bibliographic 
references? I have touched on this theme earlier. If we accept the idea that semantic value is 
rooted in a larger narrative placing, then there is relatively little to be gained by tracking 
                                                          
75For completeness sake two further sources might be mentioned. Wizard’s Bookshelf published a 1977 
reference list to The Secret Doctrine and William Savage produced an unpublished study of references in The 
Secret Doctrine (Savage 2016). It is my understanding that both these works have been taken up into the 
Pasadena Secret Doctrine References published online (Theosophical Society Pasadena). 
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every quoted sentence or statement. Of course, it is of interest which books H. P. Blavatsky 
may have quoted from, but she cannot “mean” precisely what a seventeenth-century author 
meant, or a twelfth-century author, or an earlier or later writer. Nor can the justificatory 
mechanisms, resources, and context be the same. To quote a sentence from an Egyptian text 
or a sixteenth-century philosophical text in support of a nineteenth-century theory is to do 
nothing but privilege, inevitably, the present over the past. Blavatsky’s interpretive system 
could not pre-exist her, or her context, no matter how convincing the superficial similarities 
from the past may appear.  
 
5) THE INTERSECTION 
H. P. Blavatsky mentioned well over 2000 individual authors across her works and it would 
likely be easier to list recognized authors in the field of comparative religion that she did not 
mention than those she did. To speak of “influence” regarding the diverse series of authors 
referenced may be a fruitless endeavour. It is quite possible that a single sentence or thought 
in a minor work may have influenced Blavatsky disproportionally, while a frequently 
referenced work could, for example, be referenced simply because it was convenient, 
popular, or a foil for her own thoughts. Furthermore, accepted histories of the field already 
betray exclusions of which I am suspicious.76 It strikes me that the best way to understand 
what H. P. Blavatsky is doing is to examine how she uses the works she references. As I am 
arguing that meaning is obtained through use, and is determined through a content holism, I 
believe this will illustrate Blavatsky’s methodology in practice. 
To locate Blavatsky in the field of comparative religion I cross-referenced here author 
references to those in standard works on the history of the field. This produced a list of 
approximately 143 authors. Cross-referencing this with Coleman’s list of books Blavatsky 
plagiarised from produced the following authors: Baron C. C. J. Bunsen (1791-1860), James 
Darmesteter (1849-1894), Paul Decharme (1839-1905), Louis Jacolliot (1837-1890), F. Max 
Müller (1823-1900), A. De Quatrefages (1810-1892), H. H. Wilson (1786-1860), and T. W. 
                                                          
76An example of an excluded actor is J. S. C. Schweigger (1779-1857). In Isis Unveiled, H. P. Blavatsky claimed 
that Schweigger’s works had proven that mythological symbolism had a scientific foundation, which makes his 
omission in The Secret Doctrine noticeable (1988a, vol. I, 23; Phillips 2007, 40-67). Examples of influential 
authors who had published during her lifetime include Friedrich Nietzsche and Karl Marx, though these figures 




Rhys Davids (1843-1922). If I confine myself to the overlap of authors mentioned by 
Blavatsky and significant in the history of comparative religion we obtain the following list: 
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), E. B. Tylor (1832-1917), F. Max Müller, Charles Darwin 
(1809-1882), G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), David Hume (1711-1776), William Jones (1746-
1794), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Goblet de Alviella (1846-1925), Francis Bacon (1561-
1626), Adolf Bastian (1826-1905), Baron C. C. J. Bunsen, Auguste Comte (1798-1857), H. 
T. Colebrook (1765-1837), Ernest Renan (1823-1892), T. W. Rhys Davids, Karl W. F. Von 
Schlegel (1772-1829), Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), William. D. Whitney (1827-1894), 
and Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920). Additional authors actors important to the field and whom 
Blavatsky does mention includes, G. F. Creuzer (1771-1858), Jean Bodin (1530-1596), Franz 
Bopp (1791-1867), Emile-Louis Burnouf (1821-1907) and Eugene Burnouf (1801-1852), 
James Freeman Clarke (1810-1888), C. F. Dupuis (1742-1809), J. J. Von Gorres (1776-
1848), Sir John Lubbock (1834-1913), K. O. Müller (1797-1840), Edward Pococke (   ), F. 
D. E. Schleiermacher (1768-1834). Important authors in the field, but for which I found no 
reference in Blavatsky’s writing include, James G. Frazer (1854-1941), William Robertson 
Smith (1846-1894), Cornelis P. Tiele (1830-1902), Chantepie de la Saussaye (1848-1920), 
John F. McLennan (1827-1881), William James (1842-1910), Andrew M. Fairbairn (1838-
1912), Joseph E. Carpenter (1844-1927), F. D. Maurice (1805-1872), and Charles Hardwick 
(1821-1859). Of the more prominent Comparative Theologians identified by Masuzawa, we 
might add the following names to the list of unmentioned authors, Samuel Henry Kellog 
(1839-1899), and James Clement Moffatt (1811-1890). Andrew Lang (1844-1912) does not 
appear to have been referenced in any of H. P. Blavatsky’s works. 
Clearly, I lack the space to examine 2000 authors in any detail. I have, therefore, selected the 
following list of actors and themes to illustrate H. P. Blavatsky in action: 
- George Oliver on the seven-fold constitution of the individual, 
- E. B. Tylor as referenced by H. P. Blavatsky, 
- Herbert Spencer on the “Unknowable,” and 
- F. Max Müller as referenced by H. P. Blavatsky. 
Any thorough study of H. P. Blavatsky would entail examining each and every use, whether 
direct or indirect, of all works and authors referenced. I hope that the present selection will 





5.1) George Oliver on the Seven-fold Constitution 
The seven-fold constitution is fundamental to H. P. Blavatsky’s presentation. In The Secret 
Doctrine she references two works in support of this classification, Gerald Massey’s lecture 
entitled, “The Seven Souls of Man, and their Culmination in the Christ” (1992) published 
originally in 1886, and George Oliver’s, The Pythagorean Triangle (1975) published 
originally in 1875 (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. II, 632, 640-1). I discuss, briefly, the place of the 
latter in The Secret Doctrine. Massey’s contribution is problematic due to it post-dating the 
presenting of the classic seven-fold Theosophical classification and, in fact, it includes 
references to Sinnett’s Esoteric Buddhism (1883). Coleman suggested that George Oliver, a 
well-known freemason, was one of the minor sources from which H. P. Blavatsky drew 

















I place the extracts side by side below, 
George Oliver H. P. Blavatsky 
The Theosophic philosophy, which was 
copiously introduced into the counterfeit 
Masonry practised on the Continent during 
the last century, counted seven properties in 
man – viz. 
1. The divine golden man. 
2. The inward holy body from fire and 
light, like pure silver. 
3. The elemental man. 
4. The mercurial growing paradisiacal 
man. 
5. The martial soul-like man. 
6. The venerine, according to the 
outward desire. 
7. The solar man, an inspector of the 
wonders of God. 
 
 
They had also seven fountain spirits, or 
powers of nature, called Binding, 
Attraction, Anguish, Fire, Light, Sound, 
and Body (Oliver 1975, 179). 
“The Theosophic Philosophy counted 




1. The divine golden Man; 
2. The inward holy body from fire and 
light, like pure silver; 
3. The elemental man; 
4. The mercurial paradisiacal man; 
 
5. The martial Soul-like man; 
6. The passionate man of desires; 
 
 
7. The Solar man; a witness to and 




They had also seven fountain Spirits, or 
Powers of Nature.” (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. II, 
640-41). 
 
A few preliminary points, beyond random capitalising and italicising amendments, might be 
noted before I make the more obvious points. Firstly, though presenting this entire passage in 
“quotation marks,” Blavatsky has in fact not copied it exactly. Secondly, she has inserted an 
explanatory note, “(or principles),” into the passage giving a Theosophical connotation to the 
terms. Thirdly, she has excised the Christian underpinning of the original text by substituting 
“Universe” for “God.” More pertinently, we see that H. P. Blavatsky presents this Masonic 
reading as a “jumbled account and distribution of Western theosophic philosophy” which 
compared unfavourable to her own “theosophic explanations by the Eastern School of 
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Theosophy” (1988b, vol. II, 641). Furthermore, it is clear that beyond the fact that a 
classification of seven is being presented, George Oliver and H. P. Blavatsky simply do not 
mean the same thing. By the time The Secret Doctrine is written Blavatsky’s scheme and 
vocabulary had been worked out. When she refers to, for example, the fourth principle, this is 
intimately linked to “desire,” is seven-fold itself, is part of an evolutionary scheme of rounds 
and root-races, and is in a complicated and specific relation with the seven cosmic planes. 
George Oliver would not have recognized Blavatsky’s Theosophical content in his works, 
and Blavatsky is largely unconcerned, in this instance, with what Oliver was saying. They 
both reference the number seven in relation to the human being, but the similarities end there. 
Blavatsky has, in effect, interpreted, appropriated, and re-presented Oliver’s work in service 
of her larger project. To call this plagiarism or to suggest Oliver “influenced” H. P. Blavatsky 
is a mistake; she quite simply read through him and found what she was looking for, her own 
thoughts. 
 
5.2) E. B. Tylor as Referenced 
Blavatsky makes only a few scattered references to E. B. Tylor throughout her works. The 
chief relevance of discussing her referring statements is to illustrate the way in which she 
makes use of contemporary authors and fields of knowledge. 
Blavatsky refers to E. B. Tylor’s (sometimes ‘Tyler’) Researches into the Early History of 
Mankind (1865) in Isis Unveiled (1988a, vol. I, 246-48). Following the complete references 
in the text it becomes apparent that she is drawing from Max Müller’s essay On Manners and 
Customs in his Chips from a German Workshop: Volume II (1876), and does not appear to 
have worked with Tylor’s book directly. The general theme in Max Müller’s review of 
Tylor’s Researches is how to account for apparently similar beliefs, superstitions, and the like 
which appeared to exist around the world in different cultures, some of which were linked 
historically and some seemingly not. The two examples discussed by Blavatsky are the belief 
that certain plants and humans may have some sort of sympathetic relation, and a reference to 
a Pythagorean maxim, “Do not stir fire with a sword.” 
Blavatsky is making a number of points in relation to these extracts. She wonders why 
science would not investigate the supposed relation between plants and humans – a 
sympathetic relation she feels has universal testimony to support it. Part of her answer is that 
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science has decided to ignore any type of evidence which is beyond that of the five senses. 
Contemporary materialistic science is closed to anything which transcends its own imposed 
boundaries. She links this to the notion, seemingly referenced to Plato, that humanity cycles 
through periods of spiritually and intellectually fertile and barren periods, and suggests that 
the eighteenth century heralded a sceptical and barren period of which the nineteenth century 
is an inheritor. 
She uses the seemingly universal prevalence of the idea contained in the Pythagorean maxim 
as proof that “magic [here a body of occult and moral truths] was a universal science, entirely 
in the hands of the sacerdotal savant” (1988a, vol. I, 247). Various explanations emerge as 
the seeming similarity demands explanation. These include diffusion, European influence on 
newly contacted cultures, coincidence, and Blavatsky’s “universal science” and facts found in 
nature itself. For Blavatsky, inner senses are real, appeals to universal testimony as a reliable 
gauge is sanctioned, and “savages” and “civilized” peoples lived side by side in all ages. This 
allows her to see scientific, rational truths hidden in the statements, proverbs, and 
superstitions of the past and present. 
Researchers at the Headquarters of the Pasadena Theosophical Society have identified three 
references in The Secret Doctrine to Tylor’s Encyclopaedia Brittanica 9th Edition (1878) 
entry on “Anthropology” (1988b, vol. II, 67, 70, 687). These references, found in volume two 
(Anthropogenesis) of The Secret Doctrine, are short sentence length extractions from the 
same subsection of Tylor’s article on the “Antiquity of Man.” Blavatsky’s use of the article is 
relatively uncontroversial and she, in fact, makes little use of the entry. She points to 
uncertainties, cautionary remarks, and open questions in the text and through these inserts her 
own position. By 1888 H. P. Blavatsky had a mature vocabulary and a settled position, which 
she was then trying to establish in relation to existing debates and positions. 
Reading Tylor’s full article is illuminating. He sets up a series of distinctions between 
Theology and Anthropology, Creation and Evolution, Spiritualistic and Materialistic, and 
Supernatural and Natural theories of the human being. It is clear that he favours the latter in 
every instance and, given his assessment of the spiritualistic phenomena years earlier, this is 
not unexpected. However, a reading of the article, in particular the sections “Man’s Place in 
Nature” and the “Origin of Man,” reveals both the un-finalised state of the debates and 
Tylor’s anticipation of future scientific justification. Perhaps Blavatsky’s own expectation of 
future scientific vindication was not out of place in its time. Throughout the entry Tylor felt 
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compelled to note that both sides of the debates could “count among their adherents men of 
high rank in science” (Tylor 1878, 110, 111). I think the justificatory power of this admission 
is important. The gaps, historical lacunae, in the history of the “prehistoric ages” is filled by 
Blavatsky with the knowledge of the “spiritual eagle eye of the seer,” and for her “records 
exist” that support her theories (1988b, vol. II, 67). In this instance, she presents a reading of 
the Hindu manvantaras and yugas in support of her chronological dating of humanity (1988b, 
vol. II, 68-70). This leads me back to one of my premises, that there either is or is not a 
wisdom tradition from which H. P. Blavatsky drew. Irrespective of the answer, and in current 
academic circles the answer is negative, H. P. Blavatsky presented a coherent position on 
contemporary debates which she claims was drawn from such tradition, and this position is 
logical, rational, and rhetorical when read in historical context. 
I have been able to locate only two occurrences of the term “animism” in Blavatsky’s 
writings. One reference is found in her posthumous Theosophical Glossary as part of a quote 
with no relevance for my purposes. A second, more relevant footnote, part of which I 
reproduce here, notes,  
*“Animalism” is quite an appropriate word to use (whoever invented it) as a contrast 
to Mr. Tylor’s term “animism,” which he applied to all “Lower Races” of mankind 
who believe the soul a distinct entity. He finds that the words psyche, pneuma, 
animus, spiritus, etc., all belong to the same cycle of superstition in the “lower stages 
of culture,” Professor A. Bain dubbing all these distinctions, moreover, as a “plurality 
of souls” and a “double materialism.” (Blavatsky 1980, 351)  
Animalism was the evolutionary notion that human beings were simply another animal and 
shared much in common with the animals. The broader context of the article in which this 
footnote is found relates to human psychology and the function of the will. In short, 
Blavatsky is rejecting any physiological (animalistic) explanation for the “higher human 
functions and phenomena of the mind.” Opposing any solely material explanation of the 
mind, she expresses the wish that physiological theories should not trespass into the realm of 
immaterial psychology and mind. Blavatsky locates, then, the higher functions in an 
immaterial or non-physical mind.  
We might note a number of things. Though I have not pursued it here Blavatsky, later in the 
same article, references authors who appear to support her general position of an immaterial 
mind, including George T. Ladd’s Elements of Physiological Psychology (1887). I could add 
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my own reference: James Sully (1842-1923) noted on this issue, “These questions have not 
yet been answered by accepted scientific methods” (1892, 690).77 The general sense is to 
remove the question of the reality of the mind as an independent entity from the purview of 
materialistic science into the realm of philosophy and metaphysics. That the problem of the 
mind and body was not resolved by Victorian society is also confirmed by Janet Oppenheim 
in her assessment of the field (1985, 205). Richard Rorty provides a fruitful way to read this 
state of affairs. There is no epistemological foundation with which to ground truth claims, 
and no argument is legitimately won with such claims. Instead, people begin to stop using an 
older vocabulary and begin to use a new one for individual and societal reasons. Slowly, 
almost imperceptibly, through the activities of thousands of individuals and works, the older 
language of an immaterial mind began to be eclipsed by new habits and new debates.78 
Blavatsky penned the above in 1890 and not only had the change into the new vocabulary not 
yet decisively occurred, but spiritualist and séance phenomena had given a new impetus to 
the older claims. The dating is also important as the article reveals Blavatsky translating the 
debate into her own now evolved terminology. Further in the article she will invoke the terms 
manas, higher-mind, lower-mind, individuality and personality to explain her position. 
Additionally, we note that the references to E. B. Tylor and animism in this article appear to 
be drawn straight from Bain’s Mind and Body (1873). Blavatsky, at least in this instance, 
does not seem to have made first hand use of any of Tylor’s works. This may at least offer an 
explanation as to why she feels “animalism” is a better term than “animism.” One can only 
speculate that she did not know precisely what Tylor meant by animism, or did not appreciate 
the context in which he used the concept. The replacing of animism by animalism makes no 
real sense in relation to what animism as a concept was meant to convey in Tylor’s theory. 
We might conclude that H. P. Blavatsky was well-informed on debates relating to the 
mind/body problem but seems relatively uninformed on Tylor’s theory of religion. Tylor’s 
position is unlikely to have appealed to her given their opposing orientations to séance 
phenomena outlined earlier. 
Blavatsky appears to have little direct contact with Tylor’s ideas and works. She seems not to 
have fully understood, at least in the context of her references, his concept of animism as the 
                                                          
77Janet Oppenheim identifies James Sully as one of the “leading figures in British psychology” in the nineteenth 
century (1985, 237). 
78As a practical example of this Hasok Chang, in his study of phlogiston and the varied responses to its 
“eclipse,” calls for a case-by-case study of general factors on individual participants to properly understand 
events (2010, 69). 
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origin of religion, and would not have endorsed it if she had. She uses and quotes Tylor, 
sometimes second hand, only in support of her own arguments and train of thought. She is 
not consciously in competition with Tylor as, for example Max Müller was, in terms of 
presenting an explanatory theory of religion to the public. She seems largely unaware of 
Tylor and the details of his works and is moving along her own trajectory. Both of them, 
however, are rooted in the nineteenth century and this is revealed in their appeal to the 
comparative method, the potential in science to justify their positions, and their response to 
spiritualistic phenomena. That they read the nineteenth century differently reveals the 
richness of the imagination, not a distinction between progressive and retrogressive. 
 
5.3) Herbert Spencer and the “Unknowable” 
Though H. P. Blavatsky made no systematic study of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) she made 
frequent reference to him, at one point referring to him as “the greatest philosopher of 
England” (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 600).79 Despite this assessment, H. P. Blavatsky is not an 
uncritical follower of Herbert Spencer, instead making use of him in pursuit of her own 
agenda as she did of other prominent nineteenth-century figures. While both Spencer and 
Blavatsky drew on the resources of their day, though not necessarily or directly the same 
resources, they each read the world differently. Both could present the same sentences and 
examples, but draw different conclusions from them. An example will suffice. Discussing 
“human beliefs” (i.e. religious beliefs, though not exclusively) seemingly at odds with the 
“facts,” Spencer suggests that they may still contain “some small amount of truth” (1937, 3). 
Blavatsky could no doubt say the same, the difference being in the nature of the “truth” to be 
found. As an instance, Spencer goes on to discuss the evolution, the “progress of 
civilization,” of political government ranging from ancient theories of divine kingship and 
demi-gods to his contemporary England’s monarchy and parliamentary arrangement. The 
“truth” he draws from this is not that one arrangement is true and the other false. The broad 
and abstract truth for him is that, irrespective of the precise form of government, each 
recognizes the “unquestionable fact” that individual rights are subordinated to broader 
societal needs and values (1937, 4-7). Blavatsky, having little overt interest in political 
governance, read the decreasing spiritual status of society’s rulers in the light of her root-
                                                          
79In addition to his Spencer’s own writings H.P. Blavatsky shows an awareness of secondary literature on him, 
including Spencer’s engagement with Frederic Harrison collated in Youman’s The Nature of Reality of Religion: 
a Controversy between Frederic Harrison and Herbert Spencer (1885) (Blavatsky 2010, 568-69).  
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races and the cyclic descent of spirit into matter. For her, there were in human history 
superior human beings who could be called “divine” or “demi-gods” in comparison to a later, 
more material humanity. They ruled by the natural right of an inherent spiritual superiority, a 
status which was not a “belief of the people” but a fact of natural evolution.80 
Blavatsky can draw an idea, a term, a sentence, or a paragraph from Spencer’s works in 
support of or as a foil for her writings. I am interested in those ideas she drew into her 
narrative but which take on a different meaning due to the scope of application. Specifically, 
I will review Blavatsky’s engagement with Herbert Spencer’s concept of the “Unknowable.” 
In relation to Herbert Spencer she begins with a number of broad accommodating gestures, 
which appropriating techniques reflect the importance of Spencer in the late nineteenth 
century. Her first accommodating move is a simple mention. By drawing Spencer’s name and 
vocabulary into her narrative she is weaving his authority into her work. Secondly, she 
simultaneously accommodates and dilutes his ideas by claiming that many contemporary 
scientific and philosophic ideas are merely new presentations, pale copies, of ancient ideas 
(Blavatsky 1988a, vol. I, 248-49; Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 96). This takes on a specific 
meaning in Blavatsky’s writings: in her conception if one goes far enough back in 
Theosophical human history the link between cycles and the early races, with their natural 
spiritual state in distinction to the material state of humanity in the nineteenth century, is 
emphasised (1988a, vol. I, 424). An additional broad move is to claim Spencer’s ideas as 
being either anticipated by or taken from Asian or esoteric sources (Blavatsky 1982, 92; 
Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 79). 
Having laid the groundwork to accommodate some of Spencer’s ideas Blavatsky then moves 
to frame the debate by placing Spencer and his ideas. The first placing focuses on where his 
concepts, for example, the Unknowable, belong on her Theosophical template. The second 
placing is her locating Herbert Spencer in relation to the debates of the day. Her second move 
involves her characterising Spencer as a “positivist” [erroneously, though she was not alone 
in this], of his ideas being “tainted by materialism,” and of him as presenting a “material 
metaphysics” (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. II, 156; Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 327; Blavatsky 1982, 
95-96). Referring to the “Unknowable,” the later Theosophist G. de Purucker summed up the 
consequences of this line of thinking by noting,  
                                                          
80H. P. Blavatsky’s reading of Herodotus on the Egyptian Dynasties is an example of this (1988b, vol. II, 367-69). 
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However, it [the Unknowable] has been used by modern agnostics, in particular 
Herbert Spencer, to denote things which are not unknowable, but merely the 
noumenal which underlies the phenomenal, which limits the knowable world only to 
that which we can comprehend with our present physical faculties and the mental 
notions based on them. It is therefore but a convenient way of shelving all inquiries 
which seem to stand in the way of the formulation of a materialistic philosophy.81 
(Purucker 2016) 
I believe H. P. Blavatsky would concur. Specifically, we are dealing with a different 
anthropology, the crucial distinction relating to the mind, states of consciousness, and what it 
is possible for a human being to know. What are the limits of knowledge, what is unknown, 
and what is unknowable? Earlier I argued that many of the issues raised by H. P. Blavatsky 
centred on questions of epistemology and the associated ideas which flow from it. Bernard 
Lightman has highlighted the epistemological nature of Spencer’s, and others, agnosticism 
and suggests that what is “essential” about this version of agnosticism is “the belief that there 
are inherent and constitutive limits of human cognition” (Lightman 1987, 15-6). Richard 
Rorty’s critique of epistemology has shown us that while we can note the epistemological 
debates of the past we cannot resolve the issues through appeal to them. To avoid the 
circularity of past positions we need to reframe the debate through a new vocabulary. 
In an 1889 discussion referencing Spencer and human states of consciousness, H. P. 
Blavatsky makes brief mention of “seven states of consciousness” and “higher states of 
metaphysical consciousness” (2010, 514). The suggestion being that Spencer was unaware of 
these additional states and of the implications flowing from their existence. Blavatsky had 
written more fully on this very topic in 1887, though the article was only published 
posthumously in 1896. In her article, “Modern Idealism,” she argues that Spencer “knows, it 
appears, of but one grade of subjectivity, and has no idea of the occult (Yogic) teaching, of 
the existence of other and higher planes of consciousness, vision or perception, than those of 
Mind” (Blavatsky 1960, 96). In this instance she distinguishes between the manas and buddhi 
principle in the human constitution. H. P. Blavatsky draws the Theosophical conclusion that, 
“It is the overshadowing of the Mind by Buddhi which results in ultimate realization of 
existence – i.e., self-consciousness in its purest form” (1960, 96). The implication of this is 
                                                          
81This is one of the ways Spencer was read in the late nineteenth century, though Lightman has revealed the 
religious dimension in his work (1987, 89). 
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that the higher-self, the spiritual human being, can obtain knowledge that the lower-self, the 
ego, the “brain mind,” etc. cannot access. 
In his First Principles Herbert Spencer criticises Tait and Stewart’s work The Unseen 
Universe, a book H. P. Blavatsky drew on. For Spencer, The Unseen Universe contains 
statements about an invisible and unseen Universe which cannot “be the subject of any 
observation or experiment” (1937, 507-8). In contrast, the invisible side of nature is open to 
Blavatsky’s evolved human being, a type of humanity underwritten by the reality of the 
spiritualist and other occult phenomena of her day. This was one of the battles of the 
nineteenth century, the nature of the human being centred on the nature and capabilities of the 
mind. Many forms of agnosticism, and where to draw the line between what is unknown and 
what is unknowable, are challenged by the acceptance of the scientific status of supernormal 
phenomena.82 H. P. Blavatsky, we have seen, concedes the material world to material 
science. It is with respect to the inner states of mind and the corresponding inner planes that 
she feels Theosophy has a contribution to make. 
This leads into H. P. Blavatsky’s placing of Spencer’s Unknowable within her Theosophical 
framework. She begins by suggesting that Spencer’s concept of the Unknowable is only a 
“dim” or “faint” reflection of the real occult idea to which H. P. Blavatsky suggests it points 
(1988b, vol. I, 14, 281). She further argues that Spencer’s thought demonstrates “the lethal 
influence of materialistic thought” and anthropomorphism (1988b, vol. I, 327; 2010, 282). 
Having made these observations she makes the critical point that Herbert Spencer has made a 
philosophical mistake by confusing the Unknowable with the First Cause. In a specific act of 
domestication, H. P. Blavatsky proposes that the Spencer’s First Cause corresponds to her 
First Unmanifested Logos, and the Unknowable proper corresponds to her 1st Fundamental 
Proposition (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 14-5; 2010, 72-3, 568). The Theosophical Unknowable 
is “an Omnipresent, Eternal, Boundless, and Immutable PRINCIPLE on which all speculation 
is impossible, since it transcends the power of human conception and could only be dwarfed 
                                                          
82This last statement is drawn into clear relief by Richard Bithell’s, a minor nineteenth-century agnostic, A 
Handbook of Scientific Agnosticism (1892). The foundations of “scientific agnosticism” are the facts presented 
to consciousness and the logical inferences which can be drawn from them. This allows Bithell to reject 
“ghouls” and “spectres” but leave open the possibility of thought-transference and planchette-writing. Bithell 
then proposes a conception of humanity in its “present state of development,” allowing for the potential 
unfolding of additional senses in the future. For H. P. Blavatsky there was already sufficient evidence of 
evolved human beings with additional senses and states of consciousness. Agnosticism implies a specific 
anthropology, the precise thing which is under debate and negotiation in the nineteenth century. Blavatsky 
will accept that there is a point at which human knowledge reaches its limits. The point at which that limit is 
reached is the issue at stake. 
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by any human expression or similitude” (Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, 14). Synonyms include, the 
“Abstract All,”“Causeless One Cause,”“Rootless Root,” the “Unknown 
Darkness,”“Parabrahman,” the “One Absolute Reality,” the “Absolute Cause,”“En-Soph” 
and others. The First Cause is the first unconscious radiation or emanation of the Absolute, 
essentially an “effect” of the latter (Blavatsky 2010, 72, 125). The First Cause is only 
unknown, the Absolute Reality is alone unknowable.  
Blavatsky is alert, at least rhetorically, to the limits of language, specifically the English 
language, in expressing these spiritual and philosophical concepts though this does not 
prevent her from penning volumes on various topics (2010, 73). Once she has appropriated an 
idea by translating it into her own vocabulary her manipulation and use of that idea is 
enabled. The Theosophical vocabulary inserts itself throughout world scriptures. As an 
instance, Barborka provides a preliminary list of synonyms for the “Boundless, Immutable 
Principle,” the Theosophical version of the Unknowable, including, “Tat (Vedic) – 
Parabrahman (Vedantic) – Sat (Brahmanical) – Ain Soph (Kabbalistic) – Tien-Sin (Chinese) 
– Rootless Root of All (Stanzas) – Oeaohoo (Stanzas) – Ever-Darkness (of Stanzas) – the 
Boundless” (1992, 482). This, or any obtaining Theosophical entry point, allows for a re-
orientation and re-structuring of the text at hand. 
How can we assess Blavatsky’s reading and use of Spencer’s concept of the Unknowable? A 
point to stress is that Blavatsky is not a scholar of Herbert Spencer, belongs to no 
“Spencerian” school of philosophy, and we should, therefore, not expect to see her trying to 
“get him right.” She is not attempting to explain and clarify his ideas for the larger public. 
Following her own trajectory, she is creatively using, reworking, and re-describing ideas and 
concepts wherever she finds them to aid in her self-expression. A further point to note is that 
her Theosophical reading is not a radical break with Herbert Spencer’s own presentation. 
Instead, Blavatsky has, in one sense, a different scope of application. This scope of 
application reflects her understanding of the nature of the universe and of the human mind. 
Both nature and the human mind have inner, invisible (to ordinary consciousness) 
dimensions, beyond which reach is the place of the Unknowable. In short, then, in answer to 
my original question at the beginning of this paragraph, I can see no profit in evaluating her 
use of Spencer.  
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I am opposed to a simple juxtaposition of two independent narratives, and I do not believe 
there is any limit to the ways in which Spencer may be used or read.83 Furthermore, Spencer, 
as has been argued by Fitzgerald, produced no completely integrated system of thought 
(1987, 477). H. P. Blavatsky may have incorporated aspects of the various strands of thought 
which run through his work, and to tease out which aspects these are would be both tedious 
and un-enlightening. Blavatsky herself may well be shown one day, if this has not been done 
already, to have presented contrary and disjointed ideas on many individual topics. To link 
and compare all these perspectives does not seem fruitful. My goal has been to present an 
understanding of H. P. Blavatsky’s works, and I have done this through the locating of a 
holistic and developmental framework within her work. I could have told a different story, 
and others will tell theirs. A few examples may suffice. H. P. Blavatsky writes that the 
science of Occultism rests on the “illusive nature of matter” and on the “infinite divisibility of 
the atom” (1988b, vol. I, 520). Spencer, in his First Principles, argues that science cannot 
answer whether matter is infinitely divisible or not (1937, 41-44). Secondly, Timothy 
Fitzgerald lists a number of related terms in Spencer’s works,  
(a) The Real, the Actual, the Noumenon, the First Cause, the Infinite, the Absolute; the 
Inscrutable Power; and (b) appearances; the apparent; the phenomenal; the relative, etc 
(1987, 481). 
Excepting the First Cause, and possibly the Inscrutable Power, Blavatsky would largely 
endorse this basic division and terminology.  
A final example involves word play around the terms and concepts of “instinct,”“reason,” 
and “divine gift.” Discussing Herbert Spencer’s epistemology, George H. Smith notes,  
Reason, for Spencer, is the result of organic evolution, and evolution teaches us that 
there are no radical discontinuities, or breaks, in nature. Apparent differences of kind 
invariably shade into differences of degree. Reason is no exception. It is not a gift of 
the gods, a capacity unique to man. It is simply a more highly developed form of 
instinct, and as such it is subject to the limitations imposed by organic structure – i.e., 
the biological, physiological, and psychological nature of man. (1981, 115) 
Here is an early H. P. Blavatsky on a similar theme, 
                                                          
83Perhaps, one thinks too much latitude is given to H. P. Blavatsky here. But, this is no more than was granted 




 Instinct is the universal endowment of nature by the Spirit of the Deity itself; reason 
 the slow development of our physical constitution, an evolution of our adult material 
 brain. (1988a, vol. I, 425) 
This statement appears to denote agreement on the evolution of reason, though Blavatsky can 
find place for instinct as an “endowment of nature by the Spirit of the Deity itself.” Putting 
aside that I have simply wrenched these two passages from their contexts, Blavatsky does not 
believe in “endowments” or “gifts” from any Divine Being. Instinct, rooted in the inherent 
spiritual nature of human beings, in all life, and in nature itself, is not something “bestowed.” 
It is part of the intrinsic nature of all things, and in her later terminology this would be 
explained with reference to her buddhi principle which, linked to the atman principle, is the 
divine monad, the essence of all beings. Everything, furthermore, is under the sway of 
evolution and karma. “Evolution” is a further important concept common to both Spencer’s 
and Blavatsky’s thought world, though a little scratching will dispel many superficial 
similarities. 
I am not sure there is much to learn from these examples. It is more profitable to focus on 
“use” than on assessing and evaluating one system against the other. The Unknowable was 
the point of reconciliation that Spencer proposed between science and religion. For Spencer, 
both science and religion are ultimately agreed on the existence of an inscrutable “mystery” 
beyond the capacity of legitimate human speculation. This reconciliation, however, is not 
“the synthesis of science, religion, and philosophy” that The Secret Doctrine promised. 
Blavatsky did not work to relativize knowledge of the phenomenal or manifested world, 
instead, she worked to establish the truths of this world, however relative to her Absolute 
they and all manifested beings may be. In a sense, then, H. P. Blavatsky’s broad movement is 
in opposition to that of Herbert Spencer’s, who looked to the limits of knowledge, not its 
fixing. 
For completeness sake, it remains for something to be said about Herbert Spencer’s 
perspective on religion and its origin.84 Spencer placed his “ghost theory” and euhemerism 
within a broad evolutionary perspective. “Primitive man” mistook figures in dreams as 
human doubles, and applied anthropomorphic causal explanations for natural phenomena 
(Spencer 1937, 23, 35). Initially, due to inadequate reasoning faculties, early humanity 
conceived of the double figures in dreams and of the ancestral dead as corporeal, very much 
                                                          
84Spencer outlines his theory in various works, and the first volume of his The Principles of Sociology (1877) 
contains a comprehensive presentation on this topic. 
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in the like of living human beings. As early humanity evolved their conceptions of these 
ghost figures became subtler, less tangible, more complex, and less material in nature. There 
is a “germ of truth” in these initial conceptions, not in detail, but in the “apprehension” or 
“intuition” of that “Infinite and Eternal Energy” that exists beyond consciousness and from 
which all things proceed. Various conceptions of invisible agency are proposed in the 
systems of polytheism, monotheism, and pantheism. However, as the scientific enterprise 
evolved, science being defined as “all definite knowledge of the order existing among 
phenomena,” it purified religion of its superstitious and erroneous explanations of the world 
(1937, 84).85 As humanity and science evolve religion is forced to reposition itself in relation 
to the new scientific knowledge. At the foundation of religion is an “intuition” of the mystery 
of the Unknowable, and its religious explanations in beliefs, creeds, and doctrines must 
change as science progresses and undoes the misconceptions inevitably presented. 
H. P. Blavatsky raised a challenge to these intellectualist theories. She frames the debate in 
reference to “soul-survival” and asks how such a pervasive and persistent idea in human 
history and culture could “be but a shadowy and unreal intellectual conception originating 
with ‘primitive man’” (n.d., 178)? She claimed that Spencer and Max Müller had provided no 
explanation as to the origin of the “hope for a future life.” She argued that even if it were 
conceded that Spencer and Max Müller, we might add Tylor here, could explain the origins 
of this belief of early humanity in terms of primitive uneducated responses to natural 
phenomena and psychic life, this does not explain the contemporary beliefs of educated and 
scientific spiritualists (n.d., 170).86 She too links the beliefs of “primitive” and “savage” 
peoples to those of nineteenth-century spiritualists, as had Tylor. The difference being that in 
her conception the nineteenth-century séance and spiritualist phenomena were real as were, 
therefore, the phenomena of the past and the “uncivilized” present. H. P. Blavatsky spends 
some effort in her writings outlining the nature of the after-death states and of the entities 
experienced during spiritualistic phenomena. We shall see in the next sub-section that she 
resolves this question with an appeal to Max Müller’s faculty of intuition, a faculty she 
relates to Spencer’s intuition of the Unknowable. While her vocabulary will only mature in 
her later writings, this intuitive faculty is an inherent principle in the human constitution, the 
                                                          
85An example of this is Spencer’s explanation of the symbol of the Sun being “a chariot of a god, drawn by 
horses” (Spencer 1937, 85). For Spencer, this metaphor of “mechanical traction” would be replaced by new 
metaphors as science presented new theories of motion. It may be significant that surya drawn by seven 
horses, or a seven headed horse, was interpreted by H. P. Blavatsky in reference to number symbolism. For 
her, the symbolism of the image reveals the seven-fold nature of the sun and the solar system. 
86Spencer, revealing his hand, refers to the “superstitions of the “spiritualists”” (1877, 154). 
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buddhic principle, which allows for a deeper form of knowledge than strict rationality which 
she confines to the lower mind. 
I am compelled to make a final point. Much has been made of H. P. Blavatsky’s amateur 
status, her lack of first-hand or competent knowledge of ideas of the day, and of her reliance 
on a limited selection of resources to pen her works. Bernard Lightman made the following 
comment concerning Herbert Spencer, 
Rarely has an intellectual read so little and produced so many volumes. The sources 
of Spencer’s thought were the occasional book he did read (such as Mansel’s 
Bampton Lectures), a fertile imagination, conversations with friends, and newspaper 
articles, all of which helped him to breathe the intellectual air of his times. (1987, 72) 
Many of the exclusionary mechanisms arrayed against Blavatsky are ruses which hide a 
deeper normative agenda at work. These strategies have long been unmasked and it remains 
for Blavatsky to be freed from the prejudices of the past and present. Both Herbert Spencer 
and H. P. Blavatsky wove stories about humanity and the origin of religion. The nineteenth 
century produced numerous narratives and the role of historians is to recapture, as best we 
can, these tales. The reason we do this is not to find the one true story, rather, it is to gain an 
appreciation of past endeavours in explaining ourselves to and for ourselves. 
 
5.4) F. MaxMüller 
H. P. Blavatsky and Theosophy have been linked to F. Max Müller in a number of studies.87 
She references him relatively frequently throughout her works though she makes no detailed 
                                                          
87General works on Max Mūller include, Tomoko Masuzawa’s article “Our Master’s Voice: F. Max Müller after a 
Hundred Years of Solitude” (2003) which presents a summary of studies on Max Müller up to 2003. More 
recent contributions with reflections on Max Müller from various perspectives include Strenski’s Thinking 
about Religion: an Historical Introduction to Theories of Religion (2006), Masuzawa’s The Invention of World 
Religions: or, How European Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism(2005), Chidester’s 
Empire of Religion (2014), and Molendijk’s Friedrich Max Müller & the Sacred Books of the East (2016). Of 
specific relevance to my work are studies which have gone beyond mere sentence length mention of H. P. 
Blavatsky’s enterprise in relation to Max Müller’s. These include, Lubelsky’s Celestial India: Madame Blavatsky 
and the Birth of Indian Nationalism (2012), Olst’s “Max Müller and H. P. Blavatsky: Comparative Religion in the 
19th Century” (2006),  Pels “Occult Truths: Race, Conjecture, and Theosophy in Victorian Anthropology” in 
Excluded Ancestors, Inventible Traditions: Essays toward a more inclusive History of Anthropology (2000),  
Joseph’s chapter “The Sources of the ‘Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis’” in his From Whitney to Chomsky: Essays in the 
History of American Linguistics (2002),  and Chidester’s Empire of Religion (2014). Special attention should be 
given to the exchange of opinion over Theosophy and H. P. Blavatsky between the Theosophist A. P. Sinnett 
and Max Müller himself. The relevant articles are reprinted in Max Müller’s Last Essays: Second Series: Essays 
on the Science of Religion (1901). 
182 
 
study of his theories. I can see no value in a broad based juxtaposition of her work against 
his. They clearly differed in many ways, and many seeming similarities will be shown to be 
superficial once individual statements are located within their broader holistic context. I 
present four examples, though mention of many more could be made. Bosch makes the 
following remark, “Müller’s view [...] was based on the idea that all religions were, in one 
way or the other, representative of the one truth and were historical manifestations of it” 
(2002, 422). I could make the same statement about H. P. Blavatsky, but this would mask 
more than it reveals. Secondly, could Max Müller’s innate human faculty to perceive the 
Infinite in the Finite share a resemblance to H. P. Blavatsky’s buddhi principle in the 
individual? My answer will be, no. Read holistically these concepts are separated in terms of 
origins, in terms of particular meaning, and in terms of the justificatory resources and 
mechanisms employed. Müller is indebted to Kantian notions of a priori categories. 
Blavatsky’s ideas emerge, in part, from the dualistic implications of spiritualistic phenomena. 
Thirdly, Bosch notes that Max Müller saw his views as being in continuity with Vedanta and 
Alexandrian speculative philosophy and its descendents (2002, 434). Certainly Blavatsky’s 
Theosophy shows an affinity with, among other traditions, Vedanta and mystical Western 
traditions. Finally, Bosch points to Max Müller’s concern that his work assist in humanity’s 
acceptance of God and the immortality of the Soul, both specific concerns of Blavatsky in 
Isis Unveiled (Blavatsky 1998a, vol. I, 36, 222; Bosch 2002, 433). I have considered various 
conceptions of these similarities. Is Blavatsky’s work a specific, concrete presentation of Max 
Müller’s more abstract and general thought? For example, while Max Müller can talk loosely 
of “innate” intuition, Blavatsky’s buddhi is a very specific notion. Are Max Müller’s and 
Blavatsky’s presentations both particular concretisations of broader, more abstract trends of 
thought in the late nineteenth century? Finally, do broad and abstract similarities signify 
anything useful? I am only partially satisfied with general commonalities between different 
actors, such as that noted by Rudbøg between H. P. Blavatsky, Max Müller, and P. 
D.Chantepie de la Saussaye. He writes, “However, it should be noted that during the 
historical period in which Blavatsky lived, the idea of one ancient common source of religion 
and the diachronic search for it was actually a common venture among scholars of the science 
of religion” (Rudbøg 2010, 168). Noting such commonalities is only a preliminary step, by 
itself essentially meaningless. For one thing, the search for the origin of religion was hardly 
confined to the nineteenth century. I am interested with the specific surface statements of H. 
P. Blavatsky in their historical particularity. In the end, for my purposes, I have decided that a 
focus on specific and particular ideas in their historical singularity is more fruitful and 
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interesting. To phrase it another way, once they are admitted, it is not narrativity or general 
discursive themes that are interesting, but rather the specific, concrete tales that enthral. I 
propose, therefore, to examine the use she made of Max Müller’s works within her larger 
narrative and to review the manner in which his works served her as she developed her own 
varied themes. I will be studying, then, how Blavatsky accommodates, rejects, interprets, 
reworks, and orientates herself toward his ideas. 
Orientation: 
I find it instructive to enter this topic via my initial focal point, the reality of the séance, 
spiritualism, and associated phenomena. Discussing his use of the term “Theosophy,” here is 
Max Müller on séance and associated phenomena: “It should be known once for all that one 
may call oneself a theosophist, without being suspected of believing in spirit-rappings, table-
turnings, or any other occult sciences and black arts” (1895b, xvi). In his discussion of 
“esoteric Budhism” with A. P. Sinnett, he makes related negative assessments concerning the 
reality of miracles (including H. P. Blavatsky’s own phenomena), ghosts, and all manner of 
invisible beings that Blavatsky argued inhabited an invisible world (Müller 1901,103, 109, 
126). I have earlier outlined Blavatsky’s positive stance on these phenomena and entities. 
Blavatsky and F. Max Müller entered the debates around religion from different points of 
view and the implications of this permeate each of their positions, rendering simplistic 
comparison unfruitful. 
A further point of discrimination should be made here, linked to the one made above, which 
provides a basis for Blavatsky’s interpretive enterprise. Blavatsky surveyed the knowledge 
fields of the late nineteenth century and produced a theory and interpretation of religion. She 
noticed a series of patterns inhering in the beliefs and traditions of the world and presented 
her distillation as the primordial, original religion of humankind. As the scholars of the day 
were not presenting any such theory, and Blavatsky could not claim legitimacy as an 
academic, she presented her theory as “esoteric” and “occult” and herself as an “esotericist” 
and “occultist.” In a reciprocal process of finding and justifying she set about detailing her 
insights in her writings. Rooted in this, university academics are prone to think in terms of 
distinctions between professional/amateur and critical scholar/dilettante. We see Max Müller 
as the positive half and H. P. Blavatsky as the negative half of these polarities. The 
connotations associated with each position run deep, and I wish to continue my challenge to 
the usefulness of these distinctions. The challenge revolves around two moves. The first is 
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identifying the political nature of the accepted oppositions. The second queries whether other 
distinctions could not also be proposed. Let me deal with the second first. Through 
Blavatsky’s writings we note a number of distinctions she drew, including, 
Orientalists/Orientals, honest scholars/dishonest scholars, academic/esotericist (occultist), 
and Western scholars/Asian scholars. To this, I propose, we add Western scholars/Western 
scholars due to the fact that European scholars were at odds with themselves on many issues. 
Max Müller could himself also distinguish between “native scholars and native scholars” 
(1901, 167). These are all viable binary distinctions beyond those which are normally 
invoked during the professionalising of a field.  
To the first point: the political and exclusionary nature of the initial distinctions. Clearly, by 
professional we invoke connotations of true, reasoned, deep, methodological, and so on. Let 
us take Max Müller as an example. His theories were not uniformly accepted during his 
lifetime and were, in fact, heavily criticised by many of his contemporaries. Sharpe assessed 
him as becoming an anachronism with a waning star before he died (1986, 46). Today, if he 
were still being studied, we would reject him for privileging etymological speculations over 
the semantic value of terms. The point being, which part of being “professional” insulated 
him from irrelevancy, fanciful methodological speculations, dubious thoughts, and simple 
error? I am, obviously, not arguing that certain distinctions were not made in the late 
nineteenth century and should therefore not be taken cognisance of. I am suggesting that in 
our assessment of the field we would be better off dropping some of them. They serve no 
interesting interpretive purpose and create artificial boundaries that are better transgressed or 
erased. Consider, H. P. Blavatsky can often make statements like, “The esoteric teachings are 
xyz” or the “occult tradition teaches xyz.” What, I wonder, is lost if she had used the word 
“my” instead of “esoteric” or “occult”? XYZ statements would remain the same. In a similar 
manner we might imagine Max Müller making statements such as, “the academic study of 
religion” or “the study of language shows xyz.” A further point should be made here. Much is 
made of H. P. Blavatsky representing, consolidating, and reworking a Western esoteric 
tradition. Part of this is a reading of her works against and in continuity with texts from this 
“tradition.” The point, thus far under-recognized, is that she used esoteric texts in much the 
same way as she used mainstream texts, adopting techniques of appropriation, selection, 
rejection, reformulating, and so on. I propose that the terms “academic,”“esoteric,” and 
“occult” are appeals to authority and reflect attempts to provide foundations for specific 
positions. Blavatsky and Max Müller produced theories of religion that should be given an 
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unbiased hearing to the extent that it is really possible. These nineteenth-century theories 
served a purpose; that purpose is the explanation of our own behaviour to ourselves. This is 
the purpose of all theories of religion and there is no real reason for any one theory to carry 
the day to the exclusion of others. This was not the case in the nineteenth century and is not 
the case now. 
H. P. Blavatsky’s entry point facilitated artificial binary distinctions of exoteric/esoteric and 
scholar (orientalist)/esotericist(occultist) that underwrote and orientated much of her work, 
including her engagement with Max Müller. Where Max Müller did not value one side of the 
polarity over the other he found the entire distinction dubious. But I have argued there is a 
rhetorical and functional identity in claims of authority grounded in being an “academic” or 
an “esotericist.” Both claims are attempts to provide a foundation for theory, and all theory 
uncovers what is not obvious. With this in mind, I turn to a review of Max Müller in service 
of H. P. Blavatsky’s interpretation of religion. 
Interpretation/Engagement: 
What I have in mind to review here is H. P. Blavatsky’s acceptance, rejection, disputation, re-
working, and accommodation of Max Müller’s ideas in service of her own interpretive 
enterprise. We recall that she had identified various patterns throughout the traditions of the 
world and was developing a vocabulary with which to describe these functional and structural 
equivalencies. These patterns are hidden in religious texts, they are esoteric, and to explain 
why they were not identified by scholars such as Max Müller she suggests various 
shortcomings in their interpretive enterprises.  
While H. P. Blavatsky approves of the endeavours of scholars in the field, specifically in 
relation to their work in new translations of texts and their undermining of Christian 
uniqueness and dogmatism, she also raises some criticisms. Speaking of Max Müller’s “sins 
of omission and commission,” she accuses him of a “Mosaic” bias, of dwarfing Hindu 
Chronology, and of not accepting Hindu knowledge of astronomy except via Greece 
(Blavatsky 1962, 140-1). Blavatsky is result-orientated—not method-oriented—and for this 
reason will have issues with methodological approaches which conclude in positions 
contradictory to hers. For example, unhappy with Max Müller’s rejection of any connection 
that “the Mother of Mercury (Budha, Thot-Hermes, etc), was Maia, the mother of Buddha 
(Guatama), also Mâyâ, and the mother of Jesus, likewise Maya (illusion, for Mary is Mare, 
186 
 
the Sea, the great illusion symbolically)” she comments dismissively on “Bopp” and his 
“code of phonetic laws” (Müller 1873, 283-344; Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, xxxi-xxxii). 
She makes similar points in relation to Max Müller’s “science of religion.” As he had 
presented a body of statements different to hers, she assured her readers that “Orientalists” 
lack sufficient data to present final positions, but that this will not stop them from doing so. A 
“scientific treatment” will not guarantee historical truthfulness, and she notes that Max 
Müller “makes history and fact subservient to his own conclusions, which may be very 
‘scientific’ in the sight of Oriental scholars, but yet very wide of the mark of actual truth” 
(Blavatsky 1988b, vol. I, xxix-xxx). Ironically, H. P. Blavatsky is right about Max Müller, 
but she is oblivious to the notion that she is guilty of the same epistemic sin. Blavatsky, then, 
also claims the “facts” in support of her conclusions. We might smile now, but this strategy 
was no different from her opponents. In his exasperation with the Theosophist A. P. Sinnett, 
Max Müller noted that he claimed no special “authority” to ground his statements and he 
wrote, “I simply speak with facts and arguments. Facts require no authority nor laws of logic, 
whether inductive or deductive” (Müller 1901, 167). It is not my argument that Blavatsky had 
some insight that mainstream scholars lacked. I am arguing that they all had the same sins 
and virtues. 
The disconnect between the conclusions of H. P. Blavatsky and Max Müller, and other 
academics, bolstered her claims of an “esoteric” wisdom in the religious traditions of the 
world. Academics lacked the “keys” to the universal symbology that prevented them from 
correctly interpreting religious texts. They read the dead letter as opposed the hidden spirit of 
a text (Blavatsky 1962, 140-1; Blavatsky 1982, 104; Blavatsky 1988a, vol. I, 413; Blavatsky  
1993, 338). The “hidden spirit” references a collection of true propositional statements about 
the world, humanity, and history. She deepens her criticism of Max Müller by suggesting he 
knows more of Sanskrit grammar than Sanskrit thought, claiming that to understand religious 
texts of the past one must be “intuitionally vivified by the religious spirit of old” (Blavatsky 
1988a, vol. I, 582). Bosch reminds us that Max Müller also advocated becoming “ancient” 
oneself in order to enter the world of the past (Bosch 2002, 381). These are rhetorical 
flourishes on the part of both parties. We cannot become “ancient” and we do not approach 






By accommodation I refer to the way in which H. P. Blavatsky embraced some of Max 
Müller’s concepts into her own system. An interesting example of this is her weaving of his 
theory of speech development into her theory of root-races.88 
For our purposes, Max Müller emphasises two points which Blavatsky has drawn into her 
work. The first is the developmental stages of language and the second is the linking of 
language to thought. Max Müller, in his The Science of Language, presents a morphological 
classification of language which has three stages, the Radical (Monosyllabic or Isolating), the 
Terminational Stage (Agglutinative), and the Inflectional (Amalgamating or Organic) Stage 
(1913, vol. I, 391-2). These stages transition due to, among other factors, the phonetic decay 
of the roots. Roots were the basic elements (words) which could not be reduced in any way to 
a more primary form (Bosch 2002, 221). This notion of phonetic decay in part explains 
Müller’s theory of mythology as a “disease of language.”An example of a language of the 
first stage was Chinese, of the second stage, various Turanian languages, and of the third 
stage Semitic and Aryan languages (Bosch 2002. 226).89 The gradual forgetting of the 
original meanings of the roots led to the transition, according to set laws of languages through 
the three stages, and as Bosch remarks, “These developments would lead to the rise of 
mythology in which ‘language was forgetting itself’” (2002, 227). The second point is Max 
Müller’s argument that language separated humanity from the “brutes” (animal world).90 
Animals had no recognizable language, and the reason for this is linked to the nature of the 
mind. Animals lacked the capacity for reasoning and discursive thought and could not evolve 
what was not latent in their constitution. Bosch notes that Max Müller at one time conceived 
of language as a “divine gift” (2002, 192). We have noted earlier that A. R. Wallace too felt 
that the human mind separated humanity from the animal world – a challenge to Darwinism, 
a theory both Max Müller and H. P. Blavatsky also resisted (Müller 1913, vol. II, 50-86; 
Bosch 2002, 232). 
What use did H. P. Blavatsky make of this? In The Secret Doctrine, her mature vocabulary is 
developed and she outlines the history of humanity in terms of root-races. In two places she 
                                                          
88Hutton & Joseph “Back to Blavatsky: the Impact of Theosophy on modern linguistics” (1998) and Joseph From 
Whitney to Chomsky: Essays in the History of American Linguistics (2002, 71-105) draw attention to this topic 
in these duplicating articles, though for different reasons than myself. 
89“Turanian” was a multi-faceted and problematic concept which has been discussed by Masuzawa in The 
Invention of World Religions (2005, 207-56). 
90For a discussion see Lourens P. van den Bosch “Language as the barrier between brute and man” (2000). 
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discusses language and speech development in relation to the root-races (Blavatsky 1988b, 
vol. II, 198-200; 661-3). The First root-race had no language or speech, as it had no mind “on 
our plane,” and the Second root-race had a “sound-language” composed of “chant-like 
sounds of vowels.” The early Third root-race developed the beginnings of speech which 
resembled the sounds of nature. It is, however, during the later Third root-race that actual 
speech develops, as it is during this period that “mind” is awakened in humanity. It is at this 
point that Blavatsky accommodates some of Max Müller’s ideas. According to her, it is the 
later humanity of the Third root-race which develops “Monosyllabic speech” (Radical 
languages). The Fourth root-races (Atlantean) developed the “Agglutinative languages” 
(determinative element), and it was during the Fifth root-race (Aryan) that “Inflectional 
speech” (formative element) evolved. We recall that in Blavatsky’s outline of the evolution of 
humanity it is during the mid to late Third root-race that the manasaputras descended and 
awakened the unconscious humanity. Blavatsky specifically links language and speech to the 
mind and mental activities. She links language to both reason and thought, points which 
mirror Max Müller’s own concerns. But, of course, Blavatsky has a very specific 
understanding of the human individual, language, and humanity as a whole. She can note, for 
example, that early humanity could communicate via “thought-transference.” Holistically, the 
differences between Max Müller’s understanding of humanity, languages, and other issues 
and Blavatsky’s are undeniable. What is of interest here is Blavatsky’s absorption of 
contemporary linguistic theories into her own overarching scheme. 
Reworking: 
Max Müller proposed an origin of religion revolving around humanity’s sense of the Infinite 
behind the finite world. Bosch quotes Max Müller’s definition of religion from his 
Introduction to the Science of Religion (1873) as “a mental faculty or a disposition, which 
independent of, nay, in spite of sense and reason, enables man to apprehend the Infinite under 
different names and under different disguises” (Bosch 2002, 304). Later, sensing the 
limitations and problems of this specific definition, he proposed a definition which 
emphasised the moral dimension of religion: “Religion consists in the perception of the 
Infinite under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral character of man” 
(Bosch 2002, 311). This is in his Natural Religion, published in 1888, the same year as The 
Secret Doctrine. His initial definition entailed a “mental faculty,” which he viewed as 
“faculty for faith” and was innate and natural to humanity, absent in animals, and allowed for 
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the apprehension of the Infinite. It is this initial definition which caught H. P. Blavatsky’s 
attention. 
H. P. Blavatsky approvingly referenced Max Müller’s Introduction to the Science of Religion 
(1873) regarding humanity’s “faculty for apprehending the infinite” (Müller 1873, 18; 
Blavatsky n.d., 178-9; Blavatsky 1982, 346). We need to examine this appropriation carefully 
to see the reworking at play. Max Müller distinguished between “sensuous or intuitional 
knowledge,”“rational or conceptual knowledge,” and a third faculty of faith. What for Max 
Müller was a “faculty of faith” becomes for H. P. Blavatsky a “faculty of Intuition,” which 
has no physiological or material basis. To draw out what H. P. Blavatsky is trying to say we 
can review G. de Purucker’s Theosophical definition of religion. In part, he notes that 
religion is “an operation of the human spiritual mind...comprising in addition a yearning and 
striving towards self-conscious union with the Divine ALL” (1933, 151).91 This aspect of the 
human is the Theosophical higher mind or buddhi principle, in distinction to the lower mind 
or emotional principles. This inner striving of the higher mind which is in sympathy with the 
inner invisible planes of the earth and the solar system is the root of true knowledge. This 
inner principle can know and “see” the workings of invisible nature and, for Blavatsky, this 
original knowing is the source of belief in personal immortality or “soul-survival.” 
This intuitional faculty, though latent in all humanity, is developed in the more evolutionarily 
advanced humans – mahatmas and buddhas, the founders of historical religions. What is the 
nature of these “advanced” humans? Gottfried de Purucker gives the following explanatory 
comments: they are relatively speaking “perfect men;” are in fact men and not spirits; they 
are evolutionary steps ahead of general humanity, and achieved this status through their own 
efforts and initiation; are in possession of nature’s secret; and are in communication with 
ordinary human beings (1933, 101).92 They are, in short, ordinary human beings who are one 
or more evolutionary steps ahead of general humanity. With this advanced evolutionary 
status come associated powers, mental and spiritual, sometimes referred to as the siddhis. In 
Isis Unveiled, Blavatsky conjures an image of the “first mystic” to find a way to 
communicate with beings on the inner planes. In her vision this “first self-made adept 
initiated but a select few, and kept silence with the multitudes” (1988a, vol. II, 317). In The 
                                                          
91While not my focus here, de Purucker broadens his definition of religion with “Behind all the various religions 
and philosophies of ancient times there is a Secret or Esoteric Wisdom given out by the greatest Men who 
have ever lived, the Founders and Builders of the various world-religions and world-philosophies; and this 
sublime System in fundamentals has been the same everywhere over the face of the globe” (1933, 152). 
92With apologies for perpetuating the gender discrimination, which is reflected in G. de Purucker’s text. 
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Secret Doctrine, she rejects the idea that her theory is based on “revelation” or is 
“supernatural” in kind. Instead, this Theosophical “language and system of science” was 
“imparted” by a more advanced “mankind” and transmitted to a lesser evolved nascent 
humanity (Blavatsky n.d., 103; 1988a, vol. I, 573; 1988b, vol. I, 309). 
These speculations revolve around Blavatsky’s anthropology. One can argue that her theory 
of religion is a species of natural religion. This is premised on her history of humanity based 
on cycles, the nature of the human individual, and the justificatory resources of the mid to 
late nineteenth century as they pertained to the séance and spiritualistic phenomena. If we 
review Peter Byrne’s categories of natural religion/revealed religion, natural 
religion/supernatural religion, and the idea of an innate natural religiousness, we can see 
Blavatsky falling on the natural side of these oppositions (Byrne 1991, 1-10). Blavatsky’s 
attempt at a synthesis of science, religion, and philosophy by collapsing them into a set of 
propositional statements about the world and humanity further challenges these divisions. 
Early humanity had an innate though unconscious knowledge of the inner planes and beings. 
This instinctive and intuitional knowledge became lost as the human race cycled into 
materiality, initiating the mystery schools and teachings. The teachers (mahatmas, masters, 
adepts, etc.) are, however, human beings, though older and more evolutionarily advanced 
than general humanity. What impedes knowledge of the “truth” are evolutionary parameters 
and obstacles, and simple lack of access to those truths. While it may seem challenging to 
read Blavatsky’s work as a theory of natural religion, we must note that Max Müller’s own 
conceptions are presented in the category of natural religion on much the same rationale 
(Bosch 2002, 310). 
We can recall at this point that one of the scientific explanations for the séance and 
spiritualistic phenomena, including telepathy, clairvoyance, and others was that individuals 
gifted with them were more evolved in certain psychological areas than other human beings. 
While mahatmas, siddhas, adepts, sages, and so on, have histories in Asian and Western 
Esoteric traditions, they also had a place within mainstream Western scientific speculations 
of the late nineteenth century.93 
 
                                                          
93See Peter French’s “The Mercurian Master” (2001) and Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke’s “The Coming of the 
Masters” (2010) on a Western esoteric tradition inspiration for the Theosophical mahatmas and a study on the 
evolution of the mahatma ideal in Theosophy. Both, however, fail to emphasis the justificatory and creative 




On some issues H. P. Blavatsky was in fundamental disagreement with Max Müller’s 
perspectives; an example of this was his evaluation of the Brāhmanas. The lesson to be learnt 
here is the determining influence one’s theoretical position can have. In Isis Unveiled, H. P. 
Blavatsky lists some of the religious texts in which the “secret doctrine” can be found hidden 
in allegorical form. Among these were the Brāhmana texts, specifically the “Aitareya 
Brāhmanam” translated by Martin Haug in 1863. She quotes Max Müller’s assessment of the 
Brāhmanas as “simple twaddle,”“theological twaddle,”“disgust inspiring,” and full of 
“theological absurdities” and “fantastic nonsense” (Müller 1895, 113; Blavatsky 1998a, vol. 
I, 580).94 Max Müller’s negative assessment is a theme to which she returns throughout the 
span of her writings. Many early mainstream Orientalists had negative opinions of the 
Brāhmanas besides Max Müller, including Arthur A. MacDonnell, William Dwight Whitney, 
and Julius Eggeling. (Tull 1991, 27-58; Collins 2014). The Brāhmanas are commentaries on 
the Vedas which latter, for Max Müller, represented a record of humanity’s earliest 
“childhood” attempt to record the perception of the Infinite in the finite.95 The Vedas 
represented a “physical” religion based on humanity’s response to the natural world. The 
Brāhmanas, representing the “manhood” of humanity, are developed reflections on this 
original primitive response. We must smile when Strenski writes, “In Müller’s view, ancient 
Aryan myths such as the Vedas were a repository of the ancient wisdom of the Aryans” 
(2006, 80). Meaning, however, we have realised is holistically given. While Max Müller 
acknowledges the simultaneous elaboration and decay of ideas in the Brāhmanas, Blavatsky 
seeks the uniform symbolism of the wisdom tradition statements, which can never decay 
(1982, 300). For her, only exoteric statements change, decay, or are forgotten, while esoteric 
truths are kept sacred. 
Linked to this, in Blavatsky’s reading, was a positive assessment of ancient magic and 
mantra. From this flow a number of inferences. Firstly, magic is real and a science of the 
ancients. Secondly, mantras (mantrika-sakti), intrinsically linked to magic, are not just 
meaningless words and syllables; they are parts of the “language of the gods” (Blavatsky 
1988b, vol. I, 293, 464). Thirdly, Max Müller’s failure to identify H. P. Blavatsky’s 
Theosophy in these ancient texts is due to his ignorance of the “esoteric philosophy” and of 
                                                          
94Max Müller adds to this list in his A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature describing the Brāhmanas as 
“absurd,” “pedantic,” “insipid,” the “twaddle of idiots,” and the “raving of madmen” (1859, 389). 




the “keys,” which unlock the blinds placed in them. Did either of these scholars get the 
Brāhmana texts “right”? A question like this has no sense, and to exclude readings based on 
some universal standard is to ignore what is happening in the process of interpretation. 
Religious texts are interpretation causing and are endlessly interpretable. We might say that 
both consistently carried the logic of their positions to their conclusion. They, in a sense, got 
their own theories right.  
In summary, H. P. Blavatsky turned to Max Müller for support where she felt she could draw 
on it and as a foil where she could not. She appropriated him favourably in her arguments 
against any special place for Christianity and in her polemics against Darwinian evolution. 
She disagreed with him on the chronology of the ancient world, the existence of an esoteric 
dimension in religious texts, the precise value of philological speculations, the age and value 
of the Vedas, and many other issues. She adopted and reframed his classification of Turanian, 
Semite, and Aryan and critically engaged him on the meaning of nirvana. Max Müller was 
one of the dominant figures of the late nineteenth-century engagement with religion and it is, 
therefore, no surprise that H. P. Blavatsky drew on his works in her own interpretive 
endeavour. Superficial similarities between them, for example, the search for original truth, 
the notion that religions decay, and many others, dissipate when they are read holistically in 
their context. That they differed in methodological orientation is clear. They approached the 
issues from different perspectives drawing on and making use of the resources of the 
nineteenth century in individual ways, and I think a better way to conceptualise this is to say 
that they both wove different stories about religion, humanity, history, and the world.  
 
6) CONCLUSION 
H. P. Blavatsky presented a theory of religion at a time when such theories were proliferating. 
So important has the late nineteenth century come to be seen in the history of comparative 
religion that it is during this period the field has come to be regarded as professionalising. 
Participants in the field in the nineteenth century worked to exclude H. P. Blavatsky from the 
field, and subsequent histories of the field have so excluded her from their narratives. Many 
of the exclusionary techniques originally invoked and perpetuated were extra-scientific or 
scientifically dubious themselves, and have been undone by our own theory work. This 
narrative is changing and my own work is the conclusion of a movement, not an 
inauguration. The simple existence of Blavatsky’s work dispels any notion that only 
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university “professionals” can produce a theory of religion. That she is only now becoming 
legitimately regarded says more about the shortcomings of a “professional” field than it does 
about her work. 
I have worked to stress a number of themes. The first is that H. P. Blavatsky entered the field 
from a particular perspective. She embraced the reality of séance and spiritualist phenomena, 
and this had implications for her theory. The second is that theories of religion are not 
separate from the larger cultural movements within society. The nineteenth century can be 
seen as a womb, one that gave birth to diverse theories of religion. H. P. Blavatsky existed 
within this environment, and is comprehensible against its background. Finally, I have 
emphasised the use she made of the material at hand in the development of her theory work. 
Theorists define their subject, use resources, and their work has a use. The use is in 



















In an underrated article, “The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres” (1984), Richard 
Rorty issued a call for what he termed ‘intellectual histories” (49-75). Intellectual histories 
challenge existing canons and propose new canons, are disruptive and experimental, 
conversational and ironic, holistically contextual and historicist, boundary challenging, and 
revisionist. This thesis answers his call in the field of comparative religion through a study of 
H. P. Blavatsky’s comparative enterprise in the late nineteenth century. Blavatsky’s thoughts 
on religion have been subject to varied assessments, ranging from initial exclusion to a more 
recent qualified acknowledgement. Given that Theosophy had an interest in comparative 
religion from its inception, accounting for this exclusion is my research problem.  
The trajectory of the academic engagement with Blavatsky’s work began in the late 
nineteenth century and was characterised by boundary-formation and exclusion. The 
founding fathers of the field of comparative religion, such as Max Müller and Herbert 
Spencer, dismissed her speculations on religion. This initial period was followed by one of 
sustained silence and is characterised by the absence of any engagement with or recognition 
of her work. This second period drew to an end in the 1980s and 90s when a period of re-
engagement under the auspices of Western esotericism was inaugurated. This third period is 
characterised by a qualified, though under-researched, acknowledgment of Blavatsky’s 
comparative endeavour. More recently, scholars in the actual field of comparative religion, 
such as David Chidester, Gauri Viswanathan, and J. Barton Scott, have shown an increasing 
awareness of Blavatsky’s comparative religion and its attendant interpretive strategies. My 
assessment of these more recent studies is that they retain problematic aspects of the inherited 
exclusionary and normative narrative which was negotiated in the late nineteenth century. My 
own work guides this trajectory to its next logical step by presenting an argument for the 
inclusion of Blavatsky in histories of the field of comparative religion. H. P. Blavatsky is 
shown to have presented a justifiable, reasoned, strategic, and coherent enterprise in 
comparative religion. Its exclusion from the history of the field is no longer sustainable.  
In chapter one, to address my research problem, I posed the research question: What is the 
nature and characteristic of H. P. Blavatsky’s enterprise in comparative religion? To answer 
this question I worked to recover her comparative religion, and to locate her effort in its late 
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nineteenth-century context. My original contribution is in respect to this recovery and 
historicising. 
From its inception, the Theosophical Society had an explicit interest in interpreting and 
comparing religions. Thus far, there has been no study dedicated to recovering Blavatsky’s 
work in this field. This study addresses the lacuna. In working to understand Blavatsky’s 
comparative enterprise I have sought a guiding or orienting principle that underlaid her 
approach. Jonathan Z. Smith provided the first clue to this orienting principle. He pointed to 
the importance of various comparative sciences, including comparative anatomy and 
comparative philology, in the development of the field of comparative religion. Discussing 
his morphological mode of comparison, he highlighted the following characteristics of this 
style of comparison – synthetic, structural, synchronic and phenomenological – which 
seemed indicative of Blavatsky’s interpretive moves (1971, 80-5).  
It is, however, Daston and Galison’s Objectivity (2007) that provided a foundation for my 
thesis. Daston and Galison proposed three codes which formed the basis for various epistemic 
positions in the sciences. The codes they proposed are truth-to-nature, mechanical objectivity, 
and trained judgement, and it is the first code that is characteristic of Blavatsky’s comparative 
method. While trained judgement followed mechanical objectivity which followed truth-to-
nature, the new codes do not eliminate the preceding style. Instead, the new codes are added 
to the old and all codes remain, once in existence, available and operative at any time. 
Daston and Galison trace their truth-to-nature epistemic code in a number of scientific 
disciplines, including, anatomy, botany, mineralogy, and zoology. The persona of the 
scientist who engaged in this code was that of the “sage” who “selected,” “synthesised,” and 
looked for “universals” (2007, 371). This scientist worked to correct the variables, 
imperfections, and contingencies of nature, and sought universal, essential, and underlying 
types. They sought the essence or the perfect form, and to do this they approached their 
subject through reason, imagination, selection, and rejection. These “epistemic virtues” 
characterise the comparative endeavour of Blavatsky. She too sought the true form of 
religion, and I have traced the evolution of this form or type of the true religion by 
referencing diagrams in her two major works, Isis Unveiled and The Secret Doctrine.  
The diagrams in her works are graphic representations of her conceptions. Blavatsky found, 
or imposed (there are many potential metaphors), a pattern which she located in the religious 
texts of the world. She presented her Theosophical statement as the original type, of which 
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the historical religions were reflections of varying completeness. Her Theosophy, as a body 
of teachings, is then the primordial type and structure of all religions. While I have focused 
on the diagrams found throughout Blavatsky’s works, I have argued that religion, for her, was 
conceived of as a body of propositional statements about the world, history, and humanity. 
She presented these propositions in continuity with and in opposition to competing visions of 
the world in the late nineteenth century, specifically in relation to scientific and religious 
views of the world. The importance of Daston and Galison’s truth-to-nature epistemic code is 
that it links Blavatsky to a general mode and style of investigation and research that provided 
a foundation for much recognised scientific speculation. She participated, then, in a basic 
scientific mode of engaging with a subject, and this orienting, justifying, and explanatory link 
has been missing in studies of Blavatsky’s Theosophy. 
Blavatsky’s quest for a comprehensive typology of religion, uncorrupted and complete, led 
into a search for the original or first religion, an urform. Blavatsky’s mature Theosophical 
statement reveals the parameters of this original religion. While she posits an original 
religion, lost in the past of humanity, she only fully reveals its parameters towards the end of 
her life in The Secret Doctrine. I have traced the evolution of her ideas across her works by 
focusing on her vocabulary and pattern development. I have argued that the coming together 
of her coping vocabulary and her structuring insight into a harmonised, coherent, 
systematised, and reasoned whole, in The Secret Doctrine, is the conclusion of her 
comparative enterprise. What follows are applications, revisions, minor refinements, 
elaborations, and corrections.  
To understand Blavatsky’s co-option and adoption of a wide variety of terms from 
philosophy, religion, and science I have invoked a semantic holism. A holistic approach 
allows for the shifts in meaning that many of these recognizable terms underwent when 
placed in her broader system. This evolution and development in her technical vocabulary, 
her novel use of existing terms, does not reflect her ignorance of what the terms (may have) 
meant in their original context. It reflects her conscious attempt to express her own unfolding 
vision. Blavatsky measured the religions of the world against her complete grid, and her work 
is corrective, correcting, amplifying, and shaping. To aid in her recovery of Theosophy (the 
wisdom tradition, esoteric tradition, or occult tradition) in the various religions and 
philosophies of the world, she harnessed a number of additional supporting interpretive 
techniques, including functional equivalences, symbolism, allegory, keys, blinds, and many 
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more. Blavatsky used these subsidiary manoeuvres to insert, locate, assemble, and identify 
her statement on religious texts. 
H. P. Blavatsky’s Theosophy did not pre-exist her presentation. Nor is the mature Theosophy 
of her later writings already in existence in her earlier works. While the seeds of her final 
system are sown in Isis Unveiled, it is a number of years before her vocabulary and structure 
are tightly woven together into a self-sustaining, self-justifying, and coherent whole. 
Blavatsky’s interpretive endeavour has shortcomings, but they do not pertain to the usual 
charges aimed at her. I have worked to show that her works are not irrational, that an 
“idiosyncratic” assessment can be viewed as a compliment from a Rortyan perspective, and 
that her works are not beside the point – that is, they are, in fact, pragmatically interpretive. 
She presents a reasoned and coherent explanation of religion based on an assessment of the 
resources available in the nineteenth century. Certainly, she read the nineteenth century and 
its resources in a certain way, but any era is open to varying narrative readings.  
Her shortcomings revolve around competing theories of religion, which drew attention to 
certain aspects therein that she ignored or felt inessential. For example, her enterprise was 
almost exclusively text-based and ignored or under-valued, among other dimensions, 
ritualism and the institutional side of religion. Her interpretive shortcomings also relate to 
failings which characterised various fields in general, for example, anachronism. Her 
approach is, therefore, one-dimensional by our standards. We must, however, acknowledge 
two points. The first is that many of the same charges, for example, that theories are too text-
based, were raised against more recognized theorists of her day. The second is that all 
theories have shortcomings and are subject to criticism from alternate perspectives. 
The place of H. P. Blavatsky and her Theosophy has been described in a number of studies. 
These studies, drawing on her references to an esoteric tradition, locate her in a Western 
wisdom tradition. I have challenged these studies by deploying a number of recent 
methodological and theoretical perspectives which allow for a re-description of various late 
nineteenth-century knowledge fields. I began by discerning two movements. One was 
Blavatsky’s justificatory appeal to the séance phenomena and occult sciences. The other was 
the general idea that various fields of study are described as becoming scientific, disciplined, 
and professionalized during the last third of the nineteenth century. To draw these two 
observations together I examined various interpretive positions and responses to the 
spiritualist séance phenomena of the late nineteenth century.  
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To enter these debates from a new perspective one needs to challenge existing views. One 
needs to disrupt popular, inherited narratives in order to impose a new description on the 
field. To accomplish this opening gesture I have drawn on and referenced theorists who have 
challenged normative and teleological conceptions of the scientific endeavour. These 
theorists include: Richard Rorty, Michel Foucault, Alun Munslow, Thomas Gieryn, Gavin 
Flood, Roger Luckhurst, and Richard Noakes. This challenge to normal science is essential to 
my broader argument as certain scientific perspectives underlie the interpretive theories 
which are the subject of histories of comparative religion. Blavatsky’s writings reveal a dual 
orientation of attraction and repulsion to various developing nineteenth-century sciences.  
Thomas Gieryn examines the negotiations, debates, arguments, and justifications that 
characterise the boundary work of distinguishing science from pseudo-science. Foucault 
reminds us that these negotiations are not innocent, and that a politics is implicit in our claims 
to knowledge and in our very knowledge itself. Notions of knowledge fields disciplining and 
professionalising are implicit in the processes of boundary-marking. Boundaries are, 
however, continually and inherently contested, and this explains Blavatsky’s ambivalent and 
ambiguous orientation to science. The scientific enterprise was itself conflicted and 
ambiguous. While we tend to read the history of science from a teleological perspective, a 
more historicist and synchronic assessment of the late nineteenth century reveals a more 
complex story. Scholars such as Frank M. Turner, Roger Luckhurst, Richard Noakes, and 
Matthew Stanley have recovered various forms of legitimate and mainstream science which 
were not indebted to scientific naturalism. As an entry point to these conflicts and 
negotiations, I have presented three responses to the séance and spiritualist phenomena in the 
1870s. 
In chapter two, I reviewed the responses of E. B. Tylor, A. R. Wallace, and H. P. Blavatsky 
to the spiritualist phenomena. While there were many other responses to these phenomena, 
Tylor and Wallace are illuminating for my purposes because both were recognized 
professionals in their respective fields. From these three actors we learnt two things. Firstly, 
the phenomena were capable of being conceptualised in various ways by intelligent and 
reasoned actors. Secondly, one’s reading of the phenomena could have direct implications for 
theories of religion. Tylor, who adopted an evolutionary paradigm, sensed duplicity and fraud 
in the séance parlour, projected his assessment back into the history of religion and found the 
same tendencies among “savages” and “primitives.” Wallace, who found himself converted 
by the “facts” of the spiritualist phenomena, incorporated the reality of these facts into his 
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evolutionary theory. Blavatsky, who emerged, in part, from the spiritualist milieu, was 
convinced of and participated in the phenomena from the beginning. The consequences of her 
stance permeate her theory of religion. Isis Unveiled is a useful compendium of nineteenth-
century boundary negotiations over the reality of the séance and spiritualist phenomena. I 
have argued that we should not valorise one perspective over the other and instead we should 
embrace the idea that all actors were rational and warranted in their assessments. Roger 
Luckhurst’s notion that we see the scientific engagement with spiritualist phenomena as 
“emergent” is a powerful justificatory re-description of the field. Once this re-description is 
enabled, the consequences for how we read alternate theories of religion are far-reaching. 
New actors begin to surface, and this thesis has focused on one such participant. 
In addition to the consequences of a wider, more inclusive reading of the nineteenth century, 
Richard Rorty has provided the philosophical tools to review this period. Rorty’s historicist, 
pragmatic, anti-essentialist, and anti-foundationalist perspective has guided my thesis. 
Rorty’s work can be used as a tool to re-examine past debates, and to re-describe them for 
new purposes. His critique of epistemology undermines all grand truth claims of the past (and 
present). This is important as it forces a reassessment of past debates without the normative 
values of inherited histories. We can recover lost voices, perspectives, and positions which a 
“victor’s history” has obscured. Rorty’s distinction between normative and revolutionary 
thought lends support to Luckhurst’s emergent thesis. Rorty’s critique, however, does 
something else of importance. Once we relinquish the idea that we are getting closer and 
closer to the “truth” of the world as it is in itself, shorn of human description, we replace it 
with a notion of narrative. We come to realise that we are telling stories, about ourselves and 
the world, and we do so to satisfy our own varying human needs.  
I have found Alun Munslow’s notion of deconstructive history, that history is an act of 
narrative making, a suggestive tool to do two things. These are, challenging inherited 
histories and composing my own narrative. While a narrative view has become less popular 
in contemporary theorising of religion, the application of a Rortyan perspective makes its 
application inevitable. Munslow echoes Rorty’s critique of epistemology and representation 
and applies it to the field of history. A consequence of this is his call for experimental and 
conversational histories. Of the many points Munslow raises, his emphasis on the power and 
responsibility of the “historian as author” and the consequences flowing from the historian’s 
selection of the “story space” were of especial use to my theorising. On the one hand, they 
allowed me to identify the choices (selections and rejections) made by other historians. The 
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application and implication of selection, emphasis, and use for specific purposes are clear in 
existing studies of Theosophy. On the other hand, they forced me to be conscious of my own 
preferences. In my tale, I de-emphasise Blavatsky’s links to the esoteric and occult milieu of 
the nineteenth century and try to draw attention to the various mainstream thought trends that 
she drew on. I also separate Blavatsky’s Theosophy from the Theosophical streams which 
succeeded her. Usually, reference is made to the Theosophy of Annie Besant and Charles 
Leadbeater, but there are, in fact, a variety of post-Blavatsky Theosophical orientations. 
Scholars who emphasise the esoteric or occult nature of Blavatsky’s enterprise make a 
number of assumptions that I challenge. Firstly, they have not appreciated the power of 
Rorty’s critique of epistemology. Once this is admitted, all claims to truth and knowledge can 
be reassessed on an equal basis. This allows for a recovery of marginalised efforts in a wide 
variety of fields. In a sense, it makes the very notion of marginalisation less interesting. 
Secondly, they have failed to note the broad appeal of spiritualistic phenomena to nineteenth-
century society. Spiritualistic phenomena demanded a response from the common person, the 
educated elite, the aristocracy, and from prominent scientists of the day. The rhetorical power 
of the terms “esoteric” and “occult” is to distance and de-familiarise, and I have tried to 
counter this trend. Finally, they have ignored Blavatsky’s use of many mainstream ideas of 
her time. Certainly, she appropriated and reworked some of them, but this was done within 
the bounds of rational inference. Blavatsky’s works existed in the nineteenth century and 
make sense in the nineteenth century. This is an important point. It is not my argument that 
Blavatsky should be heard as a simple consequence of a metaphysical relativism. It is my 
argument that Blavatsky made warranted use of the nineteenth-century sources available, that 
her enterprise has been obscured by normative histories of the period, and that the nature of 
her works demand that she be included among the community of reasoned commentators on 
religion of the period. 
One consequence of conceding that H. P. Blavatsky produced a legitimate theory of religion 
is that a number of binaries are challenged, one of which is the value of distinguishing 
between professional and amateur theories of religion. That the academy is showing an 
increasing awareness of her comparative enterprise is the rectification of an oversight internal 
to the academic environment – no Theosophist will be surprised by this turn of events. That 
the academy wilfully blinded itself to her enterprise is further revealed when one realises that 
at least one mainstream actor, Herbert Spencer, could not be regarded as a professional 
scholar, if by that one means university employed.  
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Abroad implication of applying Rortyan pragmatism is that many entrenched distinctions are 
undermined. His focus on “use for purpose” accomplishes the change of vocabulary, the re-
description, which he aimed for. My own challenge, however, flows as much from his call for 
contextualising in historical studies. The literature around Blavatsky and her Theosophical 
enterprise still invokes distinctions between science/pseudo-science, science of 
religion/theology, religious studies/religion, rational/irrational, and insider/outsider. I have 
laboured to show that her work, when contextualised by more charitable (in a Davidsonian 
sense) descriptions of various fields in the nineteenth century, transgressed these boundaries 
and that it is more fruitful to evaluate her contribution without them. This re-description 
reveals Blavatsky to be in reasoned communication with the fullness of the late nineteenth 
century, which is reflected in her work either by absence or presence, consciously or 
unconsciously, directly or indirectly. 
Certainly, there is value in diachronic, teleological studies of the history of theorising about 
religion. They do, however, also have shortcomings. Diachronic studies struggle to recapture 
the depth of actors in any historical period and impose boundaries which guide their selection 
and rejection of specific participants. I have favoured a synchronic, contextualist perspective 
which allows for the recapturing of lost voices in the study of religion. I have proposed that 
the late nineteenth century be conceptualised as a womb or matrix from which many theories 
of religion emerged. These theories were in conversation with each other and, to some extent, 
make sense only in this conversational environment. My methodological underpinnings 
enable the recovery of theories without imposing hierarchical evaluations on these 
orientations. Perhaps, synchronic and diachronic studies are motivated by different impulses. 
Diachronic studies, as Rorty noted, skip from “peak to peak” selecting the “best” examples 
and perspectives. Synchronic studies highlight the contingency of our all our ideas and reveal 
alternate conceptions of being human in the world. I think it important to note, in the field of 
comparative religion, that all theories of religion are explanatory, and that all theories of the 
nineteenth century have been rendered suspect by our own guiding lights. 
What, then, are we doing in the academic study of religion? To broaden the question: what 
were late nineteenth-century theorists of religion doing when confronting and creating the 
religious data of the world? Are we engaged in the same activity? It is obvious that we are all 
presenting explanations and interpretations of religion. Reviewing the comparative 
endeavours of the nineteenth century it is apparent that they were implicated in the broader 
encounter with non-European cultures, the colonial project, and that they drew on 
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developments in the sciences and philosophy of the time. By implication, then, the study of 
religion revolved around negotiations of what it meant to be human, the history of humanity, 
and the nature of the world. The writings of H. P. Blavatsky certainly reveal this 
preoccupation with explaining the place of humanity in the world. This observation is another 
way in which the nineteenth-century science of religion should not be too markedly separated 
from religious presentations of the world – both classified and delineated the parameters of 
the world and humanity.  
Is this, however, the nature of the field in the twenty-first century? Are we engaged in 
negotiating the place and nature of the human being in the world? My answer would be a 
qualified, yes. Either consciously or unconsciously, by reflecting the various scientific, 
sociological, and intellectual movements, opportunities, and positions available to us we are 
endorsing and reinforcing implicit ontological commitments. There is one clear difference 
between nineteenth-century and contemporary studies of religion, which is highlighted by 
Nancy Frankenberry. Frankenberry is committed to a definition of religion which includes 
reference to “superhuman agents” (2014, 196). I do not feel, however, that this maps 
unproblematically onto the nineteenth century as the scientific enterprise too could justifiably 
reference such agents. The extent to which students of religion can bring these habits, of 
reflecting our broader justificatory environment, into conscious light will determine the 
capacity to transgress what is determined and allow for the production of novel theories of 
religion, and ourselves. Theories of religion have a use–they are part of the broader processes 
of describing ourselves to ourselves, for ourselves. David Chidester produced a definition of 
religion, the first part of which proposes that religion involves a negotiation of what it means 
to be “human in a human place.” This is also, implicitly, what the study of religion does. I do 
not embrace, here, the balance of Chidester’s definition as, flowing from my assessment of 
the boundary-marking of the nineteenth century, I do not want to distinguish the student of 
religion from the believer, or the study of religion from its object. That the study of religion is 
no longer seen as central to this descriptive process of what it means to be human reflects the 
diminished place of religion in the larger intellectual atmosphere of our time. 
Given my own assumptions and theoretical background I cannot suggest that this study 
concludes any conversation, though I have gestured towards positions I find more interesting. 
The purpose of studying religion is to explain the category and the phenomena. However, all 
theories of religion offer an explanation of what religion is. I have no doubt that the future 
will bring forth many more interpretive descriptions of religion. The purpose of histories of 
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the study of religion is to recover all interpretive efforts. Why should we do this? Rorty, 
again, provides the answers. He argues that there will never be a final explanation of any 
phenomena, including religion. The capacity for re-description is infinite, and once we admit 
that no human phenomena have an “essence” waiting only for the right descriptive 
vocabulary we will see the logic of this stance. Rorty reminds us of the contingency of our 
descriptions of human endeavours, both of the past, and more tellingly, in the present. Rorty, 
further, notes that we would not recognize the “truth,” in any metaphysical sense, even if it 
were presented. The truth would be just another story we tell ourselves for ourselves. And, if 
any tale, any uniform “capacity for religion” or “mode of production” were ever admitted as 
the final truth, I suspect it would become almost immediately uninteresting. 
The perspective I have offered signals the need for more contextualised studies of 
Blavatsky’s positions on the various sciences. For example, I have inferred that the 
conclusions of this study of Blavatsky’s enterprise in comparative religion– that she was a 
reasoned, coherent, and rational participant – can be generalised across her works. While I 
have pointed to other scholars who have intimated a similar position, further studies in a 
variety of fields are required to confirm this stance. A second issue this study raises is 
whether a synchronic study can provide convincing explanations of all religious phenomena. 
(Though, I have not made any such claim). I have offered a cogent argument for the inclusion 
of Blavatsky’s position into the centre of nineteenth-century life. But, what could a 
synchronic assessment of Theosophy in the twentieth-first century offer? This is somewhat 
more obscure to me. Current Theosophy is the inheritor of a 140-year history which 
constrains it. Blavatsky had no such commitments or constraints. Perhaps, a diachronic 
assessment of contemporary Theosophy, where its commitments to its own past are admitted, 
would be as fruitful. I have purposely confined my study to Blavatsky’s comparative religion 
in the nineteenth century, but I concede that broader studies have value too. For example, 
terms which were under negotiation in the nineteenth century, including science, religion, and 
esotericism, reflected more settled meanings as time unfolded and distinctions hardened. 
Theosophy, I suspect, lost some of its justificatory links to the wider scientific environment. 
Any broader study must, however, be based on historically-based engagements with any 
topic, such as I have presented here.  
In this thesis, I have laboured to dismantle current assessments of Blavatsky’s Theosophy 
through a wide-ranging re-description of the late nineteenth century. Disrupting a dominant 
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narrative is, however, not the work of single text. It is the result of multiple interventions, of 
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